Changes

==Amerasia cover up==

==Amerasia cover up==

On June 6 1945, 6 persons, including three U.S. government officials, were arrested on conspiracy and espionage charges related to possession of roughly 1000 stolen classified Government documents in the offices of ''[[Amerasia]]'' magazine.  ''Amerasia'' had published classified materials verbatim from the United States wartime intelligence service, the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS). FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover believed he had an "airtight case," and Justice Department officials were ready to prosecute.  [[Thomas Corcoran]] (Tommy the Cork), a former [[Franklin Roosevelt]] personal adviser who lived in the [[White House]] at the President's side and afterward became a prominent Washington lawyer and fixer, worked with the Truman administration to cover up the case.  Soviet agent [[Duncan Lee]], counsel to OSS head General William Donovan, was the highest ranking [[KGB]] operative among nearly two dozen known Soviet agents who penetrated the OSS, worked in Corcoran's Washington law firm. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster092.pdf Vol. 92, pgs. 20 - 21] pdf, January 26, 1947. Biographical details and extended wrap-up on Duncan C. Lee, formerly of OSS, [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations concerning him, his contacts with [[Donald Wheeler]] and [[Mary Price]], and his employment by the law firm of President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] adviser [[Thomas Corcoran]]. </ref>

On June 6 1945, less than a month after the War in Europe ended and while the pacific War was winding down, 6 persons, including three U.S. government officials, were arrested on conspiracy and espionage charges related to possession of roughly 1000 stolen classified Government documents in the offices of ''[[Amerasia]]'' magazine.  ''Amerasia'' had published classified materials verbatim from the United States wartime intelligence service, the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS). FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover believed he had an "airtight case," and Justice Department officials were ready to prosecute.  [[Thomas Corcoran]] (Tommy the Cork), a former [[Franklin Roosevelt]] personal adviser who lived in the [[White House]] at the President's side and afterward became a prominent Washington lawyer and fixer, worked with the Truman administration to cover up the case.  Soviet agent [[Duncan Lee]], who served as counsel to OSS chief General William Donovan and was the highest ranking [[KGB]] operative among nearly two dozen Soviet agents who penetrated the OSS, after the War was working in Corcoran's Washington law firm. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster092.pdf Vol. 92, pgs. 20 - 21] pdf, January 26, 1947. Biographical details and extended wrap-up on Duncan C. Lee, formerly of OSS, [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations concerning him, his contacts with [[Donald Wheeler]] and [[Mary Price]], and his employment by the law firm of President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] adviser [[Thomas Corcoran]]. </ref>

A transmission from [[Soviet Military Intelligence]] (GRU) agents in New York on June 16, 1943 to Moscow read,

A transmission from [[Soviet Military Intelligence]] (GRU) agents in New York on June 16, 1943 to Moscow read,

==The [[Silvermaster case]]==

==The [[Silvermaster case]]==

[[Image:Fbisilvermasterfilevol15p4.JPG|right|250px|thumb|CPUSA defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified he could name 400 individuals involved in the [[CPUSA#Secret_apparatus|Communist conspiracy]]; <ref>[http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docId=ft296nb15t&chunk.id=d0e6193&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e4718&brand=eschol FBI Headquarters File 100-63, Louis Francis Budenz, Internal Security—C, Serial 122.]</ref> Hayden Peake, Curator of the [[CIA]]'s Historical Intelligence Collection stated, "[[Venona]] makes absolutely clear that they had active agents in the [[U.S. State Department]], [[Treasury Department]], [[Justice Department]], [[LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee|Senate committee]] staffs, the military services, the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS), the [[Manhattan Project]], and the [[White House]], as well as wartime agencies. No modern government was more thoroughly penetrated."<ref>[[Hayden B. Peake]], [http://web.archive.org/web/20060820054409/http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/2000/summer/re2-su0.htm ''The Venona Progeny''], Naval War College Review, Summer 2000, Vol. LIII, No. 3. [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/P_folder/peake.html]</ref>]]

