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On November 25, 1941 Lattimore dispatched from China an anxious cable to Currie in the [[White House]] arguing against a proposed diplomatic understanding between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the [[Silvermaster group]].<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> [[Harry Dexter White]]'s harsh, demanding language in the ultimatum only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Japanese Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the ultimatum to Japan after Congress investigated the [[Pearl Harbor attack]]. <ref> Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref> Prof. Anthony Kubek has written that Lattimore, by this one act, designed to accomplish the Soviet objective of promoting war between the United States and Japan -- did more to promote the Sovietization of China than in any other act of his career. All Comintern designs for conquest of China hinged upon destroying Japan and the balance of power in the Pacific. <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103]  Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]</ref>

On November 25, 1941 Lattimore dispatched from China an anxious cable to Currie in the [[White House]] arguing against a proposed diplomatic understanding between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the [[Silvermaster group]].<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> [[Harry Dexter White]]'s harsh, demanding language in the ultimatum only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Japanese Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the ultimatum to Japan after Congress investigated the [[Pearl Harbor attack]]. <ref> Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref> Prof. Anthony Kubek has written that Lattimore, by this one act, designed to accomplish the Soviet objective of promoting war between the United States and Japan -- did more to promote the Sovietization of China than in any other act of his career. All Comintern designs for conquest of China hinged upon destroying Japan and the balance of power in the Pacific. <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103]  Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]</ref>

Defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified that Lattimore had been hand picked by the Comintern "to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and relations to the Soviet Union." Lattimore was thought to be a man "who could put out [[propaganda]] and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists." According to Budenz "the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy," but the language employed 'Was non-Soviet in character.' " <ref>Testimony of Louis Francis Budenz, August 22, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings. Part 2, pp. 522-23.</ref> When, on June 15 1943, Lattimore instructed Joseph Barnes<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791284,00.html ''Tongue-Tied''], [[Time magazine]], Feb. 07, 1944.</ref> to replace the non-Communist Chinese of the U.S. [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) with Communists, OWI did so. On July 14 [[Thomas A. Bisson]], in the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] publication, ''Far Eastern Survey'', referred to [[Maoist]] forces as the "democratic China."  The disinformation was widely repeated among journalists and academics. Lattimore, [[Frederick Field]] and others, in the ''New York Times'' of May 14, 1944, wrote of China's "agrarian reformers."  Vice-President [[Henry Wallace]] was sent on a fifty-two-day, twenty-seven-thousand-mile trip to Siberia, China, and Mongolia. <ref>''Yalta Betrayal'', Wittmer, 1953, pg. 58. Retrieved from GELO.com [http://www.ogleo.com/search/ogleo-History_of_CzechoslovakiaHistory of Czechoslovakia] 05/08/07.</ref>  In July and August 1943, the Chinese Communist forces -- in the midst of the war -- joined with the Japanese armies to inflict a serious defeat on Kuomintang troops allied with the United States.  <ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Claxton Printers, 1953, pg. 36.</ref>

Defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified that Lattimore had been hand picked by the Comintern "to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and relations to the Soviet Union." Lattimore was thought to be a man "who could put out [[propaganda]] and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists." According to Budenz "the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy," but the language employed 'Was non-Soviet in character.' " <ref>Testimony of Louis Francis Budenz, August 22, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings. Part 2, pp. 522-23.</ref> When, on June 15 1943, Lattimore instructed Joseph Barnes<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791284,00.html ''Tongue-Tied''], [[Time magazine]], Feb. 07, 1944.</ref> to replace the non-Communist Chinese of the U.S. [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) with Communists, OWI did so. On July 14 [[Thomas A. Bisson]], in the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] (IPR) publication, ''Far Eastern Survey'', referred to [[Maoist]] forces as the "democratic China."  The disinformation was widely repeated among journalists and academics. Lattimore, [[Frederick Field]] and others, in the ''New York Times'' of May 14, 1944, wrote of China's "agrarian reformers."  Vice-President [[Henry Wallace]] was sent on a fifty-two-day, twenty-seven-thousand-mile trip to Siberia, China, and Mongolia. <ref>''Yalta Betrayal'', Wittmer, 1953, pg. 58. Retrieved from GELO.com [http://www.ogleo.com/search/ogleo-History_of_CzechoslovakiaHistory of Czechoslovakia] 05/08/07.</ref>  In July and August 1943, the Chinese Communist forces -- in the midst of the war -- joined with the Japanese armies to inflict a serious defeat on Kuomintang troops allied with the United States.  <ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Claxton Printers, 1953, pg. 36.</ref>

Chiang Kai-shek himself claimed that Harry Dexter White and his staff sabotaged his government's economic policies.  The U.S. government made a commitment to Chiang in writing to supply $200 million in gold to Nationalist China <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', London, 1974, pg. 333.</ref> in 1943 at a time when inflation was spiraling out of control.<ref>John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, ''Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, New Haven Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 142-145 ISBN 0-300-08462-5 </ref> White's policy prevented the shipment until it was too late to be effective in stemming the inflation. In a December 9, 1944 memo to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, White wrote,  

Chiang Kai-shek himself claimed that Harry Dexter White and his staff sabotaged his government's economic policies.  The U.S. government made a commitment to Chiang in writing to supply $200 million in gold to Nationalist China <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', London, 1974, pg. 333.</ref> in 1943 at a time when inflation was spiraling out of control.<ref>John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, ''Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, New Haven Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 142-145 ISBN 0-300-08462-5 </ref> White's policy prevented the shipment until it was too late to be effective in stemming the inflation. In a December 9, 1944 memo to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, White wrote,