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| | [[Image:Commuting to Work.jpg|right|thumb|Tiananmen gate of the [[Forbidden City]]. The Forbidden City used to be the palace of the emperor of China, it is now a tourist attraction.]] | | [[Image:Commuting to Work.jpg|right|thumb|Tiananmen gate of the [[Forbidden City]]. The Forbidden City used to be the palace of the emperor of China, it is now a tourist attraction.]] |
| − | The origin of Chinese civilization is shrouded in myth and conflicting tales. Documented history begins with the [[Shang dynasty]], founded about 1600 BC. [[China]] has long been the most populous country in the world. It's warring states were united into a single nation by Qin Shi Huang, the king of Qin, in 221 BC. For the next two thousand years, the country was ruled by a series of dynasties that followed the principles of [[Confucianism]]. Officials were selected by an examination system which tested their knowledge of classic works of literature. The Qing (1644-1911), the last of these dynasties, was founded by the Manchu, a nomadic people from the northeast. | + | The origin of Chinese civilization is shrouded in myth and conflicting tales. Documented history begins with the [[Shang dynasty]], founded about 1600 BC. [[China]] has long been the most populous country in the world. It's warring states were united into a single nation by Qin Shi Huang, the king of Qin, in 221 BC. For the next two thousand years, the country was ruled by a series of dynasties that followed the principles of [[Confucianism]]. Officials were selected by an examination system which tested their knowledge of classic works of literature. The Qing (1644–1911), the last of these dynasties, was founded by the Manchu, a nomadic people from the northeast. |
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| | Publications established by Christian missionaries introduced reformist ideas in the late 19th century, culminating in the Chinese Revolution of 1911. The May Fourth Movement of the 1920s was characterized by language reform, campaigns against footbinding and other abusive practices toward women, and a reverent attitude toward "science." At this time, the country was divided among various warlord factions. It was reunited in 1927 by the Nationalists under [[Chiang Kai-shek]]. In 1937, most of China was occupied by Japan. Fighting between Nationalist China and Japan continued until 1945, when Japan was defeated by the United States. | | Publications established by Christian missionaries introduced reformist ideas in the late 19th century, culminating in the Chinese Revolution of 1911. The May Fourth Movement of the 1920s was characterized by language reform, campaigns against footbinding and other abusive practices toward women, and a reverent attitude toward "science." At this time, the country was divided among various warlord factions. It was reunited in 1927 by the Nationalists under [[Chiang Kai-shek]]. In 1937, most of China was occupied by Japan. Fighting between Nationalist China and Japan continued until 1945, when Japan was defeated by the United States. |
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| − | After the war, China was ensnared in [[Cold War]] rivalries. In the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949), Soviet-backed communists led by [[Mao Zedong]] defeated the U.S.-backed Nationalists. Although impoverished by many years of war and upheaval, China entered the [[Korean War]] (1950-1953) with Soviet backing. Loses were heavy, but U.S. forces did retreat before the Chinese offensive. During the [[Great Leap Forward]] (1958-1961), the communists starved the nation's peasants to maximize rice exports. The money raised was used to build a nuclear bomb, which was tested in 1964. | + | After the war, China was ensnared in [[Cold War]] rivalries. In the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), Soviet-backed communists led by [[Mao Zedong]] defeated the U.S.-backed Nationalists. Although impoverished by many years of war and upheaval, China entered the [[Korean War]] (1950–1953) with Soviet backing. Loses were heavy, but U.S. forces did retreat before the Chinese offensive. During the [[Great Leap Forward]] (1958–1961), the communists starved the nation's peasants to maximize rice exports. The money raised was used to build a nuclear bomb, which was tested in 1964. |
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| | Market-oriented reforms have allowed the country to experience rapid economic growth since 1978. China's economy is now has the world's second largest, surpassing that of Japan in 2010. However, the Communist Party maintains a monopoly on political power. In 1989, the army killed thousands of anti-Communist demonstrators in the Tiananmen Square Massacre. | | Market-oriented reforms have allowed the country to experience rapid economic growth since 1978. China's economy is now has the world's second largest, surpassing that of Japan in 2010. However, the Communist Party maintains a monopoly on political power. In 1989, the army killed thousands of anti-Communist demonstrators in the Tiananmen Square Massacre. |
| − | [[File:Chinese people.jpg|right|300px|thumb|]] | + | [[File:Chinese people.jpg|right|300px|thumb]] |
| | ==Origins== | | ==Origins== |
| | ===Mythological=== | | ===Mythological=== |
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| | ===Great Wall=== | | ===Great Wall=== |
| − | [[File:Great Wall of China.jpg|left|240px|thumb|]] | + | [[File:Great Wall of China.jpg|left|240px|thumb]] |
| | The [[Great Wall of China]] was designed to keep enemies out and protect their country. Construction took centuries, and was begun during the Qin dynasty, 221-206 BC. In 246 BC the emperor Qin Shi Huang Di, whose original name was Ying Zheng, came to power in the state of Qin. By 221 BC, he had unified China using the Legalistic philosophy of his state to encourage colonization and to build up the military in what was previously a minor desert state. | | The [[Great Wall of China]] was designed to keep enemies out and protect their country. Construction took centuries, and was begun during the Qin dynasty, 221-206 BC. In 246 BC the emperor Qin Shi Huang Di, whose original name was Ying Zheng, came to power in the state of Qin. By 221 BC, he had unified China using the Legalistic philosophy of his state to encourage colonization and to build up the military in what was previously a minor desert state. |
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| | [[File:Map South Asia.jpg|right|400px]] | | [[File:Map South Asia.jpg|right|400px]] |
| | ===Yuan Shikai: 1911-1916=== | | ===Yuan Shikai: 1911-1916=== |
| − | By 1911 China had 400 million people and the beginnings of a railroad system. The old dynasty collapsed in 1911 as soldiers mutinied, and the emperor abdicated in early 1912. A republic was proclaimed on January 1, 1912, but power was held by army leader [[Yuan Shikai]] (1859-1916). The army officers felt loyalty to Yuan as a former commander who reorganized the army. Most owed their positions to him. The Nationalist Party won parliamentary elections in 1913, but Yuan had the parliamentary leader assassinated, crushed republican uprisings, shut down parliament, and ruled as a dictator. Yuan proclaimed himself emperor in 1915. This triggered an uprising based in the South. Few army officers appreciated the prospect of serving Yuan's playboy son, who was now heir to the throne. Faced with unanimous opposition, Yuan renounced the throne. He died suddenly of natural causes in June 1916.<ref>Hsü, (1999) ch 20</ref> | + | By 1911 China had 400 million people and the beginnings of a railroad system. The old dynasty collapsed in 1911 as soldiers mutinied, and the emperor abdicated in early 1912. A republic was proclaimed on January 1, 1912, but power was held by army leader [[Yuan Shikai]] (1859–1916). The army officers felt loyalty to Yuan as a former commander who reorganized the army. Most owed their positions to him. The Nationalist Party won parliamentary elections in 1913, but Yuan had the parliamentary leader assassinated, crushed republican uprisings, shut down parliament, and ruled as a dictator. Yuan proclaimed himself emperor in 1915. This triggered an uprising based in the South. Few army officers appreciated the prospect of serving Yuan's playboy son, who was now heir to the throne. Faced with unanimous opposition, Yuan renounced the throne. He died suddenly of natural causes in June 1916.<ref name="Hsü, 1999 ch 20">Hsü, (1999) ch 20</ref> |
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| | ===Age of warlords: 1916-1930=== | | ===Age of warlords: 1916-1930=== |
