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| | [[Image:Bigthree.jpg|right|thumb|The "Big Three" at Yalta]] | | [[Image:Bigthree.jpg|right|thumb|The "Big Three" at Yalta]] |
| | The '''Yalta Conference''' was the meeting in [[February]] of 1945, the last year of [[World War II]], between [[President]] [[Franklin Roosevelt]], [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics|Soviet]] Premier [[Joseph Stalin]] and [[Great Britain|British]] [[Prime Minister]] [[Winston Churchill]] (the big three) at [[Yalta]] on the [[Crimea]]n Peninsula in the USSR. The conference was held at the Livadia Palace, a former summer home of the [[Tsar|Tsars]] in the Crimea. It opened [[February]] 4, 1945. the chief questions were (1) the adoption of the [[Dumbarton Oaks]] plan for the United Nations, (2) the conditions of the approaching German surrender, (3) the treatment of Poland and the other liberated countries. It was during this conference that Roosevelt saw a significant decrease in his health. Upon his return to the [[United States]], he soon became very ill and died in April. | | The '''Yalta Conference''' was the meeting in [[February]] of 1945, the last year of [[World War II]], between [[President]] [[Franklin Roosevelt]], [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics|Soviet]] Premier [[Joseph Stalin]] and [[Great Britain|British]] [[Prime Minister]] [[Winston Churchill]] (the big three) at [[Yalta]] on the [[Crimea]]n Peninsula in the USSR. The conference was held at the Livadia Palace, a former summer home of the [[Tsar|Tsars]] in the Crimea. It opened [[February]] 4, 1945. the chief questions were (1) the adoption of the [[Dumbarton Oaks]] plan for the United Nations, (2) the conditions of the approaching German surrender, (3) the treatment of Poland and the other liberated countries. It was during this conference that Roosevelt saw a significant decrease in his health. Upon his return to the [[United States]], he soon became very ill and died in April. |
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| | + | ==Western betrayal== |
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| | The [[United Nations]] plan, which had been agreed to in principle by Soviet Union long before, was no longer an issue. There was the question of voting to be settled and this was done without any difficulty by agreeing in full to Stalin's desires. The formal proposal to hand over eastern Poland east of the [[Curzon line]] was made by Roosevelt himself.<ref>''Speaking Frankly'', James F. Byrnes, New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, p. 29.</ref> In western Poland, Stalin already had a government there representing no one but Stalin. FDR agreed, however, that this provisional government should be "reorganized" to include "democratic leaders from Poles abroad." Stalin agreed to hold an election, which he said "he could do in a month." The election was not held for 23 months and Poland ended with nothing but Communists in the government <ref>''Speaking Frankly'', Byrnes, op.cit., p. 32.</ref> of a country where they did not represent 10 per cent of the people, while the other elements fled Poland for their lives. To compensate Poland it was agreed to give Poland a part of East Prussia, a totally German land. The Yalta conference was, as it has come to be known in Poland, Eastern Europe, China, and much of the world, the [[Western betrayal]] of democratic allies who had fought for the principals of [[self-determination]]. | | The [[United Nations]] plan, which had been agreed to in principle by Soviet Union long before, was no longer an issue. There was the question of voting to be settled and this was done without any difficulty by agreeing in full to Stalin's desires. The formal proposal to hand over eastern Poland east of the [[Curzon line]] was made by Roosevelt himself.<ref>''Speaking Frankly'', James F. Byrnes, New York: Harper & Bros., 1947, p. 29.</ref> In western Poland, Stalin already had a government there representing no one but Stalin. FDR agreed, however, that this provisional government should be "reorganized" to include "democratic leaders from Poles abroad." Stalin agreed to hold an election, which he said "he could do in a month." The election was not held for 23 months and Poland ended with nothing but Communists in the government <ref>''Speaking Frankly'', Byrnes, op.cit., p. 32.</ref> of a country where they did not represent 10 per cent of the people, while the other elements fled Poland for their lives. To compensate Poland it was agreed to give Poland a part of East Prussia, a totally German land. The Yalta conference was, as it has come to be known in Poland, Eastern Europe, China, and much of the world, the [[Western betrayal]] of democratic allies who had fought for the principals of [[self-determination]]. |
