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18 bytes added ,  03:12, August 27, 2007
→‎Questioning the Premise: More rewording; headings
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** Therefore, the traditional Judeo-Christian God does not exist.
 
** Therefore, the traditional Judeo-Christian God does not exist.
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== Questioning the Premise ==
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== Questioning the Premises ==
    
The argument can be dismissed by dropping one or more of the givens:  that God is omniscient, that God is omnipotent, that God is omnibenevolent, or that evil exists.
 
The argument can be dismissed by dropping one or more of the givens:  that God is omniscient, that God is omnipotent, that God is omnibenevolent, or that evil exists.
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Also, rejecting the existence of evil would appear to contradict Scripture:  ''I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these [things].'' (Isaiah 45:7, KJV)
 
Also, rejecting the existence of evil would appear to contradict Scripture:  ''I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these [things].'' (Isaiah 45:7, KJV)
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''''Tapestry' view:'''
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== Questioning the logic ==
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However, the argument is flawed in that the conclusion that evil would not exist given an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God does not necessarily follow from the premises.
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The argument is flawed in that the conclusion that evil would not exist given an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God does not necessarily follow from the premises.
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That is, there is the question of whether an omnibenevolent God should want to prevent all evil.
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That is, there is nothing in the logic to show that an omnibenevolent God would necessarily want to prevent all evil.
 
If the allowance of evil serves some greater good, then the allowance of evil itself is not inconsistent with an omnibenevolent God.
 
If the allowance of evil serves some greater good, then the allowance of evil itself is not inconsistent with an omnibenevolent God.
 
For instance, if the exercise of free will means that evil can occur, is it better to create independent beings and allow free will or to not create at all?
 
For instance, if the exercise of free will means that evil can occur, is it better to create independent beings and allow free will or to not create at all?
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