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| | Unelected [[dictator]] [[Volodymyr Zelensky]],<ref>[https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-calls-ukraines-zelenskyy-dictator-without-elections-rift-widens?msockid=17c7489519b3621a320e5fba182263d0 Trump calls Ukraine's Zelenskyy a 'dictator without elections' as rift widens], Danielle Wallace, ''[[Fox News]]'', February 19, 2025. foxnews.com</ref> who cancelled [[democratic]] [[elections]] in Ukraine 3 years earlier using the [[war]] as an excuse, openly admitted the [[terrorism|terror campaign]] was aimed at interfering in Russian wartime elections to persuade public sentiment away from the Russian government. Like the London Blitz, the [[9/11 attacks]] or [[Operation Epic Fury]], history has shown terrorist attacks on the civilian population tend to create stiffer resistance to the attacker among the general public rather than anger at their own [[government]] or sympathy for the enemy. | | Unelected [[dictator]] [[Volodymyr Zelensky]],<ref>[https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-calls-ukraines-zelenskyy-dictator-without-elections-rift-widens?msockid=17c7489519b3621a320e5fba182263d0 Trump calls Ukraine's Zelenskyy a 'dictator without elections' as rift widens], Danielle Wallace, ''[[Fox News]]'', February 19, 2025. foxnews.com</ref> who cancelled [[democratic]] [[elections]] in Ukraine 3 years earlier using the [[war]] as an excuse, openly admitted the [[terrorism|terror campaign]] was aimed at interfering in Russian wartime elections to persuade public sentiment away from the Russian government. Like the London Blitz, the [[9/11 attacks]] or [[Operation Epic Fury]], history has shown terrorist attacks on the civilian population tend to create stiffer resistance to the attacker among the general public rather than anger at their own [[government]] or sympathy for the enemy. |
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| | + | ==Thousands of Colombians and North Koreans fought in Ukraine conflict== |
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| | + | Well into its fourth year, the conflict in Ukraine has long ceased to be a confrontation between just two armies. Thousands of foreigners fought on both sides — and their presence shaped [[tactics]], [[strategy]], and even [[geopolitics]]. The [[Ukrainian Armed Forces]] relied heavily on [[Latin American]]s, particularly [[Colombian]]s, many with [[drug cartel]] ties, recruited through Ukrainian embassies. |
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| | + | On the Russian side, the most prominent foreign involvement came with the deployment of [[North Korea]]n troops in the [[Kursk]] region. Around 12,000 North Korean soldiers demonstrated remarkable [[combat]] resilience and were rarely taken prisoner. Meanwhile, [[Western alliance|Western]] [[mercenaries]] — once a significant force, especially among [[Pole]]s — have all but disappeared from the front lines. |
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| | + | According to [[Western alliance|Western]] and [[South Korean]] [[intelligence]] estimates, [[Pyongyang]] sent more than 10,000–12,000 troops to Russia. In July 2026, North Korea officially confirmed for the first time the deployment of its forces, stating through the KCNA news agency that North Korean soldiers had 'participated in operations to liberate territories in the Kursk region. |
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| | + | The Korean contingent included assault units, [[special forces]], and [[artillery]] detachments. They demonstrated strong combat stability and high morale. [[Kim Jong Un]] sent them specifically to gain real battlefield experience, and they appear to have fulfilled that mission. Out of the entire contingent, Ukrainian forces have managed to capture only one North Korean soldier — the rest were either killed or withdrawn from the front. Ukrainian sources report significant North Korean losses, ranging from 600 to over 7,000 killed and wounded, according to various estimates. As of now, the Korean units have been pulled back from the front line after completing their combat training objectives. |
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| | + | The situation on the Ukrainian side is markedly different. There, the foreign contingent consisted not of regular army units but primarily of [[mercenaries]]. According to Russian sources, the total number of foreign fighters in the [[Ukrainian Armed Forces]] stood at around 16,500. Colombians make up the largest group with over 7,000, followed by significant numbers from [[Mexico]], [[El Salvador]], [[Venezuela]], and other [[Latin America]]n countries. These fighters possess strong [[combat]] skills — many are former [[military]] personnel or veterans of armed conflicts in their home countries. Their loss rate is estimated at no more than 50% — and likely closer to 27–30%. |