[[Image:Fbisilvermasterfilevol15p4.JPG|right|250px|thumb|CPUSA defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified he could name 400 individuals involved in the [[CPUSA#Secret_apparatus|Communist conspiracy]]; <ref>[http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docId=ft296nb15t&chunk.id=d0e6193&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e4718&brand=eschol FBI Headquarters File 100-63, Louis Francis Budenz, Internal Security—C, Serial 122.]</ref> Hayden Peake, Curator of the [[CIA]]'s Historical Intelligence Collection stated, "[[Venona]] makes absolutely clear that they had active agents in the [[U.S. State Department]], [[Treasury Department]], [[Justice Department]], [[LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee|Senate committee]] staffs, the military services, the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS), the [[Manhattan Project]], and the [[White House]], as well as wartime agencies. No modern government was more thoroughly penetrated."<ref>[[Hayden B. Peake]], [http://web.archive.org/web/20060820054409/http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/2000/summer/re2-su0.htm ''The Venona Progeny''], Naval War College Review, Summer 2000, Vol. LIII, No. 3. [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/P_folder/peake.html]</ref>]]

In November 1945 a courier from a very large [[CPUSA#Secret_apparatus|CPUSA underground apparatus]] which operated in numerous federal agencies throughout [[World War II]], including the [[White House]], defected to the [[FBI]].  The [[KGB]] had removed [[Elizabeth Bentley]] from overseeing at least 80 KGB sources late in the war.  When she realized she knew too much, was no longer of use to the KGB and her life was in danger, she told her story in a deposition.

In November 1945 when the War was finally over ,a courier from a very large [[CPUSA#Secret_apparatus|CPUSA underground apparatus]] operating in numerous federal agencies throughout the [[New Deal]],which included the [[White House]], defected to the [[FBI]].  The [[KGB]] had removed [[Elizabeth Bentley]] from overseeing at least 80 KGB sources late in the war.  When she realized she knew too much, was no longer of use to the KGB and her life was in danger, she told her story in a deposition to the FBI. Bentley was assigned covername "Gregory" to protect her identity, and the highly secret investigation was referred to as "the Gregory Case."   

to the FBI. Bentley was assigned covername "Gregory" to protect her identity, and the highly secret investigation was referred to as "the Gregory Case."   

The FBI knew of 5 Soviet agents during the war, Bentley added at least another 80, some of them still employed in the government at that time.  Her story at first was incredible, and embarrassing to the FBI, but it soon was determined that Bentley’s allegations were borne out by information already in Bureau files. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster008.pdf Vol. 8, pg. 3] pdf.</ref> By December, no fewer than 227 FBI agents were involved in the case. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, Vol. 8, pg. 6 pdf.</ref>

The FBI knew of 5 Soviet agents during the war, Bentley added at least another 80, some of them still employed in the government at that time.  Her story at first was incredible, even embarrassing to the FBI, but it soon was determined that Bentley’s allegations were borne out by information already in Bureau files. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster008.pdf Vol. 8, pg. 3] pdf.</ref> By December, no fewer than 227 FBI agents were investigating in the case. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, Vol. 8, pg. 6 pdf.</ref>

For much of 1946 the suspects were surveilled, and other information came from [[Igor Guzenko]] <ref>Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945, Central Intelligence Agency, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/part1.htm Igor Gouzenko file. 5 pages].</ref> , a Soviet code clerk who defected in Canada, and the [[Army Signals Intelligence Service]] which began secretly reading [[KGB]] communications with Moscow. In the later part of February a 194 page report based upon Bentley's deposition entitled, ''Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government'' <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster023.pdf Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government"], Vol. 23, pgs. 55 - 272, February 21, 1946. Includes alphabetical index at end.</ref> was transmitted to Secretary of State [[George Marshall]] an other agencies.  By December of 1946 leaks were developing. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Memorandum for the Attorney General, December 20, 1946, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster081.pdf Vol. 81, pgs. 55 - 56] pdf.  In transmitting a summary of the investigation on [[Harry Magdoff]], Hoover urges the Attorney General to give consideration to the overall facts of the case before making the information available to any other government official.  Hoover complains that a summary report prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury had been "lost" and a copy furnished to the White House was found in a desk drawer at the [[War Assets Administration]] -- the agency Greg Silvermaster had been working in.</ref>  

For much of 1946 the suspects were surveilled, other information came from [[Igor Guzenko]],<ref>Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945, Central Intelligence Agency, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/part1.htm Igor Gouzenko file. 5 pages].</ref> a Soviet code clerk who defected in Canada. The FBI was unaware at this point the [[Army Signals Intelligence Service]] was secretly reading [[KGB]] communications with Moscow.  

