Changes

The word '''McCarthyism'''

The word '''McCarthyism'''

"was coined in the bowels of NKVD headquarters at 3 Dzerzhinsky Square in Moscow and first published in the Communist ''Daily Worker,'' Moscow’s U.S. house organ with the justified belief that it would be enthusiastically picked up and used by America’s useful liberal idiots." [http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID={45A7D4B2-DD6F-4B87-934A-F1811BD31FC5}]

"was coined in the bowels of NKVD headquarters at 3 Dzerzhinsky Square in Moscow and first published in the Communist ''Daily Worker,'' Moscow’s U.S. house organ with the justified belief that it would be enthusiastically picked up and used by America’s useful liberal idiots." [http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID={45A7D4B2-DD6F-4B87-934A-F1811BD31FC5}]

The [[Venona intercepts]] prove that McCarthy was right about the extent of Soviet spies in the U.S. government.  

The [[Venona intercepts]] prove that McCarthy was right about the extent of Soviet spies in the U.S. government.  

==Pretext==

==Pretext==

==Amerasia cover up==

==Amerasia cover up==

On June 6 1945, 6 persons, including three U.S. government officials, were arrested on conspiracy and espionage charges related to possession of roughly 1000 stolen classified Government documents in the offices of ''[[Amerasia]]'' magazine.  ''Amerasia'' had published classified materials verbatim from the United States wartime intelligence service, the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS). FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover believed he had an "airtight case," and Justice Department officials were ready to prosecute.  [[Thomas Corcoran]] (Tommy the Cork), a former [[Franklin Roosevelt]] personal adviser who lived in the [[White House]] at the President's side and afterward became a prominent Washington lawyer and fixer, worked with the Truman administration to cover up the case.  Soviet agent [[Duncan Lee]], counsel to OSS head General William Donovan, was the highest ranking [[KGB]] operative among nearly two dozen known Soviet agents who penetrated the OSS, worked in Corcoran's Washington law firm. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster092.pdf Vol. 92, pgs. 20 - 21] pdf, January 26, 1947. Biographical details and extended wrap-up on Duncan C. Lee, formerly of OSS, [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations concerning him, his contacts with [[Donald Wheeler]] and [[Mary Price]], and his employment by the law firm of President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] adviser [[Thomas Corcoran]]. </ref>

On June 6 1945, 6 persons, including three U.S. government officials, were arrested on conspiracy and espionage charges related to possession of roughly 1000 stolen classified Government documents in the offices of ''[[Amerasia]]'' magazine.  ''Amerasia'' had published classified materials verbatim from the United States wartime intelligence service, the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS). FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover believed he had an "airtight case," and Justice Department officials were ready to prosecute.  [[Thomas Corcoran]] (Tommy the Cork), a former [[Franklin Roosevelt]] personal adviser who lived in the [[White House]] at the President's side and afterward became a prominent Washington lawyer and fixer, worked with the Truman administration to cover up the case.  Soviet agent [[Duncan Lee]], counsel to OSS head General William Donovan, was the highest ranking [[KGB]] operative among nearly two dozen known Soviet agents who penetrated the OSS, worked in Corcoran's Washington law firm. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster092.pdf Vol. 92, pgs. 20 - 21] pdf, January 26, 1947. Biographical details and extended wrap-up on Duncan C. Lee, formerly of OSS, [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations concerning him, his contacts with [[Donald Wheeler]] and [[Mary Price]], and his employment by the law firm of President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] adviser [[Thomas Corcoran]]. </ref>

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associated of real espionage.  Hoover told a House Committee in February 1950 that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associated of real espionage.  Hoover told a House Committee in February 1950 that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

 

The Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the loop in intelligence sharing after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] had become more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have had considerable counter espionage information which would have been helpful to them in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic energy program, but they had not been aware of it until after Fuchs arrest They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value. The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects. <ref>W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,]9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency. </ref>

The Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the loop in intelligence sharing after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] had become more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have had considerable counter espionage information which would have been helpful to them in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic energy program, but they had not been aware of it until after Fuchs arrest They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value. The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects. <ref>W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,]9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency. </ref>

==Hiss and the UN==

==Hiss and the UN==

 

When the Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) was created in 1944, [[Alger Hiss]] became the deputy director - a sensitive and key position. In August of 1944, Hiss was executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. When he returned, all matters pertaining to the new organization came under his direct supervision. With [[Harry Hopkins]], [[Cordell Hull]], and others, Hiss worked on the first drafts of the [[United Nations]] Charter. <ref>Ralph de Toledano and Victor Lasky, [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Seeds_Of_Treason-Ralph_de_Toledano_and_Victor_Lasky-1950-278pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=343&PHPSESSID=b964065077a1de19538c4c7b1cf9e825 ''Seeds of Treason''], (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950), pg. 107.</ref> Hiss negotiated privately with the ailing U.S. president, [[Franklin Roosevelt]], and [[CPSU]] General Secretary [[Josef Stalin]] at the [[Yalta conference]]. <ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 109.</ref>  It was here that FDR agreed to allow the Soviet Union to occupy Poland and set up a [[Comintern]] affiliated [[puppet state]] -- a clear violation of the principals of self-determination expressed in the [[Atlantic Charter]], and the very cause over which Great Britain went to war with Germany in September of 1939.

