Changes

==Traditional military history==

==Traditional military history==

[[Image:Stalingrad_Cutting_barbed_wire.jpg|thumb|right|300px|A [[Russia]]n soldier cutting barbed wire at the [[Battle of Stalingrad]]]]

[[Image:Stalingrad Cutting barbed wire.jpg|thumb|right|300px|A [[Russia]]n soldier cutting barbed wire at the [[Battle of Stalingrad]]]]

''See also:'' [[List of military strategies and concepts]]

''See also:'' [[List of military strategies and concepts]]

Since the 1970s a dramatic shift has taken place away from traditional military history to the "New Military History."  

Since the 1970s a dramatic shift has taken place away from traditional military history to the "New Military History."  

In the United States, the so-called "new military history" evolved rapidly during the 1980s. It broadened the focus and current methodology, allowing historians to formulate new problems, find new materials, and use new methods. The interest of American academic circles in this New Military History has resulted in new lines of historical research. Among the most fruitful are the historical study of military technology, the interesting debate about the "Military Revolution" in Early Modern history, and the analysis of armed conflict and the nature of combat with particular attention to strategic, logistical, and tactical problems. The most rapid growth has been in the social history of the armed forces, which analyzes such subjects as the social composition of armies, recruitment and military training, motivation, and the effects of military service.  Critics complain the new military history minimizes subject of combat and downplays famous people and battles. The new military history does place less emphasis on soldiers, weapons, tactics, and operations and more on society, economics, politics, and culture.

In the United States, the so-called "new military history" evolved rapidly during the 1980s. It broadened the focus and current methodology, allowing historians to formulate new problems, find new materials, and use new methods. The interest of American academic circles in this New Military History has resulted in new lines of historical research. Among the most fruitful are the historical study of military technology, the interesting debate about the "Military Revolution" in early modern history, and the analysis of armed conflict and the nature of combat with particular attention to strategic, logistical, and tactical problems. The most rapid growth has been in the social history of the armed forces, which analyzes such subjects as the social composition of armies, recruitment and military training, motivation, and the effects of military service.  Critics complain the new military history minimizes subject of combat and downplays famous people and battles. The new military history does place less emphasis on soldiers, weapons, tactics, and operations and more on society, economics, politics, and culture.

Lynn (1997) argues academic military history faces an increasingly hostile environment because of the current fashions in the study of history. Theoretical complexity, novelty, and even the trivial are now exalted over the traditional forms of historical studies that are at the heart of military history. The "holy trinity plus one" - race, class, and gender in the workplace and popular culture - are the preferred fields of study. Many of the faculty members on the "cutting edge" have no tolerance for interests and approaches that run counter to current trends, leading to an imbalance in hiring that restricts history departments to a narrow focus. There is hope, however, that military history can survive in the hostile academic environment, but to do so it must explore subject matter and methodologies that fit well with contemporary trends. Both gender history and the "new cultural history," for example, hold promise for military historians, even in the study of combat, the essence of military history

Lynn (1997) argues academic military history faces an increasingly hostile environment because of the current fashions in the study of history. Theoretical complexity, novelty, and even the trivial are now exalted over the traditional forms of historical studies that are at the heart of military history. The "holy trinity plus one" - race, class, and gender in the workplace and popular culture - are the preferred fields of study. Many of the faculty members on the "cutting edge" have no tolerance for interests and approaches that run counter to current trends, leading to an imbalance in hiring that restricts history departments to a narrow focus. There is hope, however, that military history can survive in the hostile academic environment, but to do so it must explore subject matter and methodologies that fit well with contemporary trends. Both gender history and the "new cultural history," for example, hold promise for military historians, even in the study of combat, the essence of military history

===The Military Revolution===

===The Military Revolution===

British historian Michael Roberts introduced the concept of  the "Military Revolution" begun by the Swedes in the early modern period (1450-1600), which made offensive warfare much more effective in the West, and defensive strategies less viable.  Innovations included ways to create, train, fund and maintain large armies, development of superior warships and cannon that could sink ships without boarding them, more effective muskets and infantry drill, and artillery that could destroy castle walls.  Body armor and castles became useless, and kings (with bigger armies than local lords) consolidated their rule. The advantage over Asian military power became clear as the Spanish expelled the Moors by using artillery, Portuguese warships took control of the Indian Ocean, and Venice defeated the Ottoman Empire at the [[Battle of Lepanto]].  In a broader perspective, a number of technological innovations in sixteenth- and early seventeenth century Europe revolutionized warfare, drove state formation, and facilitated colonial expansion.<ref>see Parker (1996)</ref>

