Changes

The United States, which had important political and economic interests in East Asia, was alarmed by these Japanese moves. The U.S. increased military and financial aid to China, and embarked on a program of strengthening its military power in the Pacific. Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] sought to make America's economic policy ambiguous so that Japan might be deterred by fear of sanctions not yet imposed and won by hopes of concessions not yet granted. Such a policy obtained Roosevelt's explicit approval while at the same time it more aggressive elements in Japan to take control.

The United States, which had important political and economic interests in East Asia, was alarmed by these Japanese moves. The U.S. increased military and financial aid to China, and embarked on a program of strengthening its military power in the Pacific. Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] sought to make America's economic policy ambiguous so that Japan might be deterred by fear of sanctions not yet imposed and won by hopes of concessions not yet granted. Such a policy obtained Roosevelt's explicit approval while at the same time it more aggressive elements in Japan to take control.

Roosevelt accepted a plan for economic sanctions presented by Treasury Assistant [[Harry Dexter White]]. On July 26, 1941, a full scale economic blockade was implamented, all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. were froze and trade virtually ended between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The Japanese Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>   

Roosevelt accepted a plan for economic sanctions presented by Treasury Assistant [[Harry Dexter White]]. On July 26, 1941, a full scale economic blockade was implemented, all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. were froze and trade virtually ended between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The Japanese Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>   

Because Japan was poor in natural resources, its government viewed these steps, especially the embargo on oil, as a threat to the nation's survival. Japan's leaders responded by resolving to seize the resource-rich territories of Southeast Asia, even though that move would certainly result in war with the United States.  A proposal by Japanese Premier [[Fumimaro Konoe]] for a personal meeting with Roosevelt was rejected. Hull abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put in final shape an ultimatum. Hull's use of the harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme. <ref>''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time'', Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pgs. 735 - 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>

Because Japan was poor in natural resources, its government viewed these steps, especially the embargo on oil, as a threat to the nation's survival. Japan's leaders responded by resolving to seize the resource-rich territories of Southeast Asia, even though that move would certainly result in war with the United States.  A proposal by Japanese Premier [[Fumimaro Konoe]] for a personal meeting with Roosevelt was rejected. Hull abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put in final shape an ultimatum. Hull's use of the harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme. <ref>''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time'', Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pgs. 735 - 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>