In the later part of February a 194 page report based upon Bentley's deposition entitled, ''Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government'' <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster023.pdf Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government"], Vol. 23, pgs. 55 - 272, February 21, 1946. Includes alphabetical index at end.</ref> was transmitted to Secretary of State [[George Marshall]] an other agencies.  By December of 1946 leaks were developing. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Memorandum for the Attorney General, December 20, 1946, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster081.pdf Vol. 81, pgs. 55 - 56] pdf.  In transmitting a summary of the investigation on [[Harry Magdoff]], Hoover urges the Attorney General to give consideration to the overall facts of the case before making the information available to any other government official.  Hoover complains that a summary report prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury had been "lost" and a copy furnished to the White House was found in a desk drawer at the [[War Assets Administration]] -- the agency Greg Silvermaster had been working in.</ref>  

In January of 1947, Edward Morgan of the FBI was asked to make an objective analysis of the case. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memo_Morgan_to_Clegg%2C_Janaury_14%2C_1947 Morgan to Clegg, January 14, 1947].</ref>  Morgan writes, "Coming in after the event as the Bureau did, we are now on the outside looking in, with the rather embarrassing responsibility of having a most serious case of Soviet espionage laid in our laps without a decent opportunity to make it stick. This very circumstance, however, necessitates pursuing more direct methods."  Without [[Venona]] evidence, Morgan observes,  "the case is no more than the word of [Bentley]  against that of the several conspirators. The likely result would be an acquittal under very embarrassing circumstances."   

In January of 1947, Edward Morgan of the FBI was asked to make an objective analysis of the case. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memo_Morgan_to_Clegg%2C_Janaury_14%2C_1947 Morgan to Clegg, January 14, 1947].</ref>  Morgan writes, "Coming in after the event as the Bureau did, we are now on the outside looking in, with the rather embarrassing responsibility of having a most serious case of Soviet espionage laid in our laps without a decent opportunity to make it stick. This very circumstance, however, necessitates pursuing more direct methods."  Not knowing of the super secret [[Venona project]] yet, Morgan observes,  "the case is no more than the word of [Bentley]  against that of the several conspirators. The likely result would be an acquittal under very embarrassing circumstances."   

Morgan suggests it is possible “some of the lesser lights among the subjects would crack during the course of a careful and pointed interview" and concludes with the recommendation "That one of the subjects of this case, probably the weakest sister, be contacted with a view to making him an informant...Failing in this respect, that immediately the other subjects be exhaustively interviewed. Since an interview with one would virtually amount to putting all of them on notice, it would seem logical to conduct such interviews as nearly simultaneously as possible....That failing to break any of the subjects, serious consideration be given to exposing this lousy outfit and at least hounding them from the Federal Service. Several possibilities exist in this regard but this would seem to be a bridge to cross when we get to it."

Morgan suggests it is possible “some of the lesser lights among the subjects would crack during the course of a careful and pointed interview" and concludes with the recommendation "That one of the subjects of this case, probably the weakest sister, be contacted with a view to making him an informant...Failing in this respect, that immediately the other subjects be exhaustively interviewed. Since an interview with one would virtually amount to putting all of them on notice, it would seem logical to conduct such interviews as nearly simultaneously as possible....That failing to break any of the subjects, serious consideration be given to exposing this lousy outfit and at least hounding them from the Federal Service. Several possibilities exist in this regard but this would seem to be a bridge to cross when we get to it."