British historian Michael Roberts introduced the concept of  the "Military Revolution" begun by the Swedes in the early modern period (1450–1600), which made offensive warfare much more effective in the West, and defensive strategies less viable.  Innovations included ways to create, train, fund and maintain large armies, development of superior warships and cannon that could sink ships without boarding them, more effective muskets and infantry drill, and artillery that could destroy castle walls.  Body armor and castles became useless, and kings (with bigger armies than local lords) consolidated their rule. The advantage over Asian military power became clear as the Spanish expelled the Moors by using artillery, Portuguese warships took control of the Indian Ocean, and Venice defeated the Ottoman Empire at the [[Battle of Lepanto]].  In a broader perspective, a number of technological innovations in sixteenth- and early seventeenth century Europe revolutionized warfare, drove state formation, and facilitated colonial expansion.<ref>see Parker (1996)</ref>

Studies of the Military Revolution cover the expansion of armed forces, increased military expenses, and more effective administration. The concept of royal "Absolutism" retains much of its validity when focused on the relationship between armies and states.

Studies of the Military Revolution cover the expansion of armed forces, increased military expenses, and more effective administration. The concept of royal "Absolutism" retains much of its validity when focused on the relationship between armies and states.

===Napoleonic===

===Napoleonic===

====Jomini====

====Jomini====

Swiss soldier and military strategist [[Antoine-Henri Jomini]] (1779-1869) was born in Switzerland, served in Napoleon's army from 1804 to 1813, and then joined the army of Tsar Alexander I. He helped to revolutionize warfare through his publications that appeared from 1807 to 1834.   

Swiss soldier and military strategist [[Antoine-Henri Jomini]] (1779–1869) was born in Switzerland, served in Napoleon's army from 1804 to 1813, and then joined the army of Tsar Alexander I. He helped to revolutionize warfare through his publications that appeared from 1807 to 1834.   

Jomini used a classical, Newtonian model that saw history as a body of empirical data from which one could derive timeless principles.  He stressed maps that showed the "forces" (a Newtonian concept) and stressed the importance of quantitative data. Jomini-style history emphasized maps, with every unit and its strength clearly marked, with arrows to show movement of forces. He argued the immutable geometrical principle that "to be superior to the enemy at the decisive point is the key to victory." Jomini emphasized information and the value of intelligence, based on his experience with good intelligence in the French armies.  Jomini emphasized the offensive only insofar as it resulted in the capture of places—he believed the occupation of territory or strategic points more important than confronting the American army.  

Jomini used a classical, Newtonian model that saw history as a body of empirical data from which one could derive timeless principles.  He stressed maps that showed the "forces" (a Newtonian concept) and stressed the importance of quantitative data. Jomini-style history emphasized maps, with every unit and its strength clearly marked, with arrows to show movement of forces. He argued the immutable geometrical principle that "to be superior to the enemy at the decisive point is the key to victory." Jomini emphasized information and the value of intelligence, based on his experience with good intelligence in the French armies.  Jomini emphasized the offensive only insofar as it resulted in the capture of places—he believed the occupation of territory or strategic points more important than confronting the American army.  

====Clausewitz====

====Clausewitz====

[[Image:Clausewitz.jpg|right|thumb|[[Carl von Clausewitz]] ]]

[[Image:Clausewitz.jpg|right|thumb|[[Carl von Clausewitz]] ]]

[[Carl von Clausewitz]] (1780-1831) was a German theorist who stressed the moral and political aspects of war. His great work ''On War'' was unfinished at his death. He used a romantic or Hegelian conception of warfare, stressing the dialectic of how opposite factors interact, and noting how unexpected new developments unfolded under the "fog of war" and called for rapid decisions by alert commanders. Clausewitz saw history as a complex check on abstractions that did not accord with experience. In opposition to Jomini he argued war could not be quantified or graphed or reduced to mapwork and graphs.

[[Carl von Clausewitz]] (1780–1831) was a German theorist who stressed the moral and political aspects of war. His great work ''On War'' was unfinished at his death. He used a romantic or Hegelian conception of warfare, stressing the dialectic of how opposite factors interact, and noting how unexpected new developments unfolded under the "fog of war" and called for rapid decisions by alert commanders. Clausewitz saw history as a complex check on abstractions that did not accord with experience. In opposition to Jomini he argued war could not be quantified or graphed or reduced to mapwork and graphs.