When the Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) was created in 1944, [[Alger Hiss]] became the deputy director - a sensitive and key position. In August of 1944, Hiss was executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. When he returned, all matters pertaining to the new organization came under his direct supervision. With [[Harry Hopkins]], [[Cordell Hull]], and others, Hiss worked on the first drafts of the [[United Nations]] Charter. <ref>Ralph de Toledano and Victor Lasky, [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Seeds_Of_Treason-Ralph_de_Toledano_and_Victor_Lasky-1950-278pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=343&PHPSESSID=b964065077a1de19538c4c7b1cf9e825 ''Seeds of Treason''], (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950), pg. 107.</ref> Hiss negotiated privately with the ailing U.S. president, [[Franklin Roosevelt]], and [[CPSU]] General Secretary [[Josef Stalin]] at the [[Yalta conference]]. <ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 109.</ref>  It was here that FDR agreed to allow the Soviet Union to occupy Poland and set up a [[Comintern]] affiliated [[puppet state]] -- a clear violation of the principals of self-determination expressed in the [[Atlantic Charter]], and the very cause over which Great Britain went to war with Germany in September of 1939.

==Oppenheimer and atomic espionage==

==Oppenheimer and atomic espionage==

An 86 year old [[Pavel Sudoplatov]] wrote in his memoirs,  

An 86 year old [[Pavel Sudoplatov]] wrote in his memoirs,  

{{Cquote|My Administration for Special Tasks was responsible for sabotage, kidnapping, and assassination of our enemies beyond the country's borders. It was a special department working in the Soviet security service....I was also in charge <ref>[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&doc_id=43900&group_id=13349 Was Oppenheimer a Soviet Spy?] A Roundtable Discussion with Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Gregg Herken and [[Hayden Peake]]. The Cold War International History Project. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.  Peake, curator of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]’s (CIA) Historical Intelligence Collection [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/P_folder/peake.html], states, "The content of the ''Sacred Secrets'' Merkulov letter is also questioned on the point of whether it is or is not "smoking gun" evidence that Robert Oppenheimer was a Soviet source or agent while he worked on the atom bomb project during WWII. ...In short, I accept the letter and its implications." </ref> of the Soviet espionage effort to obtain the secrets of the [[atomic bomb]] from America and Great Britain. I set up a network of illegals <ref>H.B. Laes, Theory of Fielding, [http://web.archive.org/web/20050204173143/http://www.tof.blogspot.com/#kgborg KGB Organization]. Retieved September 04, 2007. [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/spycases_folder/bomb_folder/bombgenm-q.html]</ref> who convinced [[Robert Oppenheimer]]<ref>[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034F6F1-96B6-175C-9170648C02EA02F8&sort=Collection&item=Post%20Stalin%20succession%20struggle Merkulov to Beria], 2 October 1944.  The letters states, "In 1942 one of the leaders of scientific work on [uranium] in the USA, Professor Oppenheimer while being an unlisted (nglastny) member of the apparat of [[Comrade Browder]] informed us about the beginning of work.  On the request of Comrade Kheifitz, confirmed by Comrade Browder, he provided cooperation in access to research for several of our tested sources including a relative of [Comrade Browder]"</ref>, [[Enrico Fermi]], [[Leo Szilard]], [[Bruno Pontecorvo]], [[Alan Nunn May]], [[Klaus Fuchs]], and other scientists in America and Great Britain to share atomic secrets with us.<ref>Pavel Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks : Memoirs of an Unwanted Spymaster'', Little Brown and Company, London, 1994,  pg. 3. </ref>}}

