Changes

The memorandum listed the names of nine State Department officials and said that they were "only a few of the hundreds now employed in varying capacities who are protected and allowed to remain despite the fact that their presence is an obvious hazard to national security." On June 24, 1947, Assistant Secretary of State John Peurifoy notified the chairman of the Senate subcommittee that ten persons had been dismissed from the department, five of whom had been listed in the memorandum. But from June 1947 until McCarthy's Wheeling speech in February 1950, the State Department did not fire one person as a loyalty or security risk. <ref>[http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jepeurifoy.htm John Emil Peurifoy, Foreign Service Office & United States Ambassador],  Arlington National Cemetery Website, retrieved 21 March 2007.</ref>

The memorandum listed the names of nine State Department officials and said that they were "only a few of the hundreds now employed in varying capacities who are protected and allowed to remain despite the fact that their presence is an obvious hazard to national security." On June 24, 1947, Assistant Secretary of State John Peurifoy notified the chairman of the Senate subcommittee that ten persons had been dismissed from the department, five of whom had been listed in the memorandum. But from June 1947 until McCarthy's Wheeling speech in February 1950, the State Department did not fire one person as a loyalty or security risk. <ref>[http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jepeurifoy.htm John Emil Peurifoy, Foreign Service Office & United States Ambassador],  Arlington National Cemetery Website, retrieved 21 March 2007.</ref>

In 1947, <ref>NSA Archives, National Cryptological Museum, [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sanders/214/other/handouts/VenonaChrono.html Venona Chronology]; "~September 1: Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer Robert J. Lamphere on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic. September: Carter W. Clarke of G-2 advises S. Wesley Reynolds, FBI, of successes at Arlington Hall on KGB espionage messages." </ref> it was apparent that no individual in the U.S. Government realized that evidence of massive Soviet espionage within the government was developing on twin tracks. <ref>Robert Louis Benson, and Michael Warner, eds. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/preface.htm VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957,] pg. 9. Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1996. Robert L. Benson, works in the Office of Security, National Security Agency; Michael Warner, Deputy Chief of the CIA History Staff.</ref>  There was an [[FBI]] counterintelligence investigation <ref>Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Appendix A, 7. The Cold War]; "In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley informed the FBI of her activities as a Soviet courier, which in turn led to renewed interest in Chambers. In late August or early September 1947, the FBI was informed that the Army Security Agency had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages". </ref> which empanelled a grand jury in New York to look into defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations, and the [[Army Signal Intelligence Service]] reading Soviet cipher decrypts <ref>National Security Agency, Venona Archives, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations,[http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html  The VENONA Breakthroughs]; "An Arlington Hall report on 22 July 1947 showed that the Soviet message traffic contained dozens, probably hundreds, of covernames, many of KGB agents, including ANTENNA and LIBERAL (later identified as Julius Rosenberg). One message mentioned that LIBERAL's wife was named "Ethel." General Carter W. Clarke, the assistant G-2, called the FBI liaison officer to G-2 and told him that the Army had begun to break into Soviet intelligence service traffic, and that the traffic indicated a massive Soviet espionage effort in the U.S.</ref> at [[Arlington Hall]].  It was a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.  Leaks in the investigation into the [[Greg_Silvermaster#Silvermaster_group|Silvermaster case]] began to threaten the successful prosecution. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Vol. 93, February 1947. Summary: Hoover memo expressing doubts about successful prosecution and statement that, because of leaks by the Department, "there is little which can be expected from any action now." Further Hoover memo of February 4, 1947, saying "investigative reports in this case would not be furnished to the Criminal Division [of Justice] because of the possibility that some of the material therein would be publicized."  See also January 27, 1947 J. Edgar Hoover Memorandum for the Attorney General, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf pgs. 31 -32].</ref>  So when McCarthy later made charges that the Truman administration knowingly protected Soviet agents, on the surface, this appeared to large sectors <ref>National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), [http://www.nacic.gov/history/CIReaderPlain/Vol3Chap1.pdf Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, Chap. 1, pg.47], "Polls taken at the time revealed that a majority of Americans believed that Communism at home and abroad was a serious threat to US security".</ref> of the American public<ref>Margaret Chase Smith, [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SmithDeclaration.pdf Declaration of Conscience, pg. 2], 1 June 1950, U.C. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 7894-95.  "The Democratic administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democratic administration.  There are enough proved cases to make this point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges"; "..there have been enough proved cases, such as the ''[[Amerasia]]'' case, the [[Hiss]] case, the [[Coplon]] case, the [[Harry Gold|Gold]] case, to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations".</ref> as true.