Press leaks continued from an Executive Conference formed of DOJ prosecutors and FBI investigators discussing how to proceed.  In a hand written margin note from a memo dated January 23, 1947, Hoover writes, "in view of all the 'gabbing' done by the Dept to the Press there is little which can be expected from <u>any</u> action now." <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Tamm to the Director, January 23, 1947, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf Vol. 93, pgs. 20 -22] pdf.</ref>  Four days later Hoover, in a somber tone, recommends to the Attorney General, "I am of the opinion...it will be impossible to continue the investigation....the subjects...are now all very security conscious... any attempt to interrogate them, either by Bureau agents or before a grand jury, would produce nothing. Obviously, this situation leaves only the third alternative; that is, that the Department furnish to the employing departments the basic data concerning the activities of the individual subjects as a possible means of concluding the case. It is assumed, of course, that the employing departments will take administrative action against the subjects who are employed in these departments." <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Memorandum_for_the_Attorney_General%2C_January_27%2C_1947 Memorandum for the Attorney General, January 27, 1947].</ref>

Press leaks continued from an Executive Conference formed of DOJ prosecutors and FBI investigators discussing how to proceed.  In a hand written margin note from a memo dated January 23, 1947, Hoover writes, "in view of all the 'gabbing' done by the Dept to the Press there is little which can be expected from <u>any</u> action now." <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Tamm to the Director, January 23, 1947, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf Vol. 93, pgs. 20 -22] pdf.</ref>  Four days later Hoover, in a somber tone, recommends to the Attorney General, "I am of the opinion...it will be impossible to continue the investigation....the subjects...are now all very security conscious... any attempt to interrogate them, either by Bureau agents or before a grand jury, would produce nothing. Obviously, this situation leaves only the third alternative; that is, that the Department furnish to the employing departments the basic data concerning the activities of the individual subjects as a possible means of concluding the case. It is assumed, of course, that the employing departments will take administrative action against the subjects who are employed in these departments." <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Memorandum_for_the_Attorney_General%2C_January_27%2C_1947 Memorandum for the Attorney General, January 27, 1947].</ref>

In June of 1947, members of the [[Senate Appropriations Committee]] sent a confidential report to Secretary of State [[George Marshall]], in which they stated:  

In June of 1947, members of the [[Senate Appropriations Committee]] sent a confidential report to Secretary of State [[George Marshall]], in which they stated:  

{{Cquote|It is evident that there is a deliberate calculated program being carried out not only to protect Communist personnel in high places, but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity. . . . On file in the Department is a copy of a preliminary report of the FBI on Soviet espionage activities in the United States, which involves large numbers of State Department employees. . . this report has been challenged and ignored by those charged with the responsibility of administering the department...}}

{{Cquote|It is evident that there is a deliberate calculated program being carried out not only to protect Communist personnel in high places, but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity. . . . On file in the Department is a copy of a preliminary report of the FBI on Soviet espionage activities in the United States, which involves large numbers of State Department employees. . . this report has been challenged and ignored by those charged with the responsibility of administering the department...}}

The memorandum listed the names of nine of these State Department officials and said that they were "only a few of the hundreds now employed in varying capacities who are protected and allowed to remain despite the fact that their presence is an obvious hazard to national security." On June 24, 1947, Assistant Secretary of State John Peurifoy notified the chairman of the Senate subcommittee that ten persons had been dismissed from the department, five of whom had been listed in the memorandum. But from June 1947 until McCarthy's Wheeling speech in February 1950, the State Department did not fire one person as a loyalty or security risk. <ref>[http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jepeurifoy.htm John Emil Peurifoy, Foreign Service Office & United States Ambassador],  Arlington National Cemetery Website, retrieved 21 March 2007.</ref>

The memorandum listed the names of nine State Department officials and said that they were "only a few of the hundreds now employed in varying capacities who are protected and allowed to remain despite the fact that their presence is an obvious hazard to national security." On June 24, 1947, Assistant Secretary of State John Peurifoy notified the chairman of the Senate subcommittee that ten persons had been dismissed from the department, five of whom had been listed in the memorandum. But from June 1947 until McCarthy's Wheeling speech in February 1950, the State Department did not fire one person as a loyalty or security risk. <ref>[http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jepeurifoy.htm John Emil Peurifoy, Foreign Service Office & United States Ambassador],  Arlington National Cemetery Website, retrieved 21 March 2007.</ref>

