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Talk:Ronald Wilson Reagan (view source)
Revision as of 02:34, March 12, 2007
, 02:34, March 12, 2007→Evidence that Reagan helped to end the Cold War.
By the way, when the Soviet Union imposed martial law on Poland because of Solidarity, Reagan did take crucial action, and the results can not be underestimated. He revoked Poland's most favored nation trading status, which meant Polish goods faced a high tariffs on exports to the US. Most importantly, he banned the sale of oil and gas technologies to the USSR. Both of these actions put tremendous pressure on the Soviets to settle the strike on terms favorable to the Americans.
By the way, when the Soviet Union imposed martial law on Poland because of Solidarity, Reagan did take crucial action, and the results can not be underestimated. He revoked Poland's most favored nation trading status, which meant Polish goods faced a high tariffs on exports to the US. Most importantly, he banned the sale of oil and gas technologies to the USSR. Both of these actions put tremendous pressure on the Soviets to settle the strike on terms favorable to the Americans.
You got that last part absolutely wrong. The Soviet government didn't impose martial law on Poland. The Polish regime of Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski declared it because the alternative was to watch its own collapse and allow Poland to descend into complete chaos. The Soviets were not a factor -- repeat: not a factor -- in the end to the Solidarity crisis. In fact, we now know based on documents in archives in Warsaw and Moscow that have become available since the fall of communism that the Kremlin was prepared to allow Poland to "go its own way" in 1981. This was not Moscow's preference, for obvious reasons, but after Soviet leaders assessed the likely outcome of a crackdown (a la Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Afghanistan in 1979), they ruled out the military option. Some of the reasoning behind this was that Soviet leaders feared the repercussions of intervention, which they surmised would have brought an end to detente. However, equally important was their conviction that the Poles would fight back, and that the Polish Army could not be trusted to remain loyal to the Communist regime in the event of a Soviet invasion. The decision to crack down on Solidarity was left entirely to the Polish leadership. (For more elaboration on this, see Vojtech Mastny's article "The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the End of the Cold War," and Matthew Ouimet's "The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy.")
The irony, of course, was that the West widely believed (rather erroneously, as we now know) that Moscow had been calling the shots in Poland. So, despite the fact that it hadn't ordered the crackdown and resigned itself to the possibility of a non-Communist Poland, the Kremlin still faced the loss of benefits that had come with detente.
I'm also perplexed by your claim that the end of the legal Solidarity movement (and it's much more accurately characterized as an independent trade union and opposition movement than a strike, since hundreds of strikes occurred in this period in Poland) saw the Soviets "settle the strike on terms favorable to the Americans." Martial law was about the last thing the Reagan White House would've wanted. Or perhaps the next-to-last thing, since only a direct Soviet invasion of Poland could have been worse from an American standpoint.
However, even if you point to the end of detente and the economic hardships this brought to the Soviet Union as a major causal factor in the fall of communism, it's still debatable how much credit Reagan deserves for that. Many of the moves in that direction, such as the end of American food relief to the Soviet Union, had been initiated by Jimmy Carter following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and prior to Reagan's presidency. Under Reagan those policies may have been pursued to an even greater degree, though it is likely that, had he won a second term in office, Carter would have followed much the same course (especially if you recall that his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was a Pole). Much of the basis for crediting Reagan with the collapse of communism seems to dwell on his outspoken opposition to communism, and to having been in the right place at the right time. Given the array of systemic weaknesses, the developing opposition movements and the long-brewing crises that culminated in East-Central Europe in 1989, and in the Soviet Union over the following two years, it is highly probable that communism would have collapsed roughly when it did regardless of who lived in the White House in the 1980s.
Furthermore, I'd be interested in seeing the verbatim quote from Walesa. A professor said that Walesa gave a talk in Seattle some years ago where one of the audience members asked him if he thought Reagan or Gorbachev deserved the most credit for the collapse of communism. Walesa replied, "No, it was the Holy Father!" by which he meant Pope John Paul II (since Catholics refer to the pontiff as the Holy Father). So from the perspective on someone who obviously "witnessed" (and also shaped) history, you can see what people on the ground thought.
-- "KW"