In 1947, <ref>NSA Archives, National Cryptological Museum, [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sanders/214/other/handouts/VenonaChrono.html Venona Chronology]; "~September 1: Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer Robert J. Lamphere on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic. September: Carter W. Clarke of G-2 advises S. Wesley Reynolds, FBI, of successes at Arlington Hall on KGB espionage messages." </ref> it was apparent that no individual in the U.S. Government realized that evidence of massive Soviet espionage within the government was developing on twin tracks. <ref>Robert Louis Benson, and Michael Warner, eds. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/preface.htm VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957,] pg. 9. Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1996. Robert L. Benson, works in the Office of Security, National Security Agency; Michael Warner, Deputy Chief of the CIA History Staff.</ref>  There was an [[FBI]] counterintelligence investigation <ref>Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Appendix A, 7. The Cold War]; "In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley informed the FBI of her activities as a Soviet courier, which in turn led to renewed interest in Chambers. In late August or early September 1947, the FBI was informed that the Army Security Agency had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages". </ref> which empanelled a grand jury in New York to look into defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations, and the [[Army Signal Intelligence Service]] reading Soviet cipher decrypts <ref>National Security Agency, Venona Archives, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations,[http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html  The VENONA Breakthroughs]; "An Arlington Hall report on 22 July 1947 showed that the Soviet message traffic contained dozens, probably hundreds, of covernames, many of KGB agents, including ANTENNA and LIBERAL (later identified as Julius Rosenberg). One message mentioned that LIBERAL's wife was named "Ethel." General Carter W. Clarke, the assistant G-2, called the FBI liaison officer to G-2 and told him that the Army had begun to break into Soviet intelligence service traffic, and that the traffic indicated a massive Soviet espionage effort in the U.S.</ref> at [[Arlington Hall]].  It was a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.  Leaks in the investigation into the [[Greg_Silvermaster#Silvermaster_group|Silvermaster case]] began to threaten the successful prosecution. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Vol. 93, February 1947. Summary: Hoover memo expressing doubts about successful prosecution and statement that, because of leaks by the Department, "there is little which can be expected from any action now." Further Hoover memo of February 4, 1947, saying "investigative reports in this case would not be furnished to the Criminal Division [of Justice] because of the possibility that some of the material therein would be publicized."  See also January 27, 1947 J. Edgar Hoover Memorandum for the Attorney General, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf pgs. 31 -32].</ref>  So when McCarthy later made charges that the Truman administration knowingly protected Soviet agents, on the surface, this appeared to large sectors <ref>National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), [http://www.nacic.gov/history/CIReaderPlain/Vol3Chap1.pdf Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, Chap. 1, pg.47], "Polls taken at the time revealed that a majority of Americans believed that Communism at home and abroad was a serious threat to US security".</ref> of the American public<ref>Margaret Chase Smith, [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SmithDeclaration.pdf Declaration of Conscience, pg. 2], 1 June 1950, U.C. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 7894-95.  "The Democratic administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democratic administration.  There are enough proved cases to make this point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges...there have been enough proved cases, such as the ''[[Amerasia]]'' case, the [[Hiss]] case, the [[Coplon]] case, the [[Harry Gold|Gold]] case, to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations".</ref> as true.

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associates of real espionage suspects.  Hoover told a House Committee in 3 days before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associates of real espionage suspects.  Hoover told a House Committee in 3 days before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

One day before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech the Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the intelligence sharing loop after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] became more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have counter espionage information of considerable value in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic. In the summer of 1949 the FBI learned that the secret of the construction of the atom bomb had been stolen and turned over to a foreign power. An immediate investigation resulted in the identification of Fuchs. <ref>[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/atom/atom.htm The Atom Spy Case], FBI History, fbi.gov</ref> The JAEIC stated had they known in June about Fuchs, it would have impacted their estimate of Soviet atomic capabilities released in July which did not forsee the Soviet Union exploding its first nuclear device at the end of August in 1949. They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value. The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects. <ref>W. K. Benson to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,]9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency. </ref>

One day before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech the Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the intelligence sharing loop after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] became more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have counter espionage information of considerable value in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic. In the summer of 1949 the FBI learned that the secret of the construction of the atom bomb had been stolen and turned over to a foreign power. An immediate investigation resulted in the identification of Fuchs. <ref>[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/atom/atom.htm The Atom Spy Case], FBI History, fbi.gov</ref> The JAEIC stated had they known in June about Fuchs, it would have impacted their estimate of Soviet atomic capabilities released in July which did not forsee the Soviet Union exploding its first nuclear device at the end of August in 1949. They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value. The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects. <ref>W. K. Benons to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,] 9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency. </ref>