In 1947 <ref>NSA Archives, National Cryptological Museum, [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sanders/214/other/handouts/VenonaChrono.html Venona Chronology]; "~September 1: Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer Robert J. Lamphere on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic. September: Carter W. Clarke of G-2 advises S. Wesley Reynolds, FBI, of successes at Arlington Hall on KGB espionage messages." </ref>, it was apparent that no individual in the U.S. Government realized that evidence of massive Soviet espionage within the government was developing on twin tracks. <ref>Robert Louis Benson, and Michael Warner, eds. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/preface.htm VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957,] pg. 9. Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1996. Robert L. Benson, works in the Office of Security, National Security Agency; Michael Warner, Deputy Chief of the CIA History Staff.</ref>  There was an [[FBI]] counterintelligence investigation <ref>Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Appendix A, 7. The Cold War]; "In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley informed the FBI of her activities as a Soviet courier, which in turn led to renewed interest in Chambers. In late August or early September 1947, the FBI was informed that the Army Security Agency had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages". </ref> which empanelled a grand jury in New York to look into defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations of espionage regarding high government officials, and the [[Army Signal Intelligence Service]] reading Soviet cipher decrypts <ref>National Security Agency, Venona Archives, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations,[http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html  The VENONA Breakthroughs]; "An Arlington Hall report on 22 July 1947 showed that the Soviet message traffic contained dozens, probably hundreds, of covernames, many of KGB agents, including ANTENNA and LIBERAL (later identified as Julius Rosenberg). One message mentioned that LIBERAL's wife was named "Ethel." General Carter W. Clarke, the assistant G-2, called the FBI liaison officer to G-2 and told him that the Army had begun to break into Soviet intelligence service traffic, and that the traffic indicated a massive Soviet espionage effort in the U.S.</ref> at [[Arlington Hall]].  It was a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.  Leaks in the investigation into the [[Greg_Silvermaster#Silvermaster_group|Silvermaster case]] began to threaten the successful prosecution. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Vol. 93, February 1947. Summary: Hoover memo expressing doubts about successful prosecution and statement that, because of leaks by the Department, "there is little which can be expected from any action now." Further Hoover memo of February 4, 1947, saying "investigative reports in this case would not be furnished to the Criminal Division [of Justice] because of the possibility that some of the material therein would be publicized."  See also January 27, 1947 J. Edgar Hoover Memorandum for the Attorney General, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf pgs. 31 -32].</ref>  So when McCarthy later made charges that the Truman administration knowingly protected Soviet agents, on the surface, this appeared to large sectors <ref>National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), [http://www.nacic.gov/history/CIReaderPlain/Vol3Chap1.pdf Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, Chap. 1, pg.47], "Polls taken at the time revealed that a majority of Americans believed that Communism at home and abroad was a serious threat to US security".</ref> of the American public<ref>Margaret Chase Smith, [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SmithDeclaration.pdf Declaration of Conscience, pg. 2], 1 June 1950, U.C. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 7894-95.  "The Democratic administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democratic administration.  There are enough proved cases to make this point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges"; "..there have been enough proved cases, such as the ''[[Amerasia]]'' case, the [[Hiss]] case, the [[Coplon]] case, the [[Harry Gold|Gold]] case, to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations".</ref> as true.

