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In August, 1941, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin D. Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]]. On November 18, 1941, Secretary of the Treasury [[Henry Morgenthau]]  sent to Secretary of State Hull a memorandum drafted by White on the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan. <ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White received through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>  At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref>  In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. <ref> Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Hull put in final shape the ultimatum. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo and Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> In this ten-point ultimatum, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union. War between the United States and Japan - the lone obstacle to [[Comintern]] designs in the Far East - was the primary aim of Soviet foreign policy in the Far East.

In August, 1941, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin D. Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]]. On November 18, 1941, Secretary of the Treasury [[Henry Morgenthau]]  sent to Secretary of State Hull a memorandum drafted by White on the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan. <ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White received through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>  At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref>  In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. <ref> Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Hull put in final shape the ultimatum. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo and Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> In this ten-point ultimatum, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union. War between the United States and Japan - the lone obstacle to [[Comintern]] designs in the Far East - was the primary aim of Soviet foreign policy in the Far East.

On November 8, 1945 the [[FBI]] notified the [[White House]] with a provisional summary of defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]’s revelations. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster016.pdf Vol. 16, pgs. 98 - 100] pdf.</ref>  President Truman, whose motto was "The Buck Stops Here," telephone FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] on November 14 and told Hoover to confer with Secretary of State [[James Byrnes]] on the various matters of Soviet espionage.  <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster016.pdf Vol. 16, pg. 101; pgs. 102 -104] pdf.</ref>  On May 4 1946 President Truman announced the appointment of White to head the newly created post-War institution, the [[International Monetary Fund]].  White, like [[Greg Silvermaster]] and others, rather than be fired as a Security risk at a time when there was public support for the execution of spies, received a transfer, promotion and increase in pay grade.

On November 8, 1945 the [[FBI]] notified the [[White House]] with a provisional summary of defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]’s revelations. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster016.pdf Vol. 16, pgs. 98 - 100] pdf.</ref>  President Truman, whose motto was "The Buck Stops Here," telephoned FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] on November 14 and told Hoover to confer with Secretary of State [[James Byrnes]] on the various matters of Soviet espionage.  <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster016.pdf Vol. 16, pg. 101; pgs. 102 -104] pdf.</ref>  On May 4, 1946 Truman announced the appointment of White to head the newly created [[International Monetary Fund]].  White, like [[Greg Silvermaster]] and others, rather than be fired as a Security risk at a time when there was public support for the execution of spies, received a transfer, promotion and increase in pay grade.

==Oppenheimer and atomic espionage==

==Oppenheimer and atomic espionage==