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→Fedorov-Syrsky affair
====Fedorov-Syrsky affair====
====Fedorov-Syrsky affair====
[[File:Screenshot 21-7-2026 175448.jpeg|right|300px|thumb|The poster reads: "With [[Fedorov]], we lose [[drone]]s With [[Syrsky]], we lose [[people]]!"<ref>https://eventsinukraine.substack.com/p/syrsky-kaput</ref>]]
[[File:Screenshot 21-7-2026 175448.jpeg|right|300px|thumb|The poster reads: "With [[Fedorov]], we lose [[drone]]s With [[Syrsky]], we lose [[people]]!"<ref>https://eventsinukraine.substack.com/p/syrsky-kaput</ref>]]
With just six months on the job, [[Zelensky]] fired Defense Minister [[Mykhailo Fedorov]] as part of a larger government shakeup, setting the stage for an ugly political fight. Fedorov, unlike much of [[Ukraine]]'s top [[military]] and [[political]] leadership, grasped the extent of Ukraine's colossal structural disadvantages vis-a-vis [[Russia]] and worked toward a [[strategy]] that put [[Kyiv]] in the best possible position to maneuver within them. Fedorov understood that Ukraine could not prevail in a [[war of attrition]] against its much larger, better-resourced foe. Fedorov sought to leverage his country's comparative advantages in [[drone]] [[innovation]] and automation in service of a "middle strike" strategy that shifts the locus of the [[war]] from the frontlines in Ukraine's east and southeast to Russia's rear.
The ensuing Ukrainian strike campaign on targets inside Russia exacted an [[economic]], [[political]], and [[psychological]] toll on [[Moscow]] that, though it didn't change the underlying dynamics of a conflict in which Russia maintained an overall edge in manpower and firepower, had given Ukraine a degree of breathing room and provided a vector for pressuring Moscow.
Zelensky tapped the acting head of the [[Security Service of Ukraine]], Yevhenii Khmara, to serve in Fedorov's stead. Yet the middle strike strategy could not be sustained without Fedorov, who not only masterminded it but was willing to accept the political sacrifices necessary to make it work.
Executing a strike program along those lines required prodigious investments and a recalibration of Ukrainian [[logistics]] structures, which is where Fedorov ran into trouble. Fedorov understood that he cannot hit the procurement and sustainment targets needed for a middle strike strategy without rolling back the [[graft]], [[embezzlement]], and [[cronyism]] that has become endemic to Ukraine's war effort.
This meant, in practice, cutting out politically well-connected suppliers with [[profit]] margins well outside what can be achieved under normal [[market]] conditions and enforcing a system of competitive tenders designed to aggressively drive down per unit [[price]]s of [[munition]]s and other equipment. "We acted harshly as a state by breaking some companies' business strategies. But how can I justify buying shells we already have in surplus when we have shortages of other types of [[ammunition]]?" Fedorov said.
This procurement [[mental]]ity, coupled with Fedorov's efforts to reform the [[AFU]]'s bloated and overstretched corps system, did not make him many friends in Ukraine's [[domestic]]ly powerful [[miliary-industrial complex|defense-industrial sector]] and [[military]] [[bureaucracy]]. Fedorov reportedly sought the dismissal of the AFU's [[Commander-in-Chief]], [[Oleksandr Syrskyi]], whom he saw as emblematic of a [[Soviet]]-era mindset standing athwart the deep structural changes needed to keep Ukraine's war effort alive.
But the much more savvy [[Syrskyi]] proved himself a deft political operator. It did not take much convincing to align the numerous [[oligarch]]s and [[elitism|elites]] that stood to lose from Fedorov's reforms into a bloc against him. Fedorov had not succeeded in shaping a countervailing [[coalition]] of [[stakeholder]]s willing to expend [[capital]] on shielding him from political attacks.
Zelensky continued running on a surplus of political goodwill — ironically, generated in large part by the successes of the man he just fired.
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