In 1947, <ref>NSA Archives, National Cryptological Museum, [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sanders/214/other/handouts/VenonaChrono.html Venona Chronology]; "~September 1: Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer Robert J. Lamphere on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic. September: Carter W. Clarke of G-2 advises S. Wesley Reynolds, FBI, of successes at Arlington Hall on KGB espionage messages." </ref> it was apparent that no individual in the U.S. Government realized that evidence of massive Soviet espionage within the government was developing on twin tracks. <ref>Robert Louis Benson, and Michael Warner, eds. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/preface.htm VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957,] pg. 9. Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1996. Robert L. Benson, works in the Office of Security, National Security Agency; Michael Warner, Deputy Chief of the CIA History Staff.</ref>  There was an [[FBI]] counterintelligence investigation <ref>Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Appendix A, 7. The Cold War]; "In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley informed the FBI of her activities as a Soviet courier, which in turn led to renewed interest in Chambers. In late August or early September 1947, the FBI was informed that the Army Security Agency had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages". </ref> which empanelled a grand jury in New York to look into defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations, and the [[Army Signal Intelligence Service]] reading Soviet cipher decrypts <ref>National Security Agency, Venona Archives, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations,[http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html  The VENONA Breakthroughs]; "An Arlington Hall report on 22 July 1947 showed that the Soviet message traffic contained dozens, probably hundreds, of covernames, many of KGB agents, including ANTENNA and LIBERAL (later identified as Julius Rosenberg). One message mentioned that LIBERAL's wife was named "Ethel." General Carter W. Clarke, the assistant G-2, called the FBI liaison officer to G-2 and told him that the Army had begun to break into Soviet intelligence service traffic, and that the traffic indicated a massive Soviet espionage effort in the U.S.</ref> at [[Arlington Hall]].  It was a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.  Leaks in the investigation into the [[Greg_Silvermaster#Silvermaster_group|Silvermaster case]] began to threaten the successful prosecution. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Vol. 93, February 1947. Summary: Hoover memo expressing doubts about successful prosecution and statement that, because of leaks by the Department, "there is little which can be expected from any action now." Further Hoover memo of February 4, 1947, saying "investigative reports in this case would not be furnished to the Criminal Division [of Justice] because of the possibility that some of the material therein would be publicized."  See also January 27, 1947 J. Edgar Hoover Memorandum for the Attorney General, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf pgs. 31 -32].</ref>  So when McCarthy later made charges that the Truman administration knowingly protected Soviet agents, on the surface, this appeared to large sectors <ref>National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), [http://www.nacic.gov/history/CIReaderPlain/Vol3Chap1.pdf Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, Chap. 1, pg.47], "Polls taken at the time revealed that a majority of Americans believed that Communism at home and abroad was a serious threat to US security".</ref> of the American public<ref>Margaret Chase Smith, [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SmithDeclaration.pdf Declaration of Conscience, pg. 2], 1 June 1950, U.C. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 7894-95.  "The Democratic administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democratic administration.  There are enough proved cases to make this point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges"; "..there have been enough proved cases, such as the ''[[Amerasia]]'' case, the [[Hiss]] case, the [[Coplon]] case, the [[Harry Gold|Gold]] case, to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations".</ref> as true.

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associated of real espionage.  Hoover told a House Committee in February 1950 that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associates of real espionage suspects.  Hoover told a House Committee in 3 days before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

The Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the loop in intelligence sharing after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] had become more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have had considerable counter espionage information which would have been helpful to them in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic energy program, but they had not been aware of it until after Fuchs arrest They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value. The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects. <ref>W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,]9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency. </ref>

One day before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech the Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the loop in intelligence sharing after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] had become more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have had considerable counter espionage information which would have been helpful to them in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic energy program, but they had not been aware of it until after Fuchs arrest They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value. The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects. <ref>W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,]9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency. </ref>

In summary memorandums to Director Hoover of [[Venona project]] information begun in 1950 entitled, ''Operations of the [[MGB]] Residency at New York, 1944-45'', Special Agent [[Alan Belmont]] reported the FBI had identified 206 persons involved in Soviet espionage activity who had been active in United States. Of this number the FBI had information from defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]] and other sources regarding espionage activity on 87 of these persons. However, espionage activity on the part of 119 persons from Venona information were not previously known to the FBI prior to 1946 but were mostly identified through investigation by 1950. <ref>[http://foia.fbi.gov/venona/venona.pdf FBI Venona file]</ref>

In summary memorandums to Director Hoover of [[Venona project]] information begun in 1950 entitled, ''Operations of the [[MGB]] Residency at New York, 1944-45'', Special Agent [[Alan Belmont]] reported the FBI had identified 206 persons involved in Soviet espionage activity who had been active in United States. Of this number the FBI had information from defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]] and other sources regarding espionage activity on 87 of these persons. However, espionage activity on the part of 119 persons from Venona information were not previously known to the FBI prior to 1946 but were mostly identified through investigation by 1950. <ref>[http://foia.fbi.gov/venona/venona.pdf FBI Venona file]</ref>