| | [[File:Depiction of Soviet flag over the Reichstag.jpg|right|415px|thumb|[[Victory Day]] depiction of the Soviet flag raised over the [[Reichstag]].]] | | [[File:Depiction of Soviet flag over the Reichstag.jpg|right|415px|thumb|[[Victory Day]] depiction of the Soviet flag raised over the [[Reichstag]].]] |
| − | The Soviet command concentrated forces of over two million men for the offensive against the capital of the Third Reich. They faced 800,000 soldiers of the [[Wehrmacht]], [[SS]] and the [[Volkssturm]] home guard militia. | + | The Soviet command concentrated forces of over two and one half million men for the final offensive against the capital of the Third Reich. 150,000 [[Polish]] soldiers took part in the [[Soviet]]-led operation. They faced 800,000 soldiers of the [[Wehrmacht]], [[SS]] including the [[French]] contingent of the SS [[Charlemagne]] Division, and the [[Volkssturm]] home guard militia. |
| − | Hitler rejected reports about the strength and capabilities of the Soviet Army from Major General [[Reinhard Gehlen]], chief of the German Army's intelligence on the Eastern Front and summarily dismissed Gehlen in April 1945. Gehlen preferred surrender to [[the West]] as opposed to facing Soviet forces, what with all the horrendous [[war crimes]] committed by Nazi forces in [[the East]]. As a bargaining chip, he took with him extensive files about his contacts with [[Nazi]] collaborators in [[Ukraine]], the [[OUN]] and [[UPA]], as well as information on the size and strength of the Soviet army.<ref>[https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/STUDIES%20IN%20INTELLIGENCE%20NAZI%20-%20RELATED%20ARTICLES_0013.pdf American Intelligence and the Gehlen Organization, 1945-49- ], Kevin C. Ruffner. Studies in Intelligence (1997). CIA Reading Room. Released under the NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT, DATE 2001 2006. cia.gov</ref> | + | Hitler rejected reports about the strength and capabilities of the Soviet Army from Major General [[Reinhard Gehlen]], chief of the German Army's intelligence (''Abwehr'') on the Eastern Front and summarily dismissed Gehlen in April 1945. Gehlen, who had contacts with the [[UPA]], preferred surrender to [[the West]] as opposed to facing Soviet forces, what with all the horrendous [[war crimes]] committed by Nazi forces in [[the East]]. As a bargaining chip, he took with him extensive files about his contacts with [[Nazi]] collaborators in [[Ukraine]], the [[OUN]] and [[UPA]], as well as information on the size and strength of the Soviet army.<ref>[https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/STUDIES%20IN%20INTELLIGENCE%20NAZI%20-%20RELATED%20ARTICLES_0013.pdf American Intelligence and the Gehlen Organization, 1945-49- ], Kevin C. Ruffner. Studies in Intelligence (1997). CIA Reading Room. Released under the NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT, DATE 2001 2006. cia.gov</ref> |
| | After breaking through several defensive enemy lines, Soviet troops tightly encircled [[Berlin]] on April 25. Fierce street battles began, and the closer the [[Red Army]] approached the center of the city, the more ferocious the fighting became. | | After breaking through several defensive enemy lines, Soviet troops tightly encircled [[Berlin]] on April 25. Fierce street battles began, and the closer the [[Red Army]] approached the center of the city, the more ferocious the fighting became. |