Changes

==Hiss and the UN==

==Hiss and the UN==

[[Image:Hisstruman.jpg|thumb|300px|right|'''UN Secretary General of the Charter Conference Alger Hiss is seated second from President Truman's left who is speaking at the rostrum.''']]

[[Image:Hisstruman.jpg|thumb|300px|right|'''UN Secretary General of the Charter Conference Alger Hiss is seated second from President Truman's left who is speaking at the rostrum.''']]

When the Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) was created in 1944, [[Alger Hiss]] became the deputy director - a sensitive and key position. In August of 1944, Hiss was executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. When he returned, all matters pertaining to the new organization came under his direct supervision. With [[Harry Hopkins]], [[Cordell Hull]], and others, Hiss worked on the first drafts of the [[United Nations]] Charter. <ref>Ralph de Toledano and Victor Lasky, [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Seeds_Of_Treason-Ralph_de_Toledano_and_Victor_Lasky-1950-278pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=343&PHPSESSID=b964065077a1de19538c4c7b1cf9e825 ''Seeds of Treason''], (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950), pg. 107.</ref> Hiss negotiated privately with the ailing U.S. president, [[Franklin Roosevelt]], and [[CPSU]] General Secretary [[Josef Stalin]] at the [[Yalta conference]]. <ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 109.</ref>  It was here that FDR agreed to allow the Soviet Union to occupy Poland and set up a [[Comintern]] affiliated [[puppet state]] -- a clear violation of the principals of self-determination expressed in the [[Atlantic Charter]], and the very cause over which Great Britain went to war with Germany in September of 1939.

When the Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) was created in 1944, [[Alger Hiss]] became the deputy director - a sensitive and key position. In August of 1944, Hiss was executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. When he returned to Washington, all matters pertaining to the [[United Nations]] organization came under his direct supervision. With [[Harry Hopkins]], [[Cordell Hull]], and others, Hiss worked on the first drafts of the UN Charter. <ref>Ralph de Toledano and Victor Lasky, [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Seeds_Of_Treason-Ralph_de_Toledano_and_Victor_Lasky-1950-278pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=343&PHPSESSID=b964065077a1de19538c4c7b1cf9e825 ''Seeds of Treason''], (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950), pg. 107.</ref> Hiss negotiated privately with the ailing U.S. president, [[Franklin Roosevelt]], and [[CPSU]] General Secretary [[Josef Stalin]] at the [[Yalta conference]]. <ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 109.</ref>  It was here that FDR agreed to allow the Soviet Union to occupy Poland and set up a [[Comintern]] affiliated [[puppet state]] -- a clear violation of the principals of self-determination expressed in the [[Atlantic Charter]], and the very cause over which Great Britain went to war with Germany in September of 1939.  What’s more, it was the betrayal of an ally – the Polish Government – which had signed the Atlantic Charter and the [[Allied_powers#United_Nations_Declaration|United Nations Declaration]].

On March 3, 1945, the director of the [[KGB]], Lt. General [[Pavel Fitin]] instructed [[Ishkak Akhmerov]], head of KGB Illegal operations in the United States to learn what he could about American plans for the forthcoming United Nations San Francisco Conference. Assigning top priority to the task,  Fitin ordered an early report. Hiss was responsible for planning the conference.  Hiss had been working with [[Soviet Military Intelligence]] (GRU), since the mid 1930s.  Ordinarily security procedures dictated that a Case officer from one Soviet Intelligence organization would not contact an agent working for another, however under the extraordinary circumstances of the approaching UN organizational conference late in the war, Akhmerov did so, and reported on his contact with Hiss. <ref>[http://carnellknowledge.townhall.com/g/3d62b172-7492-4d6c-8062-c91c1e2d3266 McCarthy Was Right], Excerpts from The Venona Program, September 04, 2006.  Retrieved from Townhall.com September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/foxpaper.htm In the Enemy’s House: Venona and the Maturation of American Counterintelligence], John F. Fox, Jr., Presented at the 2005 Symposium on Cryptologic History, 10/27/2005.</ref><ref>Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. United States Government Printing Office. Appendix A, Part 6, [http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/12hist1.pdf Page 36] pdf. </ref>  Akhmerov reported how after the Yalta conference Hiss traveled to Moscow where [[Andrey Vyshinsky]] passed on to him the GRU's gratitude.<ref>[http://www.nsa.gov/venona/venon00006.cfm 1822 Venona Washington to Moscow 30 March 1945]. National Security Agency National Cryptologic Museum.  Retrieved September 04, 2007. </ref>  A codename was assigned by one Soviet Intelligence agency for an agent working for another Soviet Intelligence agency which created confusion among investigators. <ref>[http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2904_venona.html Secrets, Lies, and Atomic Spies], NOVA Transcript, PBS Airdate: February 5, 2002. Retrieved from PBS.org September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>Who was 'Venona's' 'Ales'? cryptanalysis and the Hiss case. Eduard Mark, Intelligence and National Security, Volume 18, Number 3, September 2003 , pp. 45-72(28)</ref> A [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] investigation determined that Hiss was responsible for the employment of 494 persons on the United Nations initial staff.  <ref>Activities of U.S. Citizens Employed by the UN, second report of the [[SISS]] (March 22, 1954), p. 12.</ref>  With the leaks in the Silvermaster case, [[Elizabeth Bentley]] was called to testify in late July 1948, and [[Whittaker Chambers]], a [[CPUSA]] defector from the 1930s, a few days later repeated information he had given to President [[Franklin Roosevelt]]'s Assistant Secretary of State [[Adolf Berle]] in 1939 - firsthand knowledge of Hiss's espionage activity - information that Berle in person relayed to President Roosevelt. <ref>Toladano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 83 (pg. 91 pdf).</ref><ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,811892-1,00.html The Case of Alger Hiss], Time magazine, Feb. 13, 1950. Contemporaneous report 3 days after Sen. McCarthy's Wheeling, West Virginia Speech.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_47_17/ai_80900413 Hiss defenders covering for the `old man'], by Ralph De Toledano, Insight on the News, Dec 17, 2001.</ref> Ambassador to the Soviet Union [[William Bullitt]] had likewise warned FDR as early as 1939 that Hiss was an agent of the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>Toladano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 86 (pg. 94 pdf).</ref>