| − | After Yuan's death, the Beiyang clique at first backed Prime Minister Duan Qirui. By 1919, army leadership had devolved into three rival factions: Anhui, Zhili, and Fengtian.<ref>Hsü, (1999) ch 20</ref> Zhang Zuolin, warlord of Manchuria and head of the Fengtian clique, was backed by Japan. He gained control of Beijing in 1926. The reactionary character of the Zhang regime provoked a backlash in the more reform-minded South. Sun Yat-sen and the Nationalist Party, backed by the Soviets, established a rival government in Guangzhou in 1925. Whampoa Academy trained a new generation of army officers who would be loyal to the party, not affiliated with any of the Beiyang cliques. | + | After Yuan's death, the Beiyang clique at first backed Prime Minister Duan Qirui. By 1919, army leadership had devolved into three rival factions: Anhui, Zhili, and Fengtian.<ref name="Hsü, 1999 ch 20"/> Zhang Zuolin, warlord of Manchuria and head of the Fengtian clique, was backed by Japan. He gained control of Beijing in 1926. The reactionary character of the Zhang regime provoked a backlash in the more reform-minded South. Sun Yat-sen and the Nationalist Party, backed by the Soviets, established a rival government in Guangzhou in 1925. Whampoa Academy trained a new generation of army officers who would be loyal to the party, not affiliated with any of the Beiyang cliques. |
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| | ===Civil War with Communists 1921-49=== | | ===Civil War with Communists 1921-49=== |
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| | {{Main article|People's Republic of China}} | | {{Main article|People's Republic of China}} |
| | [[Image:PRCFounding.jpg|right|300px|thumb|[[Mao Zedong]] proclaims the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949.]] | | [[Image:PRCFounding.jpg|right|300px|thumb|[[Mao Zedong]] proclaims the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949.]] |
| − | With Soviet aid Mao Zedong (1893-1976) and the Communists drove the KMT off the mainland to [[Taiwan]] in 1949. Mao established a totalitarian Stalinist regime under the CCP, which never in its history was chosen by the people of the Chinese mainland in a [[democracy|democratic]] election to lead them. Taiwan has always remained a separate independent sovereign republic, apart from the PRC. | + | With Soviet aid Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and the Communists drove the KMT off the mainland to [[Taiwan]] in 1949. Mao established a totalitarian Stalinist regime under the CCP, which never in its history was chosen by the people of the Chinese mainland in a [[democracy|democratic]] election to lead them. Taiwan has always remained a separate independent sovereign republic, apart from the PRC. |
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| | <!--Since its establishment, the Communist Party is doing all it can to lure countries to stand and advocate for its One-China policy that it is the sole legitimate government of all China, including Hong Kong, Macau, and [[Taiwan]].-->In the early 1970s, Beijing was recognized diplomatically by most world powers. [[Beijing]] (Pekin) assumed the China seat in the [[United Nations]] in 1971 and has since become increasingly active in multilateral organizations. Japan established diplomatic relations with China in 1972, and the United States did so in 1979. As of July 2007, the number of countries that have diplomatic relations with Beijing had risen to 167, while 24 maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. | | <!--Since its establishment, the Communist Party is doing all it can to lure countries to stand and advocate for its One-China policy that it is the sole legitimate government of all China, including Hong Kong, Macau, and [[Taiwan]].-->In the early 1970s, Beijing was recognized diplomatically by most world powers. [[Beijing]] (Pekin) assumed the China seat in the [[United Nations]] in 1971 and has since become increasingly active in multilateral organizations. Japan established diplomatic relations with China in 1972, and the United States did so in 1979. As of July 2007, the number of countries that have diplomatic relations with Beijing had risen to 167, while 24 maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. |
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| | In this type of mob savagery (think of what happened to Jews in Polish villages under Nazi rule), greed, envy, and personal resentments are useful human instincts for officials to exploit. Since class categories were often so arbitrary, and the instigators of violence usually came from the outside, people were in effect set upon one another, friends upon friends, children upon parents. This was the point of the exercise. Through organized violence, the Party made everyone complicit in the mayhem it stirred up. The aim was to tear apart the fabric of traditional Chinese life, leaving the Party as the only permitted focus of loyalty and authority.<ref>https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/china-reeducation-through-horror</ref>}} | | In this type of mob savagery (think of what happened to Jews in Polish villages under Nazi rule), greed, envy, and personal resentments are useful human instincts for officials to exploit. Since class categories were often so arbitrary, and the instigators of violence usually came from the outside, people were in effect set upon one another, friends upon friends, children upon parents. This was the point of the exercise. Through organized violence, the Party made everyone complicit in the mayhem it stirred up. The aim was to tear apart the fabric of traditional Chinese life, leaving the Party as the only permitted focus of loyalty and authority.<ref>https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/china-reeducation-through-horror</ref>}} |
| − | According to historian Frank Dikötter, who chronicled Mao’s brutality: “Many of the victims were beaten to death and some shot, but in many cases they were first [[torture]]d in order to make them reveal their assets—real or imagined.” | + | According to historian Frank Dikötter, who chronicled Mao's brutality: “Many of the victims were beaten to death and some shot, but in many cases they were first [[torture]]d in order to make them reveal their assets—real or imagined.” |
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| | ====Religious intolerance==== | | ====Religious intolerance==== |
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| | In 1951, the government formally promulgated regulations stating that those who continued their activities in unofficial religious groups would face a life sentence or the [[death penalty]]. | | In 1951, the government formally promulgated regulations stating that those who continued their activities in unofficial religious groups would face a life sentence or the [[death penalty]]. |
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| − | This movement persecuted a large number of kind-hearted and law-abiding believers in [[God]]. Incomplete statistics indicate that in the 1950s, the CCP persecuted at least 3 million religious believers and underground group members, some of whom were killed. The CCP searched almost every household across the nation and interrogated its members. The executions reinforced the CCP’s message that communist ideology was the only legitimate ideology and the only legitimate faith. | + | This movement persecuted a large number of kind-hearted and law-abiding believers in [[God]]. Incomplete statistics indicate that in the 1950s, the CCP persecuted at least 3 million religious believers and underground group members, some of whom were killed. The CCP searched almost every household across the nation and interrogated its members. The executions reinforced the CCP's message that communist ideology was the only legitimate ideology and the only legitimate faith. |
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| − | The concept of “patriotic believers” soon emerged, and the state constitution protected only patriotic believers. The reality was that, whatever [[religion]] you believed in, there were only these criteria: You had to follow the CCP’s instructions, and you had to acknowledge that the CCP was above all religions. If you were a Christian, the CCP was the God of the Christian God. If you were a Buddhist, the CCP was the Master Buddha of the Master Buddha. Among Muslims, the CCP was the Allah of the [[Allah]]. When it came to the Living Buddha in Tibetan Buddhism, the CCP would intervene, and itself choose who the Living Buddha would be. | + | The concept of “patriotic believers” soon emerged, and the state constitution protected only patriotic believers. The reality was that, whatever [[religion]] you believed in, there were only these criteria: You had to follow the CCP's instructions, and you had to acknowledge that the CCP was above all religions. If you were a Christian, the CCP was the God of the Christian God. If you were a Buddhist, the CCP was the Master Buddha of the Master Buddha. Among Muslims, the CCP was the Allah of the [[Allah]]. When it came to the Living Buddha in Tibetan Buddhism, the CCP would intervene, and itself choose who the Living Buddha would be. |
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| − | The CCP left you no choice but to say and do what the CCP demanded you to say and do. All believers were forced to carry out the CCP’s objectives while upholding their respective faiths in name only. Failing to do so would make you the target of the CCP’s persecution and dictatorship. | + | The CCP left you no choice but to say and do what the CCP demanded you to say and do. All believers were forced to carry out the CCP's objectives while upholding their respective faiths in name only. Failing to do so would make you the target of the CCP's persecution and dictatorship. |