{{Cquote|My Administration for Special Tasks was responsible for sabotage, kidnapping, and assassination of our enemies beyond the country's borders. It was a special department working in the Soviet security service....I was also in charge <ref>[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&doc_id=43900&group_id=13349 Was Oppenheimer a Soviet Spy?] A Roundtable Discussion with Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Gregg Herken and [[Hayden Peake]]. The Cold War International History Project. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.  Peake, curator of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]’s (CIA) Historical Intelligence Collection [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/P_folder/peake.html], states, "The content of the ''Sacred Secrets'' Merkulov letter is also questioned on the point of whether it is or is not "smoking gun" evidence that Robert Oppenheimer was a Soviet source or agent while he worked on the atom bomb project during WWII. ...In short, I accept the letter and its implications." </ref> of the Soviet espionage effort to obtain the secrets of the [[atomic bomb]] from America and Great Britain. I set up a network of illegals <ref>H.B. Laes, Theory of Fielding, [http://web.archive.org/web/20050204173143/http://www.tof.blogspot.com/#kgborg KGB Organization]. Retieved September 04, 2007. [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/spycases_folder/bomb_folder/bombgenm-q.html]</ref> who convinced [[Robert Oppenheimer]]<ref>[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034F6F1-96B6-175C-9170648C02EA02F8&sort=Collection&item=Post%20Stalin%20succession%20struggle Merkulov to Beria], 2 October 1944.  The letters states, "In 1942 one of the leaders of scientific work on [uranium] in the USA, Professor Oppenheimer while being an unlisted (nglastny) member of the apparat of [[Comrade Browder]] informed us about the beginning of work.  On the request of Comrade Kheifitz, confirmed by Comrade Browder, he provided cooperation in access to research for several of our tested sources including a relative of [Comrade Browder]"</ref>, [[Enrico Fermi]], [[Leo Szilard]], [[Bruno Pontecorvo]], [[Alan Nunn May]], [[Klaus Fuchs]], and other scientists in America and Great Britain to share atomic secrets with us.<ref>Pavel Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks : Memoirs of an Unwanted Spymaster'', Little Brown and Company, London, 1994,  pg. 3. </ref>}}

{{Cquote|The most vital information for developing the first Soviet atomic bomb came from scientists designing the American atomic bomb at [[Los Alamos]], New Mexico...Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard, and Szilard's secretary were often quoted in the NKVD files from 1942 to 1945 as sources for information on the development of the first American atomic bomb. It is in the record that on several occasions they agreed to share information on [[nuclear weapons]] with Soviet scientists. At first they were motivated by fear of [[Hitler]]; they believed that the Germans might produce the first atomic bomb. Then the Danish physicist [[Niels Bohr]] helped strengthen their own inclinations to share nuclear secrets with the world academic community. By sharing their knowledge with the Soviet Union, the chance of beating the Germans to the bomb would be increased. <ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 172. </ref>}}

{{Cquote|The most vital information for developing the first Soviet atomic bomb came from scientists designing the American atomic bomb at [[Los Alamos]], New Mexico...Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard, and Szilard's secretary were often quoted in the NKVD files from 1942 to 1945 as sources for information on the development of the first American atomic bomb. It is in the record that on several occasions they agreed to share information on [[nuclear weapons]] with Soviet scientists. At first they were motivated by fear of [[Hitler]]; they believed that the Germans might produce the first atomic bomb. Then the Danish physicist [[Niels Bohr]] helped strengthen their own inclinations to share nuclear secrets with the world academic community. By sharing their knowledge with the Soviet Union, the chance of beating the Germans to the bomb would be increased. <ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 172. </ref>}}

==China and subversion of the Four Policeman==

==China and subversion of the Four Policeman==

On January 1, 1942, the Soviet and [[Chinese Nationalist]] ambassadors in Washington joined with President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] and British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] in signing the [[Allied_powers#United_Nations_Declaration|Declaration by United Nations]]. Twenty-two other nations added their signatures creating the wartime alliance.  The [[Atlantic Charter]] was hailed as "a common program of purposes."  FDR apparently himself thought up the name "United Nations."  

The order in which the declaration was signed, first by the four major powers and then the other nations, reflected FDR's belief in the moral concept of "trusteeship of the powerful" for the well-being of the less powerful. The central proposal was the prompt creation of the United Nations Authority composed of all the signers of the "Grand Design",<ref>''The Roosevelt Myth'', John T. Flynn, Fox and Wilkes, 1948, Book 3, Chapter 9, Section 2. ''Roosevelt's Great Design and Casablanca'', [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/The_Roosevelt_Myth-John_T_Flynn-1948-444pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=276&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pgs. 345] pdf.</ref> led by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Nationalist China. The President privately referred to these four major powers as the Four Policemen. <ref>Townsend Hooper and Douglas Brinkley, [http://www.ninehundred.net/~jveon/fdrbook.html ''FDR and the Creation of the U.N''], New Haven, 2000, pgs. 45 50.</ref>  In October 1943 at the [[Moscow Conference]] the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the [[Kuomintang]] committed themselves to "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organisation...after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation... they will confer and co-operate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period. " <ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html Joint Four Power Declaration], Moscow Conference, October, 1943.</ref>

==Korea and the nuclear arms race==

==Korea and the nuclear arms race==