He stressed the primacy of national policy in war. Clausewitz conceived of war as a political, social, economic, and military totality involving the entire population of a nation at war. He sees war as a social act and as an extension of politics. He stressed that wars are decided by decisive battles (unlike Jomini who stressed control of central geographical locations.) However, Clausewitz's emphasis on the superiority of the defense suggests aggressive attacks can be failures. Clausewitz emphasizes the fusion of the regular army with militia, or citizen soldiers, as the only effective method of national defense. This point is especially important as it ends the independence and isolation of the regular military and democraticizes the armed forces much as universal suffrage democraticized politics.

He stressed the primacy of national policy in war. Clausewitz conceived of war as a political, social, economic, and military totality involving the entire population of a nation at war. He sees war as a social act and as an extension of politics. He stressed that wars are decided by decisive battles (unlike Jomini who stressed control of central geographical locations.) However, Clausewitz's emphasis on the superiority of the defense suggests aggressive attacks can be failures. Clausewitz emphasizes the fusion of the regular army with militia, or citizen soldiers, as the only effective method of national defense. This point is especially important as it ends the independence and isolation of the regular military and democraticizes the armed forces much as universal suffrage democraticized politics.

====Mahan====

====Mahan====

[[Alfred Thayer Mahan]] (1840-1914) was the most influential military historian in the world in the era before World War I.  His concept of "sea power" had an enormous influence in shaping the strategic thought of naval officials across the world, especially in the United States, Germany, Japan and Britain. His ideas still permeate the U.S. Navy. He used history as a stock of lessons to be learned—or more exactly, as a pool of examples that exemplified his theories. Mahan believed that national greatness was inextricably associated with the sea, with its commercial usage in peace and its control in war. His goal was to discover the laws of history that determined who controlled the  seas.  His theoretical framework came from Jomini, with an emphasis on strategic locations (such as chokepoints, canals. and coaling stations), as well as quantifiable levels of fighting power in a fleet. The primary mission of a navy was to secure the command of the sea. This not only permitted the maintenance of sea communications for one's own ships while denying their use to the enemy but also, if necessary, provided the means for close supervision of neutral trade. This control of the sea could not be achieved by destruction of commerce but only by destroying or neutralizing the enemy fleet. This called for concentration of naval forces composed of capital ships, not overly large but numerous, well manned with crews thoroughly trained, and operating under the principle that the best defense is an aggressive offense.

[[Alfred Thayer Mahan]] (1840–1914) was the most influential military historian in the world in the era before World War I.  His concept of "sea power" had an enormous influence in shaping the strategic thought of naval officials across the world, especially in the United States, Germany, Japan and Britain. His ideas still permeate the U.S. Navy. He used history as a stock of lessons to be learned—or more exactly, as a pool of examples that exemplified his theories. Mahan believed that national greatness was inextricably associated with the sea, with its commercial usage in peace and its control in war. His goal was to discover the laws of history that determined who controlled the  seas.  His theoretical framework came from Jomini, with an emphasis on strategic locations (such as chokepoints, canals. and coaling stations), as well as quantifiable levels of fighting power in a fleet. The primary mission of a navy was to secure the command of the sea. This not only permitted the maintenance of sea communications for one's own ships while denying their use to the enemy but also, if necessary, provided the means for close supervision of neutral trade. This control of the sea could not be achieved by destruction of commerce but only by destroying or neutralizing the enemy fleet. This called for concentration of naval forces composed of capital ships, not overly large but numerous, well manned with crews thoroughly trained, and operating under the principle that the best defense is an aggressive offense.

====Corbett====

====Corbett====

British theorist Sir Julian Corbett (1854-1922), was second only to Mahan as an influential exponent of sea power during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Mahan emphasized the need for concentration of forces and the decisive battle. In contrast, Corbett advised that protection of shipping lanes and local control in decisive areas was more important. While Mahan overstated the value of colonies to national strength, he overlooked "guerre de course" (attacks on merchant ships) and technological innovation. Corbett erred both by ignoring convoy warfare and in advocating a passive strategy out of keeping with the aggressive naval tradition of his British constituency.<ref>J. J. Widen, "Sir Julian Corbett and the Theoretical Study of War." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 2007 30(1): 109-127. Issn: 0140-2390 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>

British theorist Sir Julian Corbett (1854–1922), was second only to Mahan as an influential exponent of sea power during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Mahan emphasized the need for concentration of forces and the decisive battle. In contrast, Corbett advised that protection of shipping lanes and local control in decisive areas was more important. While Mahan overstated the value of colonies to national strength, he overlooked "guerre de course" (attacks on merchant ships) and technological innovation. Corbett erred both by ignoring convoy warfare and in advocating a passive strategy out of keeping with the aggressive naval tradition of his British constituency.<ref>J. J. Widen, "Sir Julian Corbett and the Theoretical Study of War." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 2007 30(1): 109-127. Issn: 0140-2390 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>