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| | According to a Feb. 22, 2002, report by Chinese online magazine ''Ren yu Renquan'' (''Humanity and Human Rights''), 20,000 Christians conducted a survey among 560,000 Christians in house churches in 207 cities in 22 provinces in China. The survey found that, among house church attendees, 130,000 were under government surveillance. | | According to a Feb. 22, 2002, report by Chinese online magazine ''Ren yu Renquan'' (''Humanity and Human Rights''), 20,000 Christians conducted a survey among 560,000 Christians in house churches in 207 cities in 22 provinces in China. The survey found that, among house church attendees, 130,000 were under government surveillance. |
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| | :{{see also|Great Leap Forward|Green Leap Forward}} | | :{{see also|Great Leap Forward|Green Leap Forward}} |
| − | According to the [[far left]] online encyclopedia [[Wikipedia]], "The name Forward carries a special meaning in socialist political terminology. It has been frequently used as a name for socialist, [[communist]] and other leftwing newspapers and publications."<ref>http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread836229/pg1</ref><ref>"There have been at least two radical-left publications named “Vorwaerts” (the German word for “Forward”). One was the daily newspaper of the Social Democratic Party of Germany whose writers included [[Friedrich Engels]] and [[Leon Trotsky]]. It still publishes as the organ of Germany’s SDP, though that party has changed considerably since World War II. Another was the 1844 biweekly reader of the Communist League. [[Karl Marx]], Engels and Mikhail Bakunin are among the names associated with that publication....[[Vladimir Lenin]] founded the publication “Vpered” (the Russian word for “forward”) in 1905." President Barack Obama adopted the motto for his [[2012 presidential election]] campaign.<br>https://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside-politics/2012/apr/30/new-obama-slogan-has-long-ties-marxism-socialism/</ref> Mao decided to use the Forward slogan in his great experiment to modernize [[New China]] under the precepts of [[Democratic Socialism]]. Mao chose to model New China's socialist economy after that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet model called for capital-intensive development of heavy industry, with the capital to be generated from the agricultural sector of the economy. The state would purchase grain from the farmers at low prices and sell it, both at home and on the export market, at high prices. In practice, agricultural production did not increase fast enough to generate the amount of capital required to build up China's industry according to plan. Mao Zedong (1893-1976) decided that the answer was to reorganize Chinese agriculture by pushing through a program of cooperativization (or collectivization) that would bring China's small farmers, their small plots of land, and their limited draught animals, tools, and machinery together into larger and, presumably, more efficient cooperatives.<ref>http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/cup/mao_zedong_agricultural_cooperation.pdf</ref> The Great Leap Forward was a program to nationalize industry and agriculture. | + | According to the [[far left]] online encyclopedia [[Wikipedia]], "The name Forward carries a special meaning in socialist political terminology. It has been frequently used as a name for socialist, [[communist]] and other leftwing newspapers and publications."<ref>http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread836229/pg1</ref><ref>"There have been at least two radical-left publications named “Vorwaerts” (the German word for “Forward”). One was the daily newspaper of the Social Democratic Party of Germany whose writers included [[Friedrich Engels]] and [[Leon Trotsky]]. It still publishes as the organ of Germany’s SDP, though that party has changed considerably since World War II. Another was the 1844 biweekly reader of the Communist League. [[Karl Marx]], Engels and Mikhail Bakunin are among the names associated with that publication....[[Vladimir Lenin]] founded the publication “Vpered” (the Russian word for “forward”) in 1905." President Barack Obama adopted the motto for his [[2012 presidential election]] campaign.<br>https://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside-politics/2012/apr/30/new-obama-slogan-has-long-ties-marxism-socialism/</ref> Mao decided to use the Forward slogan in his great experiment to modernize [[New China]] under the precepts of [[Democratic Socialism]]. Mao chose to model New China's socialist economy after that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet model called for capital-intensive development of heavy industry, with the capital to be generated from the agricultural sector of the economy. The state would purchase grain from the farmers at low prices and sell it, both at home and on the export market, at high prices. In practice, agricultural production did not increase fast enough to generate the amount of capital required to build up China's industry according to plan. Mao Zedong (1893–1976) decided that the answer was to reorganize Chinese agriculture by pushing through a program of cooperativization (or collectivization) that would bring China's small farmers, their small plots of land, and their limited draught animals, tools, and machinery together into larger and, presumably, more efficient cooperatives.<ref>http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/cup/mao_zedong_agricultural_cooperation.pdf</ref> The Great Leap Forward was a program to nationalize industry and agriculture. |
| | [[Image:FrankCoegroup.jpg|thumb|left|300px | | [[Image:FrankCoegroup.jpg|thumb|left|300px |
| | |CCP Chairman Mao Zedong (third left) with [[Israel Epstein]] (first left), [[Anna Louise Strong]] (center), [[Frank Coe]] (second right), and [[Solomon Adler]] (first right). ]] | | |CCP Chairman Mao Zedong (third left) with [[Israel Epstein]] (first left), [[Anna Louise Strong]] (center), [[Frank Coe]] (second right), and [[Solomon Adler]] (first right). ]] |
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| | [[File:Li660912-1-b.jpg|right|300px|thumb|Self-criticism and public shaming is the core of Progressive rectification. The signs read, "Right-wing extremist."]] | | [[File:Li660912-1-b.jpg|right|300px|thumb|Self-criticism and public shaming is the core of Progressive rectification. The signs read, "Right-wing extremist."]] |
| | :{{See also|Cultural Revolution}} | | :{{See also|Cultural Revolution}} |
| − | In the early 1960s, State President Liu Shaoqi and his protégé, Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, took over direction of the party and adopted pragmatic economic policies at odds with Mao's revolutionary vision. Dissatisfied with China's new direction and his own reduced authority, Party Chairman Mao launched a massive political attack on Liu, Deng, and other pragmatists in the spring of 1966. The new movement, the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," was unprecedented in communist history. For the first time, a section of the Chinese communist leadership sought to rally popular opposition against another leadership group. China was set on a course of political and social anarchy that lasted the better part of a decade. | + | In the early 1960s, State President Liu Shaoqi and his protégé, Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, took over direction of the party and adopted pragmatic economic policies at odds with Mao's revolutionary vision. Dissatisfied with China's new direction and his own reduced authority, Party Chairman Mao launched a massive political attack on Liu, Deng, and other pragmatists in the spring of 1966. The new movement, the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," was unprecedented in communist history. For the first time, a section of the Chinese communist leadership sought to rally popular opposition against another leadership group. China was set on a course of political and social anarchy that lasted the better part of a decade. |
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| | In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, Mao and his "closest comrade in arms," National Defense Minister Lin Biao, charged Liu, Deng, and other top party leaders with dragging China back toward capitalism. Radical youth organizations, called Red Guards, attacked party and state organizations at all levels, seeking out leaders who would not bend to the radical wind. | | In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, Mao and his "closest comrade in arms," National Defense Minister Lin Biao, charged Liu, Deng, and other top party leaders with dragging China back toward capitalism. Radical youth organizations, called Red Guards, attacked party and state organizations at all levels, seeking out leaders who would not bend to the radical wind. |