On March 3, 1945, the director of the [[KGB]], Lt. General [[Pavel Fitin]] instructed [[Ishkak Akhmerov]], head of KGB Illegal operations in the United States to learn what he could about American plans for the forthcoming United Nations San Francisco Conference. Assigning top priority to the task,  Fitin ordered an early report. Hiss was responsible for planning the conference.  Hiss had been working with [[Soviet Military Intelligence]] (GRU), since the mid 1930s.  Ordinarily security procedures dictated that a Case officer from one Soviet Intelligence organization would not contact an agent working for another, however under the extraordinary circumstances of the approaching UN organizational conference late in the war, Akhmerov did so, and reported on his contact with Hiss. <ref>[http://carnellknowledge.townhall.com/g/3d62b172-7492-4d6c-8062-c91c1e2d3266 McCarthy Was Right], Excerpts from The Venona Program, September 04, 2006.  Retrieved from Townhall.com September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/foxpaper.htm In the Enemy’s House: Venona and the Maturation of American Counterintelligence], John F. Fox, Jr., Presented at the 2005 Symposium on Cryptologic History, 10/27/2005.</ref><ref>Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. United States Government Printing Office. Appendix A, Part 6, [http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/12hist1.pdf Page 36] pdf. </ref>  Akhmerov reported how after the Yalta conference Hiss traveled to Moscow where [[Andrey Vyshinsky]] passed on to him the GRU's gratitude.<ref>[http://www.nsa.gov/venona/venon00006.cfm 1822 Venona Washington to Moscow 30 March 1945]. National Security Agency National Cryptologic Museum.  Retrieved September 04, 2007. </ref>  A codename was assigned by one Soviet Intelligence agency for an agent working for another Soviet Intelligence agency which created confusion among investigators. <ref>[http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2904_venona.html Secrets, Lies, and Atomic Spies], NOVA Transcript, PBS Airdate: February 5, 2002. Retrieved from PBS.org September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>Who was 'Venona's' 'Ales'? cryptanalysis and the Hiss case. Eduard Mark, Intelligence and National Security, Volume 18, Number 3, September 2003 , pp. 45-72(28)</ref> A [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] investigation determined that Hiss was responsible for the employment of 494 persons on the United Nations initial staff.  <ref>Activities of U.S. Citizens Employed by the UN, second report of the [[SISS]] (March 22, 1954), p. 12.</ref>  With the leaks in the Silvermaster case, [[Elizabeth Bentley]] was called to testify in late July 1948, and [[Whittaker Chambers]], a [[CPUSA]] defector from the 1930s, a few days later repeated information he had given to President [[Franklin Roosevelt]]'s Assistant Secretary of State [[Adolf Berle]] in 1939 - firsthand knowledge of Hiss's espionage activity - information that Berle in person relayed to President Roosevelt. <ref>Toladano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 83 (pg. 91 pdf).</ref><ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,811892-1,00.html The Case of Alger Hiss], Time magazine, Feb. 13, 1950. Contemporaneous report 3 days after Sen. McCarthy's Wheeling, West Virginia Speech.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_47_17/ai_80900413 Hiss defenders covering for the `old man'], by Ralph De Toledano, Insight on the News, Dec 17, 2001.</ref> Ambassador to the Soviet Union [[William Bullitt]] had likewise warned FDR as early as 1939 that Hiss was an agent of the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>Toladano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 86 (pg. 94 pdf).</ref>

==White and the IMF==

==White and the IMF==

[[Image:Washeveningstarmay41946.JPG|right|thumb|''Washington Evening Star'' May 4, 1946 announcement of White's appointment to head the [[IMF]].  President Truman said, "I am confident that in your new position you will add distinction to your already distinguished career with Treasury."  The appointment came after the [[White House]] had been alerted to White's espionage activity.]]