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| | The main agreement of the conference regarded the decision for an unconditional surrender of the [[Nazi]]s. They agreed to divide [[Germany]] into four occupation zones, with [[Berlin]] itself further divided into zones. They also agreed that free elections would be held in Soviet controlled Eastern [[Europe]], but Stalin never had any intention of fulfilling this promise. The USSR also agreed to take part in the war against [[Japan]], though they played a negligible role. | | The main agreement of the conference regarded the decision for an unconditional surrender of the [[Nazi]]s. They agreed to divide [[Germany]] into four occupation zones, with [[Berlin]] itself further divided into zones. They also agreed that free elections would be held in Soviet controlled Eastern [[Europe]], but Stalin never had any intention of fulfilling this promise. The USSR also agreed to take part in the war against [[Japan]], though they played a negligible role. |
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| | + | ==Operation Keelhaul== |
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| | Roosevelt agreed to have all fugitive Soviet nationals or citizens of satellite nations and tens of thousands of [[POW]]'s who elected to stay this side of the [[Iron Curtain]], returned to the Soviet Union. This was in contravention of the Geneva Convention. The ''Saturday Evening Post'' commented: | | Roosevelt agreed to have all fugitive Soviet nationals or citizens of satellite nations and tens of thousands of [[POW]]'s who elected to stay this side of the [[Iron Curtain]], returned to the Soviet Union. This was in contravention of the Geneva Convention. The ''Saturday Evening Post'' commented: |
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| | Roosevelt told a joint session of the U.S. Congress upon his return that the Yalta conference "marked the end of the system of unilateral action and exclusive alliance and [[spheres of influence]] and balances of power and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries and have always failed." <ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450301a.html Report to Congress by President Franklin D. Roosevelt On the Crimea Conference], March 1, 1945.</ref> | | Roosevelt told a joint session of the U.S. Congress upon his return that the Yalta conference "marked the end of the system of unilateral action and exclusive alliance and [[spheres of influence]] and balances of power and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries and have always failed." <ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450301a.html Report to Congress by President Franklin D. Roosevelt On the Crimea Conference], March 1, 1945.</ref> |
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| | + | The ''[[New Republic]]'', whose editors included FDR speechwriter and Soviet spy [[Michael Straight]], published soon afterwards, "on the whole, the results at Yalta represent a substantial victory for Stalin." <ref>''New Republic'', February 19, 1945, p. 243.</ref> |
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| − | The ''[[New Republic]]'', whose editors included FDR speechwriter and Soviet spy [[Michael Straight]], published soon afterwards, "on the whole, the results at Yalta represent a substantial victory for Stalin." <ref>''New Republic'', February 19, 1945, p. 243.</ref>
| + | Nobel laureate [[Alexander Solzhenitsyn]] was as a Captain in the [[Red Army]] only to be rewarded with a term in the Soviet [[Gulag]] for [[dissent]]ing from [[Socialist]] thought, remarked |
| | + | {{Cquote|In their own countries Roosevelt and Churchill are honored as embodiments of statesmanlike wisdom. To us, in our Russian prison conversations, their consistent shortsightedness and stupidity stood out as astonishingly obvious. How could they, in their decline from 1941 to 1945, fail to secure any guarantees whatever of the independence of Eastern Europe? How could they give away broad regions of Saxony and Thuringia in exchange for the preposterous toy of a four-zone Berlin, their own future Achilles' heel? And what was the military or political sense in their surrendering to destruction at Stalin's hands hundreds of thousands of armed Soviet citizens determined not to surrender? They say it was the price they paid for Stalin's agreeing to enter the war against Japan. With the [[atom bomb]] already in their hands, they paid Stalin for not refusing to occupy Manchuria, for strengthening [[Mao Tse-tung]] in China, and for giving [[Kim Il Sung]] control of half Korea! What bankruptcy of political thought! And when subsequently, the Russians pushed out [[/World_War_II#War_in_Europe_1944|Mikolajczyk]], when [[Benes]] and [[Masaryk]] came to their ends, when [[Berlin Airlift|Berlin was blockaded]], and Budapest flamed and fell silent, and Korea went up in smoke, and Britain’s Conservatives [[Suez Crisis|fled Suez]], could one really beleive that those among them with the most accurate memories did not at least recall that episode of the Cossacks? <ref>''Gulag Archipelago'', Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 1956, Part I. Chap. 4., pg. 258 fn. 12</ref>}} |
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