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| | By 1999, the CCP estimated that the group had seventy million adherents; that year, more than ten thousand of them staged a silent protest in Tiananmen Square. An arrest warrant was issued for Li Hongzhi, the group founder, who had by then immigrated to Queens, New York. The Chinese National Congress subsequently passed, and began [[violent]]ly enforcing, an "anti-cult law".<ref>http://web.archive.org/web/20101127131821/https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/16/world/china-expels-53-foreign-falun-gong-followers.html</ref> | | By 1999, the CCP estimated that the group had seventy million adherents; that year, more than ten thousand of them staged a silent protest in Tiananmen Square. An arrest warrant was issued for Li Hongzhi, the group founder, who had by then immigrated to Queens, New York. The Chinese National Congress subsequently passed, and began [[violent]]ly enforcing, an "anti-cult law".<ref>http://web.archive.org/web/20101127131821/https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/16/world/china-expels-53-foreign-falun-gong-followers.html</ref> |
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| − | The [[610 Office]] was the main organization created to eliminate Falun Gong. It is nominally subordinate to the Political and Legal Affairs Committee (PLAC). The Political and Legal Affairs Committee purview was expanded after the 610 Office was incorporated into it. The 610 Office derives its name from the date of its founding, June 10th, 1999. After that date, almost every Party branch, from the province to the county to the district level, established its own 610 Office. The source of the 610 Office’s ability to operate extralegally and with impunity is not drawn from the State. Neither the People's Congress nor the State Council has authorized its actions. Rather, approval and support for its deeds comes from the CCP. Each 610 Office takes orders from the 610 Office one level above it, going up to the Central Committee 610 Office. The local 610 Offices also take orders from the leadership team of the CCP Committee at its same organizational level.<ref>http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/506_yiyangxia_/506_yiyangxia_en.pdf</ref> It later changed its name to the Central Leading Group on Dealing with Heretical Religions or Office of Maintaining Stability. | + | The [[610 Office]] was the main organization created to eliminate Falun Gong. It is nominally subordinate to the Political and Legal Affairs Committee (PLAC). The Political and Legal Affairs Committee purview was expanded after the 610 Office was incorporated into it. The 610 Office derives its name from the date of its founding, June 10, 1999. After that date, almost every Party branch, from the province to the county to the district level, established its own 610 Office. The source of the 610 Office's ability to operate extralegally and with impunity is not drawn from the State. Neither the People's Congress nor the State Council has authorized its actions. Rather, approval and support for its deeds comes from the CCP. Each 610 Office takes orders from the 610 Office one level above it, going up to the Central Committee 610 Office. The local 610 Offices also take orders from the leadership team of the CCP Committee at its same organizational level.<ref>http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/506_yiyangxia_/506_yiyangxia_en.pdf</ref> It later changed its name to the Central Leading Group on Dealing with Heretical Religions or Office of Maintaining Stability. |
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| | ====One child policy==== | | ====One child policy==== |
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| | The Chinese military is in the process of transforming itself from a land-based power, centered on a vast ground force, to a mobile, high-tech military eventually capable of mounting limited operations beyond its coastal borders. | | The Chinese military is in the process of transforming itself from a land-based power, centered on a vast ground force, to a mobile, high-tech military eventually capable of mounting limited operations beyond its coastal borders. |
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| − | China's power-projection capability is limited but has grown. China has acquired some advanced weapons systems from abroad, including Sovremmeny destroyers, SU-27 and SU-30 aircraft, and Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia, and continued to develop domestic production capabilities, such as for the domestically-developed J-10 fighter aircraft. However, much of its air and naval forces continue to be based on 1960s-era technology. As the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review, released February 2006, noted, the U.S. shares with other countries a concern about the pace, scope, and direction of China's military modernization. We view military exchanges, visits, and other forms of engagement are useful tools in promoting transparency, provided they have substance and are fully reciprocal. Regularized exchanges and contact also have the significant benefit of building confidence, reducing the possibility of accidents, and providing the lines of communication that are essential in ensuring that episodes such as the April 2001 EP-3 aircraft incident do not escalate into major crises. During their April 2006 meeting, President Bush and President Hu agreed to increase officer exchanges and to begin a strategic nuclear dialogue between STRATCOM and the Chinese military's strategic missile command. U.S. and Chinese militaries are also considering ways in which we might cooperate on disaster assistance relief. However, it should be remembered that the Military is still under the Party's control. It is not to be equated with the European and American Armed forces. | + | China's power-projection capability is limited but has grown. China has acquired some advanced weapons systems from abroad, including Sovremmeny destroyers, SU-27 and SU-30 aircraft, and Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia, and continued to develop domestic production capabilities, such as for the domestically developed J-10 fighter aircraft. However, much of its air and naval forces continue to be based on 1960s-era technology. As the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review, released February 2006, noted, the U.S. shares with other countries a concern about the pace, scope, and direction of China's military modernization. We view military exchanges, visits, and other forms of engagement are useful tools in promoting transparency, provided they have substance and are fully reciprocal. Regularized exchanges and contact also have the significant benefit of building confidence, reducing the possibility of accidents, and providing the lines of communication that are essential in ensuring that episodes such as the April 2001 EP-3 aircraft incident do not escalate into major crises. During their April 2006 meeting, President Bush and President Hu agreed to increase officer exchanges and to begin a strategic nuclear dialogue between STRATCOM and the Chinese military's strategic missile command. U.S. and Chinese militaries are also considering ways in which we might cooperate on disaster assistance relief. However, it should be remembered that the Military is still under the Party's control. It is not to be equated with the European and American Armed forces. |
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| | ====Post-Deng China==== | | ====Post-Deng China==== |
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| | China formally joined the WTO in December 2001. As part of this far-reaching trade liberalization agreement, China agreed to lower tariffs and abolish market impediments. Chinese and foreign businessmen, for example, gained the right to import and export on their own, and to sell their products without going through a government middleman. By 2005, average tariff rates on key U.S. agricultural exports dropped from 31% to 14% and on industrial products from 25% to 9%. The agreement also opens up new opportunities for U.S. providers of services like banking, insurance, and telecommunications. China has made significant progress implementing its WTO commitments, but serious concerns remain, particularly in the realm of intellectual property rights protection. | | China formally joined the WTO in December 2001. As part of this far-reaching trade liberalization agreement, China agreed to lower tariffs and abolish market impediments. Chinese and foreign businessmen, for example, gained the right to import and export on their own, and to sell their products without going through a government middleman. By 2005, average tariff rates on key U.S. agricultural exports dropped from 31% to 14% and on industrial products from 25% to 9%. The agreement also opens up new opportunities for U.S. providers of services like banking, insurance, and telecommunications. China has made significant progress implementing its WTO commitments, but serious concerns remain, particularly in the realm of intellectual property rights protection. |
