| | :I am persuaded that the absence of any secular purpose for the legislative declarations that life begins at conception and that conception occurs at fertilization makes the relevant portion of the preamble invalid under the [[Establishment Clause]] of the [[First Amendment]] to the [[Federal Constitution]]. This conclusion does not, and could not, rest on the fact that the statement happens to coincide with the tenets of certain religions, see ''McGowan v. Maryland'', 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961); ''Harris v. McRae'', 448 U.S. 297, 319-320 (1980), or on the fact that the legislators who voted to enact it may have been motivated by religious considerations, see ''Washington v. Davis'', 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). Rather, it rests on the fact that the preamble, an unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some but by no means all Christian faiths, 11 serves no identifiable secular purpose. That fact alone compels a conclusion that the statute violates the Establishment Clause. | | :I am persuaded that the absence of any secular purpose for the legislative declarations that life begins at conception and that conception occurs at fertilization makes the relevant portion of the preamble invalid under the [[Establishment Clause]] of the [[First Amendment]] to the [[Federal Constitution]]. This conclusion does not, and could not, rest on the fact that the statement happens to coincide with the tenets of certain religions, see ''McGowan v. Maryland'', 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961); ''Harris v. McRae'', 448 U.S. 297, 319-320 (1980), or on the fact that the legislators who voted to enact it may have been motivated by religious considerations, see ''Washington v. Davis'', 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). Rather, it rests on the fact that the preamble, an unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some but by no means all Christian faiths, 11 serves no identifiable secular purpose. That fact alone compels a conclusion that the statute violates the Establishment Clause. |