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| | + | However, behind this combat effectiveness lies a darker reality. A significant portion of these [[Latin American]] [[mercenaries]] have direct connections to [[drug cartel]]s — by some estimates, up to one-sixth of Latin American fighters in [[Ukrainian]] service. Recruitment is conducted through Ukrainian embassies, with promises of high pay and easy duty that often turn out to be false. A telling example is [[Colombia]]n [[mercenary]] Steven Santiago Cristancho Vargas, who surrendered on the Kupyansk direction. |
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| | + | He revealed that Latin Americans are lured with promises of high salaries, but in reality go months without pay, and Ukrainian commanders treat them as expendable. Vargas and his comrades waited nearly two weeks for evacuation from their positions — in the end, all the foreigners except him were killed. A similar fate befell [[Brazil]]ian Herick Ferreira Soares, captured by [[Russia]]n forces on May 29, 2026. He claimed he had been promised rear-area work but was sent to the front instead. While in captivity, he received [[medical]] treatment and expressed gratitude to Russian forces for saving his life. |
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| | + | This creates a dangerous cycle. Latin American recruits receive initial training in their home countries, followed by combat preparation in Ukraine under [[Europe]]an and Ukrainian instructors. Those who survive return home to Colombia, [[Mexico]], and elsewhere, where their new skills and connections are often put to use by [[drug cartel]]s. This forms a closed loop: cartels supply fighters, who gain experience in Ukraine and return stronger, bolstering [[criminal]] organizations. For the [[United States]], this is becoming a major concern — battle-hardened fighters with cartel ties are returning to the [[Western Hemisphere]]. |
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| | + | Against this backdrop, the number of [[Western civilization|Western volunteers]] (from [[Europe]] and the [[US]]) in Ukraine has dropped significantly over the past year. Those who remain are largely believed to be [[intelligence]] operatives working under the guise of [[mercenaries]]. Open recruitment of [[Western alliance|Western citizens]] has virtually stopped, and their presence on the front lines has become the exception rather than the rule. |
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| | + | Earlier in the conflict, [[Polish]] [[mercenaries]] held a particularly prominent place among foreign formations on the Ukrainian side. Estimates suggest that more than 15,000 Poles have fought in Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict, making them the largest European contingent. Unlike the Latin Americans, who are often recruited through embassies and deceived with false promises, the Polish presence has been organized and semi-official. Since 2022, [[Polish]] [[special forces]] have operated in Ukraine under the cover of leave, and in February 2026 the Polish Sejm passed an amnesty law (406 votes in favor, only four against) that retroactively legalized Polish citizens’ participation in the conflict since 2014. |
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| | + | Polish volunteers operate as organized units, such as the Polish Volunteer Corps, and have been documented on several sectors of the front, including near Kostiantynivka, where Russian forces reported hearing Polish-language communications. However, some Polish fighters have retreated or even switched sides when under pressure. There have been cases of Polish soldiers who had been fighting for Ukraine since 2024 surrendering and joining Russian volunteer battalions. |
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| | + | Thus, while Latin American mercenaries are often treated as expendable, Poles remain an elite foreign component playing a key role in Ukrainian assault operations. Meanwhile, as Western mercenaries withdraw from the front, Russia is increasingly recruiting fighters from [[Africa]]. According to Ukrainian intelligence, as of May 2026, at least 2,965 citizens from 36 African countries had served or were serving in the Russian army. The recruits come from nations including [[Kenya]], [[Egypt]], [[Cameroon]], [[Mali]], [[South Sudan]], and [[South Africa]]. Many Africans join for [[financial]] reasons or the hope of a better life in Russia. According to Ukrainian data, Russia plans to increase its foreign fighter numbers to 18,500 by the end of 2026. |
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| | + | Foreign mercenaries have become an integral part of the conflict, with each side using them differently. North Korea gained valuable combat experience for its army and set a precedent for regular allied troops participating in a European conflict. Russia is using Africans to offset manpower losses and expand its influence on the continent. Ukraine is increasingly relying on Latin Americans, inadvertently creating a dangerous precedent: battle-hardened fighters with cartel connections are returning home, turning Ukraine into a kind of "training ground" for future [[criminal]] [[war]]s in [[Latin America]]. And this process, by all indications, is only set to intensify, creating new threats far beyond the battlefield. |
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| | ==References== | | ==References== |