[[Image:Washeveningstarmay41946.JPG|right|thumb|''Washington Evening Star'' May 4, 1946 announcement of White's appointment to head the [[IMF]].  President Truman said, "I am confident that in your new position you will add distinction to your already distinguished career with Treasury."  The appointment came after the [[White House]] had been alerted to White's espionage activity.]]

In May of 1941 Assistant Secretary of the Treasury [[Harry Dexter White]] met for lunch with [[Vitali Pavlov]], [[KGB]] assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the United States and Canada. White had been carefully selected by [[Iskhak Akhmerov]], who ran  the [[Silvermaster group]] and knew White.  The purpose was to present a series of policy initiatives for White to inject into Washington's [[foreign policy]] discussion which involved Soviet efforts to worsen U.S. Japanese relations.  The strategy was to encourage Japan's war party to view the United States, rather than Soviet Union after several recent clashes on the [[Manchukuo]] border and [[Comintern]] support to the [[Maoist]] [[CCP]], as Japan's main enemy. Pavlov handed White an outline of themes to promote among key U.S. policymakers including a demand, to be wrapped in tough rhetoric, that Japan recall its armed forces from China. <ref>Vitali Pavlov, "Operation Snow," News of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Moscow, August 1995, pgs. 5-6.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>  President  Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan and on July 26, 1941 implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. which virtually ended all trade between the two countries.  The chief of the Japanese Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be doubtful that Japan could win. The Japanese Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all military plans against Soviet Siberia, which had badly needed Red Army troops for the defense of Moscow pinned down,  and looked to the south instead for the oil resources. Due to White's involvement and influence, the U.S. set up a foreign policy that placed the Kremlin's interests ahead of the White House's.<ref> Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pp. 31, 33.</ref>

In May of 1941 Assistant Secretary of the Treasury [[Harry Dexter White]] met for lunch with [[Vitali Pavlov]], [[KGB]] assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the United States and Canada. White had been carefully selected by [[Iskhak Akhmerov]], who ran  the [[Silvermaster group]] and knew White.  The purpose was to present a series of policy initiatives for White to inject into Washington's [[foreign policy]] discussion which involved Soviet efforts to provoke tensions in U.S. Japanese relations.  The strategy was to encourage Japan's war party to view the United States as Japan's main enemy, rather than Soviet Union after several recent clashes on the [[Manchukuo]] border and [[Comintern]] support to the [[Maoist]] [[CCP]]. Pavlov handed White an outline of themes to promote among key U.S. policymakers including a demand, to be wrapped in tough rhetoric, that Japan recall its armed forces from China. <ref>Vitali Pavlov, "Operation Snow," News of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Moscow, August 1995, pgs. 5-6.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>  The Soviet Union had occupied Xinjiang (Sinkiang) since 1934. <ref>See also [http://www.worldstatesmen.org/China_prov.html#Xinjiang Sinkiang],[http://www.worldstatesmen.org/China_Foreign_colonies.html Chinese Eastern Railroad Zone][[http://www.worldstatesmen.org/China.html#PRC Kiangsi Soviet Republic], 1 Dec 1931 - 15 Oct 1934.</ref>

 

President  Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan and on July 26, 1941 implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. which virtually ended all trade between the two countries.  The chief of the Japanese Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be doubtful Japan could win. The Japanese Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all military plans against Soviet Siberia, which had badly needed Red Army troops at that moment for the defense of Moscow pinned down,  and looked to the south instead for the oil resources. Due to White's involvement and influence, the U.S. set up a foreign policy that placed the Kremlin's interests ahead of the White House's.<ref> Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pp. 31, 33.</ref>

In August, 1941, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin D. Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]]. On November 18, 1941, Secretary of the Treasury [[Henry Morgenthau]]  sent to Secretary of State Hull a memorandum drafted by White on the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan. <ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White received through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>  At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref>  In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. <ref> Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Hull put in final shape the ultimatum. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo and Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> In this ten-point ultimatum, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union. War between the United States and Japan - the lone obstacle to [[Comintern]] designs in the Far East - was the primary aim of Soviet foreign policy in the Far East.

In August, 1941, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin D. Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]]. On November 18, 1941, Secretary of the Treasury [[Henry Morgenthau]]  sent to Secretary of State Hull a memorandum drafted by White on the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan. <ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White received through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>  At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref>  In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. <ref> Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Hull put in final shape the ultimatum. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo and Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> In this ten-point ultimatum, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union. War between the United States and Japan - the lone obstacle to [[Comintern]] designs in the Far East - was the primary aim of Soviet foreign policy in the Far East.