Changes

The FBI knew of 5 Soviet agents throughout the war, Bentley added at least another 80, some of which were still employed in the US government at that time.  Her story at first was incredible, but the FBI soon determined Bentley’s allegations were born out by information already in Bureau files. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster008.pdf Vol. 8, pg. 3] pdf.</ref> By December, no fewer that 227 FBI agents were involved in the case. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, Vol. 8, pg. 6 pdf.</ref>

The FBI knew of 5 Soviet agents throughout the war, Bentley added at least another 80, some of which were still employed in the US government at that time.  Her story at first was incredible, but the FBI soon determined Bentley’s allegations were born out by information already in Bureau files. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster008.pdf Vol. 8, pg. 3] pdf.</ref> By December, no fewer that 227 FBI agents were involved in the case. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, Vol. 8, pg. 6 pdf.</ref>

For much of 1946 the suspects were surveilled, and other information came from elsewhere.  By December 1946 leaks began to develop, <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Memorandum for the Attorney General, December 20, 1946, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster081.pdf Vol. 81, pgs. 55 - 56] pdf.  In transmitting a summary of the investigation on [[Harry Magdoff]], Hoover urges the Attorney General to give consideration to the overall facts of the case before making the information available to any other government official.  Hoover complains that a summary report prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury had been "lost" and a copy furnished to the White House was found in a desk drawer at the [[War Assets Administration]] -- the agency Greg Silvermaster had been working in.</ref>  the press ran stories, Congressional interest was piqued, and the investigation compromised.

For much of 1946 the suspects were surveilled, and other information came from elsewhere.  By December 1946 leaks began to develop, <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Memorandum for the Attorney General, December 20, 1946, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster081.pdf Vol. 81, pgs. 55 - 56] pdf.  In transmitting a summary of the investigation on [[Harry Magdoff]], Hoover urges the Attorney General to give consideration to the overall facts of the case before making the information available to any other government official.  Hoover complains that a summary report prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury had been "lost" and a copy furnished to the White House was found in a desk drawer at the [[War Assets Administration]] -- the agency Greg Silvermaster had been working in.</ref>  the press ran stories, Congressional interest was piqued, and the investigation compromised.

==Failure to discharge security risks==

==Failure to discharge security risks==

In June of 1947, members of the [[Senate Appropriations Committee]] sent a confidential report to Secretary of State [[George Marshall]], in which they stated:  

In June of 1947, members of the [[Senate Appropriations Committee]] sent a confidential report to Secretary of State [[George Marshall]], in which they stated:  

The memorandum listed the names of nine of these State Department officials and said that they were "only a few of the hundreds now employed in varying capacities who are protected and allowed to remain despite the fact that their presence is an obvious hazard to national security." On June 24, 1947, Assistant Secretary of State John Peurifoy notified the chairman of the Senate subcommittee that ten persons had been dismissed from the department, five of whom had been listed in the memorandum. But from June 1947 until McCarthy's Wheeling speech in February 1950, the State Department did not fire one person as a loyalty or security risk. <ref>[http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jepeurifoy.htm John Emil Peurifoy, Foreign Service Office & United States Ambassador],  Arlington National Cemetery Website, retrieved 21 March 2007.</ref>

The memorandum listed the names of nine of these State Department officials and said that they were "only a few of the hundreds now employed in varying capacities who are protected and allowed to remain despite the fact that their presence is an obvious hazard to national security." On June 24, 1947, Assistant Secretary of State John Peurifoy notified the chairman of the Senate subcommittee that ten persons had been dismissed from the department, five of whom had been listed in the memorandum. But from June 1947 until McCarthy's Wheeling speech in February 1950, the State Department did not fire one person as a loyalty or security risk. <ref>[http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jepeurifoy.htm John Emil Peurifoy, Foreign Service Office & United States Ambassador],  Arlington National Cemetery Website, retrieved 21 March 2007.</ref>

In 1947 <ref>NSA Archives, National Cryptological Museum, [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sanders/214/other/handouts/VenonaChrono.html Venona Chronology]; "~September 1: Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer Robert J. Lamphere on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic. September: Carter W. Clarke of G-2 advises S. Wesley Reynolds, FBI, of successes at Arlington Hall on KGB espionage messages." </ref>, it was apparent that no individual in the U.S. Government realized that evidence of massive Soviet espionage within the government was developing on twin tracks. <ref>Robert Louis Benson, and Michael Warner, eds. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/preface.htm VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957,] pg. 9. Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1996. Robert L. Benson, works in the Office of Security, National Security Agency; Michael Warner, Deputy Chief of the CIA History Staff.</ref>  There was an [[FBI]] counterintelligence investigation <ref>Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Appendix A, 7. The Cold War]; "In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley informed the FBI of her activities as a Soviet courier, which in turn led to renewed interest in Chambers. In late August or early September 1947, the FBI was informed that the Army Security Agency had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages". </ref> which empanelled a grand jury in New York to look into defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations of espionage regarding high government officials, and the [[Army Signal Intelligence Service]] reading Soviet cipher decrypts <ref>National Security Agency, Venona Archives, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations,[http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html  The VENONA Breakthroughs]; "An Arlington Hall report on 22 July 1947 showed that the Soviet message traffic contained dozens, probably hundreds, of covernames, many of KGB agents, including ANTENNA and LIBERAL (later identified as Julius Rosenberg). One message mentioned that LIBERAL's wife was named "Ethel." General Carter W. Clarke, the assistant G-2, called the FBI liaison officer to G-2 and told him that the Army had begun to break into Soviet intelligence service traffic, and that the traffic indicated a massive Soviet espionage effort in the U.S.</ref> at [[Arlington Hall]].  It was a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.  Leaks in the investigation into the [[Greg_Silvermaster#Silvermaster_group|Silvermaster case]] began to threaten the successful prosecution. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Vol. 93, February 1947. Summary: Hoover memo expressing doubts about successful prosecution and statement that, because of leaks by the Department, "there is little which can be expected from any action now." Further Hoover memo of February 4, 1947, saying "investigative reports in this case would not be furnished to the Criminal Division [of Justice] because of the possibility that some of the material therein would be publicized."  See also January 27, 1947 J. Edgar Hoover Memorandum for the Attorney General, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf pgs. 31 -32].</ref>  So when McCarthy later made charges that the Truman administration knowingly protected Soviet agents, on the surface, this appeared to large sectors <ref>National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), [http://www.nacic.gov/history/CIReaderPlain/Vol3Chap1.pdf Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, Chap. 1, pg.47], "Polls taken at the time revealed that a majority of Americans believed that Communism at home and abroad was a serious threat to US security".</ref> of the American public<ref>Margaret Chase Smith, [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SmithDeclaration.pdf Declaration of Conscience, pg. 2], 1 June 1950, U.C. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 7894-95.  "The Democratic administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democtaric administration.  There are enough proved cases to make this point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges"; "..there have been enough proved cases, such as the ''[[Amerasia]]'' case, the [[Hiss]] case, the [[Coplon]] case, the [[Harry Gold|Gold]] case, to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations".</ref> as true.