In summary memorandums to Director Hoover of [[Venona project]] information begun in 1950 entitled, ''Operations of the [[MGB]] Residency at New York, 1944-45'', Special Agent [[Alan Belmont]] reported the FBI had identified 206 persons involved in Soviet espionage activity who had been active in United States. Of this number the FBI had information from defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]] and other sources regarding espionage activity on 87 of these persons. Espionage activity on the part of 119 persons from Venona information were not known to the FBI prior to 1946 but many were identified through investigation by 1950. <ref>[http://foia.fbi.gov/venona/venona.pdf FBI Venona file]</ref>

In summary memorandums to Director Hoover of [[Venona project]] information begun in 1950 entitled, ''Operations of the [[MGB]] Residency at New York, 1944-45'', Special Agent [[Alan Belmont]] reported the FBI had identified 206 persons involved in Soviet espionage activity who had been active in United States. Of this number the FBI had information from defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]] and other sources regarding espionage activity on 87 of these persons. Espionage activity on the part of 119 persons from Venona information were not known to the FBI prior to 1946 but many were identified through investigation by 1950. <ref>[http://foia.fbi.gov/venona/venona.pdf FBI Venona file]</ref>

When the Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) was created in 1944, [[Alger Hiss]] became the deputy director - a sensitive and key position. In August of 1944, Hiss was executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. When he returned to Washington, all matters pertaining to the [[United Nations]] organization came under his direct supervision. With [[Harry Hopkins]], [[Cordell Hull]], and others, Hiss worked on the first drafts of the UN Charter. <ref>Ralph de Toledano and Victor Lasky, [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Seeds_Of_Treason-Ralph_de_Toledano_and_Victor_Lasky-1950-278pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=343&PHPSESSID=b964065077a1de19538c4c7b1cf9e825 ''Seeds of Treason''], (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950), pg. 107.</ref> Hiss negotiated privately with the ailing U.S. president, [[Franklin Roosevelt]], and [[CPSU]] General Secretary [[Josef Stalin]] at the [[Yalta conference]]. <ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 109.</ref>  It was here that FDR agreed to allow the Soviet Union to occupy Poland and set up a [[Comintern]] affiliated [[puppet state]] -- a clear violation of the principals of self-determination expressed in the [[Atlantic Charter]], and the very cause over which Great Britain went to war with Germany in September of 1939.  What’s more, it was the betrayal of an ally – the Polish Government – which had signed the Atlantic Charter and the [[Allied_powers#United_Nations_Declaration|United Nations Declaration]].

When the Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) was created in 1944, [[Alger Hiss]] became the deputy director - a sensitive and key position. In August of 1944, Hiss was executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. When he returned to Washington, all matters pertaining to the [[United Nations]] organization came under his direct supervision. With [[Harry Hopkins]], [[Cordell Hull]], and others, Hiss worked on the first drafts of the UN Charter. <ref>Ralph de Toledano and Victor Lasky, [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Seeds_Of_Treason-Ralph_de_Toledano_and_Victor_Lasky-1950-278pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=343&PHPSESSID=b964065077a1de19538c4c7b1cf9e825 ''Seeds of Treason''], (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950), pg. 107.</ref> Hiss negotiated privately with the ailing U.S. president, [[Franklin Roosevelt]], and [[CPSU]] General Secretary [[Josef Stalin]] at the [[Yalta conference]]. <ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 109.</ref>  It was here that FDR agreed to allow the Soviet Union to occupy Poland and set up a [[Comintern]] affiliated [[puppet state]] -- a clear violation of the principals of self-determination expressed in the [[Atlantic Charter]], and the very cause over which Great Britain went to war with Germany in September of 1939.  What’s more, it was the betrayal of an ally – the Polish Government – which had signed the Atlantic Charter and the [[Allied_powers#United_Nations_Declaration|United Nations Declaration]].