===Maritime strategy of 1980s===

===Maritime strategy of 1980s===

Washington's so-called maritime strategy, which sought to apply US naval might against Soviet vulnerabilities on its maritime flanks, came to operation during the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] administration in the 1980s. The strategy, which witnessed a major buildup of US naval forces and aggressive exercising in seas proximate to the USSR, also explicitly targeted Moscow's strategic missile submarines with the aim of pressuring the Kremlin during crises or the early phases of global war.<ref>Christopher A. Ford and Rosenberg, David A. "The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan's Maritime Strategy." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 2005 28(2): 379-409. Issn: 0140-2390 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>  

Washington's so-called maritime strategy, which sought to apply US naval might against Soviet vulnerabilities on its maritime flanks, came to operation during the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] administration in the 1980s. The strategy, which witnessed a major buildup of US naval forces and aggressive exercising in seas proximate to the USSR, also explicitly targeted Moscow's strategic missile submarines with the aim of pressuring the Kremlin during crises or the early phases of global war.<ref>Christopher A. Ford and Rosenberg, David A. "The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan's Maritime Strategy." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 2005 28(2): 379-409. Issn: 0140-2390 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>  

===Air power===

===Air power===

[[File:Flying fortresses.jpg|thumbnail|225px|right|[[B-17 Flying Fortress|B-17 Flying Fortresses]] from the 398th Bombardment Group flying a bombing run to Neumunster, Germany, on April 13, 1945.]]

[[File:Flying fortresses.jpg|thumbnail|225px|right|[[B-17 Flying Fortress]]es from the 398th Bombardment Group flying a bombing run to Neumunster, Germany, on April 13, 1945.]]

Air power theory was developed during and shortly after [[World War I]] by Italian [[Giulio Douhet]], American [[Billy Mitchell]], and Briton Sir [[Hugh Trenchard]]. Douhet was quite influential, arguing that bombing of cities could destroy an enemy's willingness to continue fighting. Strategic bombing, therefore, could win a war without the horrible stalemate of the Western Front.  Britain and the United States bought into strategic airpower, and developed long-range bombers. Germany, Japan and Russia did not accept the theory, and focused their air forces on tactical support for the ground soldiers.  The major navies used aircraft as long-range spotters for battleships, not realizing until 1940-41 their independent power to win naval battles.<ref>Meilinger (2000); Meilinger (1997); Futrell (1989)</ref>

Air power theory was developed during and shortly after [[World War I]] by Italian [[Giulio Douhet]], American [[Billy Mitchell]], and Briton Sir [[Hugh Trenchard]]. Douhet was quite influential, arguing that bombing of cities could destroy an enemy's willingness to continue fighting. Strategic bombing, therefore, could win a war without the horrible stalemate of the Western Front.  Britain and the United States bought into strategic airpower, and developed long-range bombers. Germany, Japan and Russia did not accept the theory, and focused their air forces on tactical support for the ground soldiers.  The major navies used aircraft as long-range spotters for battleships, not realizing until 1940-41 their independent power to win naval battles.<ref>Meilinger (2000); Meilinger (1997); Futrell (1989)</ref>

* Lynn, John A. ''Battle: A Cultural History of Combat and Culture'' (2003).

* Lynn, John A. ''Battle: A Cultural History of Combat and Culture'' (2003).

* Lynn, John A. "Rally Once Again: The Embattled Future of Academic Military History," ''Journal of Military History'', 61 (Oct. 1997), 777–89.  

* Lynn, John A. "Rally Once Again: The Embattled Future of Academic Military History," ''Journal of Military History'', 61 (Oct. 1997), 777–89.  

* [[John Mearsheimer|Mearsheimer, John J.]]  ''Liddell Hart and the Weight of History.'' (1988). 234 pp.   

* [[John Mearsheimer|Mearsheimer, John J.]]  ''Liddell Hart and the Weight of History.'' (1988). 234 pp.   

* Morillo, Stephen. ''What is Military History'' (2006) [https://www.amazon.com/What-Military-History/dp/0745633919/ref=sr_1_8?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1206430429&sr=1-8 excerpt and text search]

* Morillo, Stephen. ''What is Military History'' (2006) [https://www.amazon.com/What-Military-History/dp/0745633919/ref=sr_1_8?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1206430429&sr=1-8 excerpt and text search]

* Moyar, Mark. "The Current State of Military History," ''The Historical Journal'' (2007), 50: 225-240 online at [[CJO]]

* Moyar, Mark. "The Current State of Military History," ''The Historical Journal'' (2007), 50: 225-240 online at [[CJO]]