| | #Therefore, neither side would initiate nuclear war | | #Therefore, neither side would initiate nuclear war |
| − | MAD was both reviled and praised during the Cold War. [[Game Theory|Game theorists]] spent much time debating various changes in policy and their effect on MAD. In the academic formulation, when M.A.D. is in effect, cooperation became a dominant strategy in the [[Prisoner's dilemma]] so long as defection would not lead to any discernible benefit. | + | MAD was both reviled and praised during the Cold War. [[Game Theory|Game theorists]] spent much time debating various changes in policy and their effect on MAD. In the academic formulation, when MAD is in effect, cooperation became a [[dominant strategy]] in the [[prisoner's dilemma]] because defection would not lead to any discernible benefit. |
| − | As a general rule, a 400 megaton supply of nuclear warheads is sufficient to assure the destruction of large nation, so in calculating nuclear stockpiles to determine if "M.A.D." exists, the goal is to see if you can eliminate the opposition's stockpile in a first strike to below 400 megatons. If you can, then, in the grim calculus of nuclear war, first strike becomes an option. However, this can vary greatly depending on the size and infrastructure of the nation, the overseas distribution of their nuclear capabilities, etc. | + | As a general rule, a 400 megaton supply of nuclear warheads is sufficient to assure the destruction of large nation, so in calculating nuclear stockpiles to determine if the conditions for MAD exist, the goal is to see if you can eliminate the opposition's stockpile in a [[first strike]] to below 400 megatons. If you can, then, in the grim calculus of nuclear war, first strike becomes an option. However, this can vary greatly depending on the size and infrastructure of the nation, the overseas distribution of their nuclear capabilities, etc. |