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The '''Munich Conference''' was in 1938 when [[Russia]], [[Germany]], [[Britain]], [[France]], and [[Italy]] met to decide how to cope with [[Germany]]’s aggression in [[Czechoslovakia]]. These [[League of Nations]] members decided to enforce a treaty with Germany where they would allow Germany to eliminate the boundaries of the [[Versailles Treaty]]. It was also agreed that the [[government]] of [[Poland]] would be protected and a boundary was set over which Germany would not be allowed to cross without risking full scale [[war]].  The policy of [[Appeasement]] was born out of the Munich Treaty.

The '''Munich Conference''' was in 1938 when [[Russia]], [[Germany]], [[Britain]], [[France]], and [[Italy]] met to decide how to cope with [[Germany]]’s aggression in [[Czechoslovakia]]. These [[League of Nations]] members decided to enforce a treaty with Germany where they would allow Germany to eliminate the boundaries of the [[Versailles Treaty]] and annex the [[Sudetenland]]. It was also agreed that the [[government]] of [[Poland]] would be protected and a boundary was set over which Germany would not be allowed to cross without risking full scale [[war]].  The policy of [[Appeasement]] was born out of the Munich Treaty.

Germany's land seizure in Czechoslovakia was allowed to stand uncontested.  Czechoslovakia was not given a say in this decision.  [[Neville Chamberlain]], the [[Prime Minister]] of Britain at that time, is best known for his role in piecing together the treaty and buying "peace in our time".

Germany's land seizure in Czechoslovakia was allowed to stand uncontested.  Czechoslovakia was not given a say in this decision.  [[Neville Chamberlain]], the [[Prime Minister]] of Britain at that time, is best known for his role in piecing together the treaty and buying "peace in our time".

As Hitler's legions rolled into Czechoslovakia <ref>International Military Tribunal Nuremberg, [http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-06/tgmwc-06-54-22.html Fifty-Fourth Day: Friday, 8th February, 1946], Page 207.</ref>, Under Secretary of State [[Sumner Welles]] claimed over the radio that President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] had sent a personal message to [[Mussolini]]<ref>[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/interwar/fdr13.htm President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) with a Message to Mussolini], Telegram, September 27 1938, U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, ''Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941'' (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943, pp. 427).</ref> and one to [[Hitler]] begging him to intervene and that, on this request, Mussolini had done so. As a result, Hitler had halted his soldiers and sent an invitation to Chamberlain to come to Munich. Five days later Secretary of War [[Harry Woodring]] made the same claim. And the White House secretariat put out a record of all the messages from the President synchronized with the events in Munich to prove that Roosevelt had turned the scales for peace. Later, in the 1940 campaign, [[Republican]] presidential challenger [[Wendell Willkie]] charged that Roosevelt had boasted of his part in the appeasement of Hitler. Secretary Hull denied this at the time, however Hull later admitted that Roosevelt did indeed send a "message to Mussolini" and one to Hitler<ref>[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/interwar/fdr14.htm President Roosevelt to the Chancellor of Germany (Hitler)], Telegram, September 27 1938, U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, ''Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941'' (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943, pp. 427-428).</ref> encouraging negotiations. Hull wrote "whether the actions taken by the President brought about these results it is impossible to say. But undoubtedly they exercised considerable influence." Hull produced a letter from King George VI to the President saying "I have little doubt that your efforts contributed largely to the result." <ref>Cordell Hull, ''Memoirs,'' New York Times, January 26 to March 6, 1948.</ref>

As Nazi Germany increased its aggression towards Czechoslovakia through subversion and infiltration (including support of the pro-Nazi Sudeten German Party of [[Konrad Henlein]] and its terrorist offshoots) <ref>International Military Tribunal Nuremberg, [http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-06/tgmwc-06-54-22.html Fifty-Fourth Day: Friday, 8th February, 1946], Page 207.</ref>, Under Secretary of State [[Sumner Welles]] claimed over the radio that President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] had sent a personal message to [[Mussolini]]<ref>[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/interwar/fdr13.htm President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) with a Message to Mussolini], Telegram, September 27 1938, U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, ''Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941'' (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943, pp. 427).</ref> and one to [[Hitler]] begging him to intervene and that, on this request, Mussolini had done so. As a result, Hitler had halted his soldiers and sent an invitation to Chamberlain to come to Munich. Five days later Secretary of War [[Harry Woodring]] made the same claim. And the White House secretariat put out a record of all the messages from the President synchronized with the events in Munich to prove that Roosevelt had turned the scales for peace. Later, in the 1940 campaign, [[Republican]] presidential challenger [[Wendell Willkie]] charged that Roosevelt had boasted of his part in the appeasement of Hitler. Secretary Hull denied this at the time, however Hull later admitted that Roosevelt did indeed send a "message to Mussolini" and one to Hitler<ref>[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/interwar/fdr14.htm President Roosevelt to the Chancellor of Germany (Hitler)], Telegram, September 27 1938, U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, ''Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941'' (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943, pp. 427-428).</ref> encouraging negotiations. Hull wrote "whether the actions taken by the President brought about these results it is impossible to say. But undoubtedly they exercised considerable influence." Hull produced a letter from King George VI to the President saying "I have little doubt that your efforts contributed largely to the result." <ref>Cordell Hull, ''Memoirs,'' New York Times, January 26 to March 6, 1948.</ref>

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