In 1947 <ref>NSA Archives, National Cryptological Museum, [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sanders/214/other/handouts/VenonaChrono.html Venona Chronology]; "~September 1: Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer Robert J. Lamphere on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic. September: Carter W. Clarke of G-2 advises S. Wesley Reynolds, FBI, of successes at Arlington Hall on KGB espionage messages." </ref>, it was apparent that no individual in the U.S. Government realized that evidence of massive Soviet espionage within the government was developing on twin tracks. <ref>Robert Louis Benson, and Michael Warner, eds. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/preface.htm VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957,] pg. 9. Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1996. Robert L. Benson, works in the Office of Security, National Security Agency; Michael Warner, Deputy Chief of the CIA History Staff.</ref>  There was an [[FBI]] counterintelligence investigation <ref>Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Appendix A, 7. The Cold War]; "In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley informed the FBI of her activities as a Soviet courier, which in turn led to renewed interest in Chambers. In late August or early September 1947, the FBI was informed that the Army Security Agency had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages". </ref> which empanelled a grand jury in New York to look into defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations of espionage regarding high government officials, and the [[Army Signal Intelligence Service]] reading Soviet cipher decrypts <ref>National Security Agency, Venona Archives, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations,[http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html  The VENONA Breakthroughs]; "An Arlington Hall report on 22 July 1947 showed that the Soviet message traffic contained dozens, probably hundreds, of covernames, many of KGB agents, including ANTENNA and LIBERAL (later identified as Julius Rosenberg). One message mentioned that LIBERAL's wife was named "Ethel." General Carter W. Clarke, the assistant G-2, called the FBI liaison officer to G-2 and told him that the Army had begun to break into Soviet intelligence service traffic, and that the traffic indicated a massive Soviet espionage effort in the U.S.</ref> at [[Arlington Hall]].  It was a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.  Leaks in the investigation into the [[Greg_Silvermaster#Silvermaster_group|Silvermaster case]] began to threaten the successful prosecution. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Vol. 93, February 1947. Summary: Hoover memo expressing doubts about successful prosecution and statement that, because of leaks by the Department, "there is little which can be expected from any action now." Further Hoover memo of February 4, 1947, saying "investigative reports in this case would not be furnished to the Criminal Division [of Justice] because of the possibility that some of the material therein would be publicized."  See also January 27, 1947 J. Edgar Hoover Memorandum for the Attorney General, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf pgs. 31 -32].</ref>  So when McCarthy later made charges that the Truman administration knowingly protected Soviet agents, on the surface, this appeared to large sectors <ref>National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), [http://www.nacic.gov/history/CIReaderPlain/Vol3Chap1.pdf Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, Chap. 1, pg.47], "Polls taken at the time revealed that a majority of Americans believed that Communism at home and abroad was a serious threat to US security".</ref> of the American public<ref>Margaret Chase Smith, [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SmithDeclaration.pdf Declaration of Conscience, pg. 2], 1 June 1950, U.C. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 7894-95.  "The Democratic administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democratic administration.  There are enough proved cases to make this point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges"; "..there have been enough proved cases, such as the ''[[Amerasia]]'' case, the [[Hiss]] case, the [[Coplon]] case, the [[Harry Gold|Gold]] case, to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations".</ref> as true.

 

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associated of real espionage.{{fact-political}} Hoover told a House Committee in February 1950 that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associated of real espionage. Hoover told a House Committee in February 1950 that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

[[Image:Semenov.JPG|right|thumb|285px|Iulii Khariton with a copy of the first Soviet atomic bomb, detonated on August 29, 1949.]]

[[Image:Semenov.JPG|right|thumb|285px|Iulii Khariton with a copy of the first Soviet atomic bomb, detonated on August 29, 1949.]]

The Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the loop in intelligence sharing after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] had become more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have had considerable counter espionage information which would have been helpful to them in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic energy program, but they had not been aware of it until after Fuchs arrest They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value. The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects. <ref>W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,]9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency. </ref>

The Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the loop in intelligence sharing after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] had become more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have had considerable counter espionage information which would have been helpful to them in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic energy program, but they had not been aware of it until after Fuchs arrest They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value. The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects. <ref>W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,]9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency. </ref>