Changes

The Commission findings regarding government secrecy in the early Cold War period have led to a reevaluation of many public perceptions regarding the period.  By 1950, the United States Government was in possession of information which the American public did not know: proof of a serious attack on American security by the Soviet Union, with considerable assistance from an enemy within. Soviet authorities knew the U.S. government knew. Only the American people were denied this information. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appa7.html Moynihan Commssion on Government Secrecy, Appendix A, ''The Cold War''] (1997).</ref>

The Commission findings regarding government secrecy in the early Cold War period have led to a reevaluation of many public perceptions regarding the period.  By 1950, the United States Government was in possession of information which the American public did not know: proof of a serious attack on American security by the Soviet Union, with considerable assistance from an enemy within. Soviet authorities knew the U.S. government knew. Only the American people were denied this information. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appa7.html Moynihan Commssion on Government Secrecy, Appendix A, ''The Cold War''] (1997).</ref>

One revelation of the [[VENONA]] intercepts is that many Americans who spied for the Soviet Union were never prosecuted. To do so the Government would have to reveal what it knew. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appa6.html Moynihan Commssion on Government Secrecy, Appendix A, ''The Experience of The Bomb''] (1997).</ref>  On 29 May 1946, FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] sent a high administration official a memorandum reporting “an enormous Soviet espionage ring in Washington."  Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson was at the top of the list.  Truman distrusted Hoover and suspected Hoover of playing political games.  Acheson's inclusion at the top of the list automatically discredited other accusations which were on target, [[Alger Hiss]] and [[Greg Silvermaster|Nathan Gregfory Silvermaster]]. [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/hoovlet.html]  In late August or early September 1947, the [[Arlington Hall|Army Security Agency]] informed the [[FBI]] it had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages.  Truman had never been told of the existence of the Venona project, , and always insisted [[Republican Party (United States)#Second half of the twentieth century|Republicans]] had trumped up the loyalty issue. The first fact is, that a significant Communist conspiracy was in place in Washington, New York, and Hollywood. President Truman was almost willfully obtuse as regards American Communism. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Moynihan Commssion on Government Secrecy, Chairmans Forward] (1997).</ref> There were no Communists in Kansas City politics where he came from.  Apart from intellectual circles in Manhattan and a few metropolitan centers elsewhere, and the labor movement, Communists were unknown.  Truman has been criticized for putting domestic politics above [[National Security|American security]].   

One revelation of the [[VENONA]] intercepts is that many Americans who spied for the Soviet Union were never prosecuted. To do so the Government would have to reveal what it knew. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appa6.html Moynihan Commssion on Government Secrecy, Appendix A, ''The Experience of The Bomb''] (1997).</ref>  On 29 May 1946, FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] sent a high administration official a memorandum reporting “an enormous Soviet espionage ring in Washington."  Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson was at the top of the list.  Truman distrusted Hoover and suspected Hoover of playing political games.  Acheson's inclusion at the top of the list automatically discredited other accusations which were on target, [[Alger Hiss]] and [[Greg Silvermaster|Nathan Gregory Silvermaster]]. [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/hoovlet.html]  In late August or early September 1947, the [[Arlington Hall|Army Security Agency]] informed the [[FBI]] it had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages.  Truman had never been told of the existence of the Venona project, , and always insisted [[Republican Party (United States)#Second half of the twentieth century|Republicans]] had trumped up the loyalty issue. The first fact is, that a significant Communist conspiracy was in place in Washington, New York, and Hollywood. President Truman was almost willfully obtuse as regards American Communism. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Moynihan Commssion on Government Secrecy, Chairmans Forward] (1997).</ref> There were no Communists in Kansas City politics where he came from.  Apart from intellectual circles in Manhattan and a few metropolitan centers elsewhere, and the labor movement, Communists were unknown.  Truman has been criticized for putting domestic politics above [[National Security|American security]].   

The prosecutors in the internal-security cases of the 1940s did not know they had not been given all, or even the best government evidence, against [[Julius Rosenberg]], [[Ethel Rosenberg]], and others.  The Venona materials would have been [[incontrovertible evidence|conclusive]] in establishing the cast of characters in the Soviet spy networks. <ref>Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ''Secrecy: The American Experience'', (New Haven: Yale University Press 1998), pg. 54.</ref>  Government secrecy allowed critics of the Rosenberg and Hiss cases to construct elaborate theories about frame-ups and cover-ups. For years the Rosenbergs' defenders demanded that the government reveal its secrets about the case.  When Secrecy Commission forced the disclosure of documents, the secrets revealed the government's case was even stronger. <ref>Ibid, pg. 62.</ref> "Over the years," said Ronald Radosh, "the Rosenbergs' defenders have loudly demanded the release of government documents on the case, only to deny the documents' significance once they are made public." <ref>Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, ''The Rosenberg File'', 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pgs. 471-72.</ref>  As archives of the Cold War are opened, the original case made against Soviet espionage in the United States has received ever more conclusive corroboration. <ref>Moynihan, ''Secrecy'', pg. 52.</ref>

The prosecutors in the internal-security cases of the 1940s did not know they had not been given all, or even the best government evidence, against [[Julius Rosenberg]], [[Ethel Rosenberg]], and others.  The Venona materials would have been [[incontrovertible evidence|conclusive]] in establishing the cast of characters in the Soviet spy networks. <ref>Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ''Secrecy: The American Experience'', (New Haven: Yale University Press 1998), pg. 54.</ref>  Government secrecy allowed critics of the Rosenberg and Hiss cases to construct elaborate theories about frame-ups and cover-ups. For years the Rosenbergs' defenders demanded that the government reveal its secrets about the case.  When Secrecy Commission forced the disclosure of documents, the secrets revealed the government's case was even stronger. <ref>Ibid, pg. 62.</ref> "Over the years," said Ronald Radosh, "the Rosenbergs' defenders have loudly demanded the release of government documents on the case, only to deny the documents' significance once they are made public." <ref>Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, ''The Rosenberg File'', 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pgs. 471-72.</ref>  As archives of the Cold War are opened, the original case made against Soviet espionage in the United States has received ever more conclusive corroboration. <ref>Moynihan, ''Secrecy'', pg. 52.</ref>