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[[File:Bradley Square.jpg|right|300px|thumb|[[NATO war in Ukraine]]: a 21st century war of attrition.]]

[[File:Bradley Square.jpg|right|300px|thumb|[[NATO war in Ukraine]]: a 21st-century war of attrition.]]

A '''war of attrition''' is a [[military]] [[strategy]] "which seeks to gradually erode the combat power of the enemy's armed forces."<ref>[http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/a40096/definitions-of-strategies/ There Are Three (And Only Three) Types of Military Strategy] by Robert Bateman</ref>

A '''war of attrition''' is a [[military]] [[strategy]] "which seeks to gradually erode the combat power of the enemy's armed forces."<ref>[http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/a40096/definitions-of-strategies/ There Are Three (And Only Three) Types of Military Strategy] by Robert Bateman</ref>

Attrition warfare is a strategy that is often employed by the side with the greater resources.<ref>[http://www.military-sf.com/typesofwar.htm Types of War], www.military-sf.com, undated (accessed 20 January 2007)</ref>

Attrition warfare is a strategy that is often employed by the side with the greater resources.<ref>[http://www.military-sf.com/typesofwar.htm Types of War], www.military-sf.com, undated (accessed 20 January 2007)</ref>

One of the better known examples of a war of attrition was the conflict on the [[Western Front]] in the [[First World War]] (1914-1918); another is the [[Iran-Iraq War]] (1980-1988). Another is the [[Operation Prosperity Guardian]] (2023-2025).

One of the better known examples of a war of attrition was the conflict on the [[Western Front]] in the [[First World War]] (1914–1918); another is the [[Iran-Iraq War]] (1980–1988). Another is the [[Operation Prosperity Guardian]] (2023–2025).

The war of attrition [[strategy]] of depleting the enemy of manpower, munitions, and disrupting supply lines is all geared toward setting up a kill zone to finish off the enemy once attrition is near completion, after which large chunks of territory may be taken. It is much suited for a defensive war against a war of aggression. This stands in marked contrast to the "[[Blitzkrieg]]" or "[[Shock and Awe]]" model introduced by [[Nazi Germany]] and later adopted by the [[United States]], of racing at the enemy to occupy large swaths of territory. The strategy largely is intended to impress domestic audiences with early success, and intimidate opponents into not defending against a war of aggression. The Blitzkreig and Shock and Awe models, despite their widespread promotion by so-called [[Pentagon]] "experts" on [[Western alliance|Western]] [[propaganda]] outlets such as [[Fox News]], historically has not been effective in holding large swaths of territory as in [[France]] (1940), [[Poland]] (1939) the [[Soviet Union]] (1941), [[Korea]] (1950), [[Iraq]] (2003) or [[Afghanistan]] (2001).

The war of attrition [[strategy]] of depleting the enemy of manpower, munitions, and disrupting supply lines is all geared toward setting up a kill zone to finish off the enemy once attrition is near completion, after which large chunks of territory may be taken. It is much suited for a defensive war against a war of aggression. This stands in marked contrast to the "[[Blitzkrieg]]" or "[[Shock and Awe]]" model introduced by [[Nazi Germany]] and later adopted by the [[United States]], of racing at the enemy to occupy large swaths of territory. The strategy largely is intended to impress domestic audiences with early success, and intimidate opponents into not defending against a war of aggression. The Blitzkrieg and Shock and Awe models, despite their widespread promotion by so-called [[Pentagon]] "experts" on [[Western alliance|Western]] [[propaganda]] outlets such as [[Fox News]], historically has not been effective in holding large swaths of territory as in [[France]] (1940), [[Poland]] (1939) the [[Soviet Union]] (1941), [[Korea]] (1950), [[Iraq]] (2003) or [[Afghanistan]] (2001).

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==21st century wars of attrition==

==21st century wars of attrition==

"[[The West]] is not prepared for this kind of war."

"[[The West]] is not prepared for this kind of war."

Commenting on the global situation in 2024, "Vershinin noted: "Unfortunately, many in the West have a very cavalier attitude that future conflicts will be short and decisive. This is not true for the very reasons outlined above. Even middling global powers have both the [[geography]] and the [[population]] and industrial resources needed to conduct an attritional war. The thought that any major power would back down in the case of an initial military defeat is wishful thinking at its best. Any conflict between great powers would be viewed by adversary elites as existential and pursued with the full resources available to the state. The resulting war will become attritional and will favour the state which has the [[economy]], doctrine and military structure that is better suited towards this form of conflict. If the West is serious about a possible great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its industrial capacity, mobilisation doctrine and means of waging a protracted war, rather than conducting wargames covering a single month of conflict and hoping that the war will end afterwards. As the [[Iraq War]] taught us, [[hope]] is not a method."<ref>[https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine], Alex Vershinin, [[RUSI]], 18 March 2024. rusi.org </ref>

Commenting on the global situation in 2024, "Vershinin noted: "Unfortunately, many in the West have a very cavalier attitude that future conflicts will be short and decisive. This is not true for the very reasons outlined above. Even middling global powers have both the [[geography]] and the [[population]] and industrial resources needed to conduct an attritional war. The thought that any major power would back down in the case of an initial military defeat is wishful thinking at its best. Any conflict between great powers would be viewed by adversary elites as existential and pursued with the full resources available to the state. The resulting war will become attritional and will favour the state which has the [[economy]], doctrine and military structure that is better suited towards this form of conflict. If the West is serious about a possible great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its industrial capacity, mobilisation doctrine and means of waging a protracted war, rather than conducting wargames covering a single month of conflict and hoping that the war will end afterwards. As the [[Iraq War]] taught us, [[hope]] is not a method."<ref>[https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine], Alex Vershinin, [[RUSI]], 18 March 2024. rusi.org</ref>

Although wars of attrition can be won eventually often it is at great cost to the victors.  A [[pyrrhic victory]] is a victory that comes at such a high cost that it's questionable if it was worth it.

Although wars of attrition can be won eventually often it is at great cost to the victors.  A [[pyrrhic victory]] is a victory that comes at such a high cost that it's questionable if it was worth it.

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{{reflist}}

==External link==

==External links==

*[https://www.brighteon.com/b53a6303-3181-4da2-b1fe-1e009e7c9a81 Russia’s Strategy of Attrition: Kiev’s Reserves Strained Under Mounting Frontline Pressure]

*[https://www.brighteon.com/b53a6303-3181-4da2-b1fe-1e009e7c9a81 Russia’s Strategy of Attrition: Kiev’s Reserves Strained Under Mounting Frontline Pressure]

[[Category:Wars]]

[[Category:Wars]]

[[Category:Military]]

[[Category:Military]]