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| − | While accession does not guarantee smaller trade deficits, full implementation of all WTO commitments would further open China's markets to—and help level the playing field for—U.S. exports. China is now one of the most important markets for U.S. exports: in 2006, U.S. exports to China totaled $55.2 billion, almost triple the $19 billion when China joined the WTO in 2001 and up 32% over 2005. U.S. agricultural exports have increased dramatically, making China our fourth-largest agricultural export market (after Canada, Japan, and Mexico). Over the same period (2001-2006), U.S. imports from China have risen from $102 billion to $287.8 billion. | + | While accession does not guarantee smaller trade deficits, full implementation of all WTO commitments would further open China's markets to—and help level the playing field for—U.S. exports. China is now one of the most important markets for U.S. exports: in 2006, U.S. exports to China totaled $55.2 billion, almost triple the $19 billion when China joined the WTO in 2001 and up 32% over 2005. U.S. agricultural exports have increased dramatically, making China our fourth-largest agricultural export market (after Canada, Japan, and Mexico). Over the same period (2001–2006), U.S. imports from China have risen from $102 billion to $287.8 billion. |
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| | Export growth continues to be a major driver of China's rapid economic growth. To increase exports, China has pursued policies such as fostering the rapid development of foreign-invested factories, which assemble imported components into consumer goods for export, and liberalizing trading rights. In its eleventh Five-Year Program, adopted in 2005, China placed greater emphasis on developing a consumer demand-driven economy to sustain economic growth and address global imbalances. | | Export growth continues to be a major driver of China's rapid economic growth. To increase exports, China has pursued policies such as fostering the rapid development of foreign-invested factories, which assemble imported components into consumer goods for export, and liberalizing trading rights. In its eleventh Five-Year Program, adopted in 2005, China placed greater emphasis on developing a consumer demand-driven economy to sustain economic growth and address global imbalances. |
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| | In the months prior to the fall of the [[Berlin Wall]], pro-democracy movements worldwide flourished and socialism fell into disrepute. The CCP faced the challenge of large-scale protests in Beijing's [[Tiananmen Square]] and in more than 400 other cities between April 15, 1989, and June 4, 1989. | | In the months prior to the fall of the [[Berlin Wall]], pro-democracy movements worldwide flourished and socialism fell into disrepute. The CCP faced the challenge of large-scale protests in Beijing's [[Tiananmen Square]] and in more than 400 other cities between April 15, 1989, and June 4, 1989. |
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| − | After [[Zhao Ziyang]] became the party General Secretary, the economic and political reforms he had championed came under increasing attack. His proposal in May 1988 to accelerate price reform led to widespread popular complaints about rampant [[inflation]] and gave opponents of rapid reform the opening to call for greater centralization of economic controls and stricter prohibitions against Western influence. This precipitated a political debate, which grew more heated through the winter of 1988-89. | + | After [[Zhao Ziyang]] became the party General Secretary, the economic and political reforms he had championed came under increasing attack. His proposal in May 1988 to accelerate price reform led to widespread popular complaints about rampant [[inflation]] and gave opponents of rapid reform the opening to call for greater centralization of economic controls and stricter prohibitions against Western influence. This precipitated a political debate, which grew more heated through the winter of 1988–89. |
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| − | The death of [[Hu Yaobang]] on April 15, 1989, coupled with growing economic hardship caused by high inflation, provided the backdrop for a large-scale protest movement by students, intellectuals, government employees, [[journalist]]s, workers, [[police officer]]s, members of the armed forces, and other members of a disaffected urban population. University students and other citizens camped out in Beijing's Tiananmen Square to mourn Hu's death and to protest against those who would slow reform. Their protests, which grew despite government efforts to contain them, called for an end to official corruption and for defense of freedoms guaranteed by the Chinese constitution. At least one million residents of Beijing were taking part in the protests.<ref>https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/one-million-protesters-take-to-the-streets-in-beijing</ref>Protests also spread to many other cities, including [[Shanghai]], [[Chengdu]], and [[Guangzhou]]. | + | The death of [[Hu Yaobang]] on April 15, 1989, coupled with growing economic hardship caused by high inflation, provided the backdrop for a large-scale protest movement by students, intellectuals, government employees, [[journalist]]s, workers, [[police officer]]s, members of the armed forces, and other members of a disaffected urban population. University students and other citizens camped out in Beijing's Tiananmen Square to mourn Hu's death and to protest against those who would slow reform. Their protests, which grew despite government efforts to contain them, called for an end to official corruption and for defense of freedoms guaranteed by the Chinese constitution. At least one million residents of Beijing were taking part in the protests.<ref>https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/one-million-protesters-take-to-the-streets-in-beijing</ref> Protests also spread to many other cities, including [[Shanghai]], [[Chengdu]], and [[Guangzhou]]. |
| | [[File:Wmr1a.jpg|right|300px|thumb|Burnt remains of victims were 'hosed down the drains'<ref>https://archive.is/6nzNI</ref><ref>http://www.cnd.org/HYPLAN/yawei/june4th/</ref>]] | | [[File:Wmr1a.jpg|right|300px|thumb|Burnt remains of victims were 'hosed down the drains'<ref>https://archive.is/6nzNI</ref><ref>http://www.cnd.org/HYPLAN/yawei/june4th/</ref>]] |
| − | Disagreements about how to respond split the top Party leadership and forced out the Party General Secretary at the time, Zhao Ziyang. The decisions by Wang Zhen, Li Peng, and Paramount Leader [[Deng Xiaoping]] led them to conclude that the survival of their regime was at stake. Martial law was declared on May 20, 1989 and at least 30 divisions were mobilized. As many as 250,000 troops were eventually sent to the capital. | + | Disagreements about how to respond split the top Party leadership and forced out the Party General Secretary at the time, Zhao Ziyang. The decisions by Wang Zhen, Li Peng, and Paramount Leader [[Deng Xiaoping]] led them to conclude that the survival of their regime was at stake. Martial law was declared on May 20, 1989, and at least 30 divisions were mobilized. As many as 250,000 troops were eventually sent to the capital. |
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| − | Late on June 3, 1989 and early on the morning of June 4, [[PLA]] units were brought into Beijing using automatic weapons, advancing in tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and trucks from several directions toward Tiananmen Square. They used armed force to clear demonstrators from the streets. | + | Late on June 3, 1989, and early on the morning of June 4, [[PLA]] units were brought into Beijing using automatic weapons, advancing in tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and trucks from several directions toward Tiananmen Square. They used armed force to clear demonstrators from the streets. |
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| | At 4:30 am protesters, joined by some PLA members, were given one hour to leave the Square. Five minutes later the 27th Army's armoured personnel carriers opened fire before running the crowd over at 65 kph [40 miles per hour]. “Students linked arms but were mown down. APCs then ran over the bodies time and time again to make, quote ‘pie’ unquote. Their remains were collected by bulldozer later that morning, incinerated, and then hosed down drains. | | At 4:30 am protesters, joined by some PLA members, were given one hour to leave the Square. Five minutes later the 27th Army's armoured personnel carriers opened fire before running the crowd over at 65 kph [40 miles per hour]. “Students linked arms but were mown down. APCs then ran over the bodies time and time again to make, quote ‘pie’ unquote. Their remains were collected by bulldozer later that morning, incinerated, and then hosed down drains. |
