Changes

==Preparations==

==Preparations==

Philip tried to neutralize France by involvement in its internal power struggle He raised money from loans from his German and Italian bankers, pledging his ordinary revenues, and especially the annual flow of treasure from his possessions in the New World. Aware of English naval prowess, he decided to overwhelm it with sheer mass. Philip marshaled 130 sail of all classes, totaling over 59,000 tons—from his Mediterranean and Atlantic fleets, from the Portuguese navy (which he controlled), and from his allies. More than 19,000 soldiers and 8,000 sailors recruited to man these ships were to join 30,000 troops who had been fighting in the Spanish Netherlands under Philip's commander, the Duke of Parma. He first chose a competent admiral, Don Álvaro de Bazán, but he died and Philip turned to Alonso Pérez de Guzmán, Duke of Medina Sidonia (1550-1615). He was an incompetent seaman, albeit intelligent and courageous.  

Philip tried to neutralize France by involvement in its internal power struggle He raised money from loans from his German and Italian bankers, pledging his ordinary revenues, and especially the annual flow of treasure from his possessions in the New World. Aware of English naval prowess, he decided to overwhelm it with sheer mass. Philip marshaled 130 sail of all classes, totaling over 59,000 tons—from his Mediterranean and Atlantic fleets, from the Portuguese navy (which he controlled), and from his allies. More than 19,000 soldiers and 8,000 sailors recruited to man these ships were to join 30,000 troops who had been fighting in the Spanish Netherlands under Philip's commander, the Duke of Parma. He first chose a competent admiral, Don Álvaro de Bazán, but he died and Philip turned to Alonso Pérez de Guzmán, Duke of Medina Sidonia (1550–1615). He was an incompetent seaman, albeit intelligent and courageous.  

If the Armada had landed its army in England, it may well have succeeded. The Spanish army was large, experienced, well-equipped, confident, and richly financed. English defenses were poor and outdated; troops were few and only partially trained. Spain had chosen England's weakest defensive link. London might have fallen within a week. A Catholic uprising in the north and in Ireland could have brought total defeat. England essentially depended on the will and loyalty of the common people.

If the Armada had landed its army in England, it may well have succeeded. The Spanish army was large, experienced, well-equipped, confident, and richly financed. English defenses were poor and outdated; troops were few and only partially trained. Spain had chosen England's weakest defensive link. London might have fallen within a week. A Catholic uprising in the north and in Ireland could have brought total defeat. England essentially depended on the will and loyalty of the common people.

==Historiography==

==Historiography==

For 150 years writers depended heavily on Petruccio Ubaldini's ''A Discourse Concernye the Spanish Fleete Invadinye Englande'' (1590), which explained that God favored England and English victory confirmed English Protestantism. In the 17th century William Camden (1551-1623) added nationalism and private enterprise to the English side and depicted the Duke of Medina Sidonia as an incompetent seaman. In the [[Enlightenment]] [[David Hume]] (1711–76) dropped divine favor and  stressed the leadership of Elizabeth I. Hume was challenged by 19th century Whig historians led by James A. Froude (1818–94), who criticized Elizabeth for vacillating and being unwilling to spend the money necessary to defend England. The publication of primary documents by John K. Laughton in 1894 led modern scholars, led by Julian Corbet (1854-1922), to reject the Whig views and emphasize the role of England's professional navy in the victory. Historians have since debated the relative power of English and Spanish guns and the degree of credit due Francis Drake and Charles Howard.<ref>Douglas Knerr, "Through the "Golden Mist": a Brief Overview of Armada Historiography." ''American Neptune'' 1989 49(1): 5-13.</ref>

For 150 years writers depended heavily on Petruccio Ubaldini's ''A Discourse Concernye the Spanish Fleete Invadinye Englande'' (1590), which explained that God favored England and English victory confirmed English Protestantism. In the 17th century William Camden (1551–1623) added nationalism and private enterprise to the English side and depicted the Duke of Medina Sidonia as an incompetent seaman. In the [[Enlightenment]] [[David Hume]] (1711–76) dropped divine favor and  stressed the leadership of Elizabeth I. Hume was challenged by 19th century Whig historians led by James A. Froude (1818–94), who criticized Elizabeth for vacillating and being unwilling to spend the money necessary to defend England. The publication of primary documents by John K. Laughton in 1894 led modern scholars, led by Julian Corbet (1854–1922), to reject the Whig views and emphasize the role of England's professional navy in the victory. Historians have since debated the relative power of English and Spanish guns and the degree of credit due Francis Drake and Charles Howard.<ref>Douglas Knerr, "Through the "Golden Mist": a Brief Overview of Armada Historiography." ''American Neptune'' 1989 49(1): 5-13.</ref>

[[Image:Armada2.jpg|thumb|550px]]

[[Image:Armada2.jpg|thumb|550px]]