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[[Al Smith]]'s campaign manager, [[General Motors]] executive John J. Raskob, agreed. In an article entitled "Everybody Ought to be Rich" Raskob declared, "Prosperity is in the nature of an endless chain and we can break it only by refusing to see what it is." President-elect Hoover disagreed. Even before his inauguration he urged the [[Federal Reserve]] to halt "crazy and dangerous" gambling on [[Wall Street]] by increasing the discount rate the Fed charged banks for speculative loans. He asked magazines and newspapers to run stories warning of the dangers of rampant speculation.
 
[[Al Smith]]'s campaign manager, [[General Motors]] executive John J. Raskob, agreed. In an article entitled "Everybody Ought to be Rich" Raskob declared, "Prosperity is in the nature of an endless chain and we can break it only by refusing to see what it is." President-elect Hoover disagreed. Even before his inauguration he urged the [[Federal Reserve]] to halt "crazy and dangerous" gambling on [[Wall Street]] by increasing the discount rate the Fed charged banks for speculative loans. He asked magazines and newspapers to run stories warning of the dangers of rampant speculation.
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Once in the office, the new president ordered a reluctant [[Andrew Mellon]], his holdover secretary of the treasury, to promote the purchase of bonds instead of stocks. He sent his friend Henry Robinson, a Los Angeles banker, to convey a cautionary message to the financiers of Wall Street--and received in return a long, scoffing memorandum from Thomas W. Lamont of [[J.P. Morgan]] and Company. When the [[Federal Reserve Board]] that August did take steps to check the flow of speculative credit, New York bankers defied Washington, the National City Bank alone promising $100 million in fresh loans. An angry Hoover let the president of the New York [[Stock Exchange]] know that he was thinking of regulatory steps to curb stock manipulation and other excesses. Yet he undercut his own threat by placing ultimate responsibility for such measures on New York State's new governor, [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], who was already contemplating running against Hoover.
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Once in the office, the new president ordered a reluctant [[Andrew Mellon]], his holdover secretary of the treasury, to promote the purchase of bonds instead of stocks. He sent his friend Henry Robinson, a Los Angeles banker, to convey a cautionary message to the financiers of Wall Street--and received in return a long, scoffing memorandum from Thomas W. Lamont of [[J.P. Morgan]] and Company. When the [[Federal Reserve Board]] that August did take steps to check the flow of speculative credit, New York bankers defied Washington, the National City Bank alone promising $100 million in fresh loans. An angry Hoover let the president of the [[New York Stock Exchange]] know that he was thinking of regulatory steps to curb stock manipulation and other excesses. Yet he undercut his own threat by placing ultimate responsibility for such measures on New York State's new governor, [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], who was already contemplating running against Hoover.
    
Presidents in 1929 were not supposed to regulate Wall Street, or even talk about the gyrating market for fear of inadvertently setting off a panic. Hoover had his own reasons for keeping quiet. His conscience was pained after a friend took his advice to buy an issue that later nosedived. "To clear myself," the president told intimates, "I just bought it back and I have never advised anybody since."
 
Presidents in 1929 were not supposed to regulate Wall Street, or even talk about the gyrating market for fear of inadvertently setting off a panic. Hoover had his own reasons for keeping quiet. His conscience was pained after a friend took his advice to buy an issue that later nosedived. "To clear myself," the president told intimates, "I just bought it back and I have never advised anybody since."
    
By early September, 1929 the market was topping out, some eighty two points above its January plateau. In eighteen months, General Electric had tripled in value, reaching $396 per share. Other blue chips, fueled by more than $8 billion in brokers' loans, enjoyed similar rises. The last week of October, however, brought a terrible reckoning. On October 24 alone, radio stocks lost 40% of their paper value. [[Montgomery Ward]] surrendered thirty-three points. Big bankers tried and failed to stem the dizzying decline in [[U.S. Steel]], a bellwether stock.
 
By early September, 1929 the market was topping out, some eighty two points above its January plateau. In eighteen months, General Electric had tripled in value, reaching $396 per share. Other blue chips, fueled by more than $8 billion in brokers' loans, enjoyed similar rises. The last week of October, however, brought a terrible reckoning. On October 24 alone, radio stocks lost 40% of their paper value. [[Montgomery Ward]] surrendered thirty-three points. Big bankers tried and failed to stem the dizzying decline in [[U.S. Steel]], a bellwether stock.
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== A Day of Reckoning ==
 
== A Day of Reckoning ==
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