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| | *China has become an international criminal nation by building military bases in international waters in the [[South China Sea]], in direct violation of international law as defined by the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. [[Nazi Germany]] did the same thing in [[Czechoslovakia]] and [[Poland]]. | | *China has become an international criminal nation by building military bases in international waters in the [[South China Sea]], in direct violation of international law as defined by the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. [[Nazi Germany]] did the same thing in [[Czechoslovakia]] and [[Poland]]. |
| | *China has become a military dictatorship, developing multiple missile systems whose only purpose is to attack American aircraft carriers, military bases, and cities. Those missiles will be launched long before 2050. Hitler did the same thing by building a massive air force in preparation for war with [[Britain]], in violation of international law and the agreements it had signed after [[World War I]]. | | *China has become a military dictatorship, developing multiple missile systems whose only purpose is to attack American aircraft carriers, military bases, and cities. Those missiles will be launched long before 2050. Hitler did the same thing by building a massive air force in preparation for war with [[Britain]], in violation of international law and the agreements it had signed after [[World War I]]. |
| − | *And now we have ''Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a new era''. It and Hitler’s National Socialism explain why their government model is superior to everyone else’s, why they are right about everything and everyone else is wrong, and why military force is OK at any time that anyone else is not doing what their government demands. | + | *And now we have ''Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a new era''. It and Hitler's National Socialism explain why their government model is superior to everyone else's, why they are right about everything and everyone else is wrong, and why military force is OK at any time that anyone else is not doing what their government demands. |
| | *The Chinese people hold strong nationalist, [[xenophobic]], and [[racist]] views targeting the [[Tibet]]ans, [[Uighur]]s, [[Japan]]ese, [[South Korea]]ns, [[Philippine]] people, and [[Vietnam]]ese. Hitler had similar racist and xenophobic views targeting [[Jews]], [[Russia]]ns, [[French]], and [[English]]. | | *The Chinese people hold strong nationalist, [[xenophobic]], and [[racist]] views targeting the [[Tibet]]ans, [[Uighur]]s, [[Japan]]ese, [[South Korea]]ns, [[Philippine]] people, and [[Vietnam]]ese. Hitler had similar racist and xenophobic views targeting [[Jews]], [[Russia]]ns, [[French]], and [[English]]. |
| − | *For a war to be supported by the population, every war leader must provide an ideological framework to justify [[torture]], [[rape]], [[Mass murder|mass slaughter]], and streets filled with blood, whether it is killing infidels or Marxism. China’s ''Socialism with Chinese Characteristics'' and Hitler’s National Socialism both use an ideological framework based on Marxism. | + | *For a war to be supported by the population, every war leader must provide an ideological framework to justify [[torture]], [[rape]], [[Mass murder|mass slaughter]], and streets filled with blood, whether it is killing infidels or Marxism. China's ''Socialism with Chinese Characteristics'' and Hitler's National Socialism both use an ideological framework based on Marxism. |
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| | In July 2019, the CCP released a threatening defense white paper that read, | | In July 2019, the CCP released a threatening defense white paper that read, |
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| | XUAR documents from 2019 reveal plans for a campaign of mass female sterilization in rural Uyghur regions, targeting 14 and 34 percent of all married women of childbearing age in two Uyghur counties that year. This project targeted all of southern Xinjiang, and continued in 2020 with increased funding. This campaign likely aims to sterilize rural minority women with three or more children, as well as some with two children—equivalent to at least 20 percent of all childbearing-age women. Budget figures indicate that this project had sufficient funding for performing hundreds of thousands of tubal ligation sterilization procedures in 2019 and 2020, with at least one region receiving additional central government funding. In 2018, a Uyghur prefecture openly set a goal of leading its rural populations to accept widespread sterilization surgery. | | XUAR documents from 2019 reveal plans for a campaign of mass female sterilization in rural Uyghur regions, targeting 14 and 34 percent of all married women of childbearing age in two Uyghur counties that year. This project targeted all of southern Xinjiang, and continued in 2020 with increased funding. This campaign likely aims to sterilize rural minority women with three or more children, as well as some with two children—equivalent to at least 20 percent of all childbearing-age women. Budget figures indicate that this project had sufficient funding for performing hundreds of thousands of tubal ligation sterilization procedures in 2019 and 2020, with at least one region receiving additional central government funding. In 2018, a Uyghur prefecture openly set a goal of leading its rural populations to accept widespread sterilization surgery. |
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| − | By 2019, XAUR planned to subject at least 80 percent of women of childbearing age in the rural southern four minority prefectures to intrusive birth prevention surgeries (IUDs or sterilizations), with actual shares likely being much higher. In 2018, 80 percent of all net added IUD placements in China (calculated as placements minus removals) were performed in Xinjiang, despite the fact that the region only makes up 1.8 percent of the PRC’s population. | + | By 2019, XAUR planned to subject at least 80 percent of women of childbearing age in the rural southern four minority prefectures to intrusive birth prevention surgeries (IUDs or sterilizations), with actual shares likely being much higher. In 2018, 80 percent of all net added IUD placements in China (calculated as placements minus removals) were performed in Xinjiang, despite the fact that the region only makes up 1.8 percent of the PRC's population. |
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| | Shares of women aged 18 to 49 who were either widowed or in menopause have more than doubled since the onset of the internment campaign in one particular Uyghur region. These are potential proxy indicators for unnatural deaths (possibly of interned husbands), and/or of injections given in internment that can cause temporary or permanent loss of menstrual cycles. | | Shares of women aged 18 to 49 who were either widowed or in menopause have more than doubled since the onset of the internment campaign in one particular Uyghur region. These are potential proxy indicators for unnatural deaths (possibly of interned husbands), and/or of injections given in internment that can cause temporary or permanent loss of menstrual cycles. |
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| − | Between 2015 and 2018, about 860,000 ethnic Han residents left Xinjiang, while up to 2 million new residents were added to Xinjiang’s Han majority regions. Also, population growth rates in a Uyghur region where Han constitute the majority were nearly 8 times higher than in the surrounding rural Uyghur regions (in 2018). These figures raise concerns that Beijing is doubling down on a policy of Han settler [[colonialism]]. | + | Between 2015 and 2018, about 860,000 ethnic Han residents left Xinjiang, while up to 2 million new residents were added to Xinjiang's Han majority regions. Also, population growth rates in a Uyghur region where Han constitute the majority were nearly 8 times higher than in the surrounding rural Uyghur regions (in 2018). These figures raise concerns that Beijing is doubling down on a policy of Han settler [[colonialism]]. |
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| − | These findings provide the strongest evidence yet that Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang meet one of the [[genocide]] criteria cited in the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, namely that of Section D of Article II: “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the [targeted] group” (United Nations, December 9, 1948).<ref>[https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Internment-Sterilizations-and-IUDs-UPDATED-July-21-Rev2.pdf?x79141 STERILIZATIONS,IUDS, AND MANDATORY BIRTH CONTROL: THE CCP’S CAMPAIGN TO SUPPRESS UYGHUR BIRTHRATES IN XINJIANG]'', Adrian Zenz, June 2020 Updated July 21, 2020. The Jamestown Foundation.</ref> | + | These findings provide the strongest evidence yet that Beijing's policies in Xinjiang meet one of the [[genocide]] criteria cited in the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, namely that of Section D of Article II: “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the [targeted] group” (United Nations, December 9, 1948).<ref>[https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Internment-Sterilizations-and-IUDs-UPDATED-July-21-Rev2.pdf?x79141 STERILIZATIONS,IUDS, AND MANDATORY BIRTH CONTROL: THE CCP’S CAMPAIGN TO SUPPRESS UYGHUR BIRTHRATES IN XINJIANG]'', Adrian Zenz, June 2020 Updated July 21, 2020. The Jamestown Foundation.</ref> |
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| | Xinjiang's largest concentration camp is twice the size of [[Vatican City]].<ref>https://japantoday.com/category/world/ap-looks-inside-china%27s-largest-detention-center-in-xinjiang1</ref> As of 2021, Xinjiang had over 300 concentration camps, or 206 million square feet with enough capacity to incarcerate seven times the prison population in the United States.<ref>https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/china-can-lock-million-muslims-xinjiang-once</ref> | | Xinjiang's largest concentration camp is twice the size of [[Vatican City]].<ref>https://japantoday.com/category/world/ap-looks-inside-china%27s-largest-detention-center-in-xinjiang1</ref> As of 2021, Xinjiang had over 300 concentration camps, or 206 million square feet with enough capacity to incarcerate seven times the prison population in the United States.<ref>https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/china-can-lock-million-muslims-xinjiang-once</ref> |
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| | [[File:Flag of Taiwan ROC.png|right|225px|thumb|Flag of the independent sovereign republic of Taiwan.]] | | [[File:Flag of Taiwan ROC.png|right|225px|thumb|Flag of the independent sovereign republic of Taiwan.]] |
| | :{{See also|Quad Alliance}} | | :{{See also|Quad Alliance}} |
| − | The Peoples Republic of China has threatened aggression against the sovereign republic of Taiwan since Mao's founding of the PRC in 1949. | + | The People's Republic of China has threatened aggression against the sovereign republic of Taiwan since Mao's founding of the PRC in 1949. |
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| − | In the early 21st century, contact between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait grew significantly. Taiwan relaxed restrictions on unofficial contacts with Communist China, and cross-strait interaction mushroomed. In 2001, Taiwan formally allowed the "three mini-links" (direct trade, travel, and postal links) from Quemoy and Matsu Islands to Fujian Province and permitted direct cross-strait trade in February 2002. Taiwan authorities permitted residents of Penghu Islands starting in 2007, to begin visiting mainland China via Quemoy and Matsu. Cross-strait trade grew rapidly. Communist China became Taiwan's largest trading partner, and Taiwan is the Peoples Republic of China's fifth largest. | + | In the early 21st century, contact between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait grew significantly. Taiwan relaxed restrictions on unofficial contacts with Communist China, and cross-strait interaction mushroomed. In 2001, Taiwan formally allowed the "three mini-links" (direct trade, travel, and postal links) from Quemoy and Matsu Islands to Fujian Province and permitted direct cross-strait trade in February 2002. Taiwan authorities permitted residents of Penghu Islands starting in 2007, to begin visiting mainland China via Quemoy and Matsu. Cross-strait trade grew rapidly. Communist China became Taiwan's largest trading partner, and Taiwan is the People's Republic of China's fifth largest. |
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| − | Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), told ''[[Al Jazeera]]'' in 2018<ref>https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/23/fake-news-rattles-taiwan-ahead-of-elections/</ref>, "We received propaganda warfare coming from China for years, but this is taking a very different form,. It’s coming in not from newspapers or their propaganda machine but through our [[social media]], online chat groups, [[Facebook]], the zombie accounts set up, somewhere, by the Chinese government....It’s a more serious problem because China is so close to Taiwan, language-wise. They don’t have the cultural or language barrier and can easily fabricate news and they know the mentality of Chinese thinking, so it’s easier for them to orchestrate this misinformation.” Fake news was traced to servers in the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party, and it’s [[50 Cent Army]]. Beijing has reached deep into Taiwan, sowing division and confusion through online disinformation, recruiting business figures, and funnelling cash to pro-Beijing politicians. | + | Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), told ''[[Al Jazeera]]'' in 2018,<ref>https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/23/fake-news-rattles-taiwan-ahead-of-elections/</ref> "We received propaganda warfare coming from China for years, but this is taking a very different form,. It’s coming in not from newspapers or their propaganda machine but through our [[social media]], online chat groups, [[Facebook]], the zombie accounts set up, somewhere, by the Chinese government....It’s a more serious problem because China is so close to Taiwan, language-wise. They don’t have the cultural or language barrier and can easily fabricate news and they know the mentality of Chinese thinking, so it’s easier for them to orchestrate this misinformation.” Fake news was traced to servers in the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party, and its [[50 Cent Army]]. Beijing has reached deep into Taiwan, sowing division and confusion through online disinformation, recruiting business figures, and funnelling cash to pro-Beijing politicians. |
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| | In December 2019, Taiwan passed a law to counter Chinese interference in the country's internal politics.<ref>Lee, Yimou; Hamacher, Fabian (December 31, 2019). [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-lawmaking/taiwan-passes-law-to-combat-chinese-influence-on-politics-idUSKBN1YZ0F6 Taiwan passes law to combat Chinese influence on politics]. ''Reuters''. Retrieved December 31, 2019.</ref> | | In December 2019, Taiwan passed a law to counter Chinese interference in the country's internal politics.<ref>Lee, Yimou; Hamacher, Fabian (December 31, 2019). [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-lawmaking/taiwan-passes-law-to-combat-chinese-influence-on-politics-idUSKBN1YZ0F6 Taiwan passes law to combat Chinese influence on politics]. ''Reuters''. Retrieved December 31, 2019.</ref> |
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| − | According to ''[[Forbes]]'' magazine,<ref>https://archive.is/4YC4C#selection-3285.0-3443.121</ref> to have any chance of conquering Taiwan, China might need to transport as many as two million troops across the Taiwan Strait. This would be a larger invasion force than the [[Normandy Invasion]]. The invasion force would have to land under fire at the island’s 14 potential invasion beaches or 10 major ports. | + | According to ''[[Forbes]]'' magazine,<ref>https://archive.is/4YC4C#selection-3285.0-3443.121</ref> to have any chance of conquering Taiwan, China might need to transport as many as two million troops across the Taiwan Strait. This would be a larger invasion force than the [[Normandy Invasion]]. The invasion force would have to land under fire at the island's 14 potential invasion beaches or 10 major ports. |
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| − | That is far more troops than the People’s Liberation Army Navy can haul in its 11 new amphibious ships that can only haul around 25,000 troops. To transport the bulk of the invasion force, Beijing would take into service thousands of civilian ships. To that end, the Chinese Communist Party has created a legal and bureaucratic framework for taking control of thre PRC's commercial shipping, around 2,000 large commercial vessels crewed by around 650,000 mariners. On Jan. 1, 2017, China’s National Defense Transportation Law went into effect. “Among other things, the law mandated that all of China’s basic infrastructure and related transportation platforms would henceforth be treated as military-civil fusion assets,” Ian Easton with the Project 2049 explained. “At the CCP’s discretion, they were now legally required to be designed, built and managed to support future military operations. In the event of conflict, they would be pressed into wartime service. Now they had to prepare accordingly in peacetime.” Meanwhile, naval engineers have begun modifying key vessels to make them better assault ships. Their crews actively are training for a possible assault on Taiwan. | + | That is far more troops than the People's Liberation Army Navy can haul in its 11 new amphibious ships that can only haul around 25,000 troops. To transport the bulk of the invasion force, Beijing would take into service thousands of civilian ships. To that end, the Chinese Communist Party has created a legal and bureaucratic framework for taking control of thre PRC's commercial shipping, around 2,000 large commercial vessels crewed by around 650,000 mariners. On Jan. 1, 2017, China's National Defense Transportation Law went into effect. “Among other things, the law mandated that all of China’s basic infrastructure and related transportation platforms would henceforth be treated as military-civil fusion assets,” Ian Easton with the Project 2049 explained. “At the CCP’s discretion, they were now legally required to be designed, built and managed to support future military operations. In the event of conflict, they would be pressed into wartime service. Now they had to prepare accordingly in peacetime.” Meanwhile, naval engineers have begun modifying key vessels to make them better assault ships. Their crews actively are training for a possible assault on Taiwan. |
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| | ====Relations with the United States==== | | ====Relations with the United States==== |
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| | * Fairbank, John King and Goldman, Merle. ''China: A New History.'' (2nd ed. 2006). 640 pp. [https://www.amazon.com/China-New-History-Second-Enlarged/dp/0674018281/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197346975&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] | | * Fairbank, John King and Goldman, Merle. ''China: A New History.'' (2nd ed. 2006). 640 pp. [https://www.amazon.com/China-New-History-Second-Enlarged/dp/0674018281/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197346975&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] |
| | * Gernet, Jacques, J. R. Foster, and Charles Hartman. ''A History of Chinese Civilization'' (1996), called the best one-volume survey; [https://www.amazon.com/History-Chinese-Civilization-Jacques-Gernet/dp/0521497817/ref=sr_1_11?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197220627&sr=1-11 excerpt and text search] | | * Gernet, Jacques, J. R. Foster, and Charles Hartman. ''A History of Chinese Civilization'' (1996), called the best one-volume survey; [https://www.amazon.com/History-Chinese-Civilization-Jacques-Gernet/dp/0521497817/ref=sr_1_11?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197220627&sr=1-11 excerpt and text search] |
| − | * Hsü, Immanuel Chung-yueh. ''The Rise of Modern China,'' (6th ed. 1999), highly detailed coverage of 1644-1999, in 1136pp. [https://www.amazon.com/Rise-Modern-China-Immanuel-Hsu/dp/0195125045/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197238178&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] | + | * Hsü, Immanuel Chung-yueh. ''The Rise of Modern China,'' (6th ed. 1999), highly detailed coverage of 1644–1999, in 1136pp. [https://www.amazon.com/Rise-Modern-China-Immanuel-Hsu/dp/0195125045/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197238178&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] |
| | * [[Kenneth Scott Latourette|Latourette, Kenneth Scott]]. ''The Development of China'' (1917) 273 pages; [https://books.google.com/books?id=fSIPAAAAYAAJ&dq=inauthor:latourette&num=30&as_brr=1 full text online], by a leading Christian scholar | | * [[Kenneth Scott Latourette|Latourette, Kenneth Scott]]. ''The Development of China'' (1917) 273 pages; [https://books.google.com/books?id=fSIPAAAAYAAJ&dq=inauthor:latourette&num=30&as_brr=1 full text online], by a leading Christian scholar |
| | * Michael, Franz. ''China through the Ages: History of a Civilization.'' (1986). 278pp; [http://www.questia.com/library/book/china-through-the-ages-history-of-a-civilization-by-franz-michael.jsp online edition from Questia] | | * Michael, Franz. ''China through the Ages: History of a Civilization.'' (1986). 278pp; [http://www.questia.com/library/book/china-through-the-ages-history-of-a-civilization-by-franz-michael.jsp online edition from Questia] |
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| | * Fairbank, John King and Goldman, Merle. ''China: A New History.'' 2nd ed. Harvard U. Press, (2006). 640 pp. [https://www.amazon.com/China-New-History-Second-Enlarged/dp/0674018281/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197346975&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] | | * Fairbank, John King and Goldman, Merle. ''China: A New History.'' 2nd ed. Harvard U. Press, (2006). 640 pp. [https://www.amazon.com/China-New-History-Second-Enlarged/dp/0674018281/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197346975&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] |
| | * Gernet, Jacques, J. R. Foster, and Charles Hartman. ''A History of Chinese Civilization'' (1996), called the best one-volume survey; [https://www.amazon.com/History-Chinese-Civilization-Jacques-Gernet/dp/0521497817/ref=sr_1_11?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197220627&sr=1-11 excerpt and text search] | | * Gernet, Jacques, J. R. Foster, and Charles Hartman. ''A History of Chinese Civilization'' (1996), called the best one-volume survey; [https://www.amazon.com/History-Chinese-Civilization-Jacques-Gernet/dp/0521497817/ref=sr_1_11?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197220627&sr=1-11 excerpt and text search] |
| − | * Hsü, Immanuel Chung-yueh. ''The Rise of Modern China,'' 6th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1999), highly detailed coverage of 1644-1999, in 1136pp. [https://www.amazon.com/Rise-Modern-China-Immanuel-Hsu/dp/0195125045/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197238178&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] | + | * Hsü, Immanuel Chung-yueh. ''The Rise of Modern China,'' 6th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1999), highly detailed coverage of 1644–1999, in 1136pp. [https://www.amazon.com/Rise-Modern-China-Immanuel-Hsu/dp/0195125045/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197238178&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] |
| | * Huang, Ray. ''China, a Macro History'' (1997) 335pp, an idiosyncratic approach, not for beginners; [http://www.questia.com/library/book/china-a-macro-history-by-ray-huang.jsp online edition from Questia] | | * Huang, Ray. ''China, a Macro History'' (1997) 335pp, an idiosyncratic approach, not for beginners; [http://www.questia.com/library/book/china-a-macro-history-by-ray-huang.jsp online edition from Questia] |
| | * Latourette, Kenneth Scott. ''The Development of China'' (1917) 273 pages; [https://books.google.com/books?id=fSIPAAAAYAAJ&dq=inauthor:latourette&num=30&as_brr=1 full text online] | | * Latourette, Kenneth Scott. ''The Development of China'' (1917) 273 pages; [https://books.google.com/books?id=fSIPAAAAYAAJ&dq=inauthor:latourette&num=30&as_brr=1 full text online] |
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| | * Lach, Donald F. "China in Western Thought and Culture," in Philip P. Wiener, ed. ''The Dictionary of the History of Ideas'' (1974) [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhiana.cgi?id=dv1-48 online edition] | | * Lach, Donald F. "China in Western Thought and Culture," in Philip P. Wiener, ed. ''The Dictionary of the History of Ideas'' (1974) [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhiana.cgi?id=dv1-48 online edition] |
| | * Ng, On-Cho and Wang, Q. Edward. ''Mirroring the Past: The Writing and Use of History in Imperial China.'' U. of Hawai`i Press, 2005. 306 pp. | | * Ng, On-Cho and Wang, Q. Edward. ''Mirroring the Past: The Writing and Use of History in Imperial China.'' U. of Hawai`i Press, 2005. 306 pp. |
| − | * Van Kley, Edwin J. "Europe's 'Discovery' of China and the Writing of World History," ''The American Historical Review,'' 76 (1971), 358-85. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8762(197104)76%3A2%3C358%3AE%22OCAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W in JSTOR] | + | * Van Kley, Edwin J. "Europe's 'Discovery' of China and the Writing of World History," ''The American Historical Review,'' 76 (1971), 358–85. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8762(197104)76%3A2%3C358%3AE%22OCAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W in JSTOR] |
| | * Wang, Ben. ''Illuminations from the Past: Trauma, Memory, and History in Modern China.'' Stanford U. Press, 2004. 311 pp. | | * Wang, Ben. ''Illuminations from the Past: Trauma, Memory, and History in Modern China.'' Stanford U. Press, 2004. 311 pp. |
| | * Wang, David Der-wei. ''The Monster That Is History: History, Violence, and Fictional Writing in Twentieth-Century China.'' U. of California Press, 2004. 402 pp. [https://www.amazon.com/Monster-That-History-Twentieth-Century-Lilienthal/dp/0520238737/ref=sr_1_20?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197221105&sr=1-20 excerpt and text search] | | * Wang, David Der-wei. ''The Monster That Is History: History, Violence, and Fictional Writing in Twentieth-Century China.'' U. of California Press, 2004. 402 pp. [https://www.amazon.com/Monster-That-History-Twentieth-Century-Lilienthal/dp/0520238737/ref=sr_1_20?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197221105&sr=1-20 excerpt and text search] |