On March 3, 1945, the director of the [[KGB]], Lt. General [[Pavel Fitin]] instructed [[Ishkak Akhmerov]], head of KGB Illegal operations in the United States to learn what he could about American plans for the forthcoming United Nations San Francisco Conference. Assigning top priority to the task,  Fitin ordered an early report. Hiss was responsible for planning the conference.  Hiss had been working with [[Soviet Military Intelligence]] (GRU), since the mid 1930s.  Ordinarily security procedures dictated that a Case officer from one Soviet Intelligence organization would not contact an agent working for another, however under the extraordinary circumstances of the approaching UN organizational conference late in the war, Akhmerov did so, and reported on his contact with Hiss. <ref>[http://carnellknowledge.townhall.com/g/3d62b172-7492-4d6c-8062-c91c1e2d3266 McCarthy Was Right], Excerpts from The Venona Program, September 04, 2006.  Retrieved from Townhall.com September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/foxpaper.htm In the Enemy’s House: Venona and the Maturation of American Counterintelligence], John F. Fox, Jr., Presented at the 2005 Symposium on Cryptologic History, 10/27/2005.</ref><ref>Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. United States Government Printing Office. Appendix A, Part 6, [http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/12hist1.pdf Page 36] pdf. </ref>  Akhmerov reported how after the Yalta conference Hiss traveled to Moscow where [[Andrey Vyshinsky]] passed on to him the GRU's gratitude.<ref>[http://www.nsa.gov/venona/venon00006.cfm 1822 Venona Washington to Moscow 30 March 1945]. National Security Agency National Cryptologic Museum.  Retrieved September 04, 2007. </ref>  A codename was assigned by one Soviet Intelligence agency for an agent working for another Soviet Intelligence agency which created confusion among investigators. <ref>[http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2904_venona.html Secrets, Lies, and Atomic Spies], NOVA Transcript, PBS Airdate: February 5, 2002. Retrieved from PBS.org September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>Who was 'Venona's' 'Ales'? cryptanalysis and the Hiss case. Eduard Mark, Intelligence and National Security, Volume 18, Number 3, September 2003 , pp. 45-72(28)</ref> A [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] investigation determined that Hiss was responsible for the employment of 494 persons on the United Nations initial staff.  <ref>Activities of U.S. Citizens Employed by the UN, second report of the [[SISS]] (March 22, 1954), p. 12.</ref>  With the leaks in the Silvermaster case, [[Elizabeth Bentley]] was called to testify in late July 1948, and [[Whittaker Chambers]], a [[CPUSA]] defector from the 1930s, a few days later repeated information he had given to President [[Franklin Roosevelt]]'s Assistant Secretary of State [[Adolf Berle]] in 1939 - firsthand knowledge of Hiss's espionage activity - information that Berle in person relayed to President Roosevelt. <ref>Toladano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 83 (pg. 91 pdf).</ref><ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,811892-1,00.html The Case of Alger Hiss], Time magazine, Feb. 13, 1950. Contemporaneous report 3 days after Sen. McCarthy's Wheeling, West Virginia Speech.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_47_17/ai_80900413 Hiss defenders covering for the `old man'], by Ralph De Toledano, Insight on the News, Dec 17, 2001.</ref> Ambassador to the Soviet Union [[William Bullitt]] had likewise warned FDR as early as 1939 that Hiss was an agent of the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>Toladano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 86 (pg. 94 pdf).</ref>

On March 3, 1945, the director of the [[KGB]], Lt. General [[Pavel Fitin]] instructed [[Ishkak Akhmerov]], head of KGB Illegal operations in the United States to learn what he could about American plans for the forthcoming United Nations San Francisco Conference. Assigning top priority to the task,  Fitin ordered an early report. Hiss was responsible for planning the conference.  Hiss had been working with [[Soviet Military Intelligence]] (GRU), since the mid 1930s.  Ordinarily security procedures dictated that a Case officer from one Soviet Intelligence organization would not contact an agent working for another, however under the extraordinary circumstances of the approaching UN organizational conference late in the war, Akhmerov did so, and reported on his contact with Hiss. <ref>[http://carnellknowledge.townhall.com/g/3d62b172-7492-4d6c-8062-c91c1e2d3266 McCarthy Was Right], Excerpts from The Venona Program, September 04, 2006.  Retrieved from Townhall.com September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/foxpaper.htm In the Enemy’s House: Venona and the Maturation of American Counterintelligence], John F. Fox, Jr., Presented at the 2005 Symposium on Cryptologic History, 10/27/2005.</ref><ref>Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. United States Government Printing Office. Appendix A, Part 6, [http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/12hist1.pdf Page 36] pdf. </ref>  Akhmerov reported how after the Yalta conference Hiss traveled to Moscow where [[Andrey Vyshinsky]] passed on to him the GRU's gratitude.<ref>[http://www.nsa.gov/venona/venon00006.cfm 1822 Venona Washington to Moscow 30 March 1945]. National Security Agency National Cryptologic Museum.  Retrieved September 04, 2007. </ref>  A codename was assigned by one Soviet Intelligence agency for an agent working for another Soviet Intelligence agency which created confusion among investigators. <ref>[http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2904_venona.html Secrets, Lies, and Atomic Spies], NOVA Transcript, PBS Airdate: February 5, 2002. Retrieved from PBS.org September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>Who was Venona's “Ales”? Cryptanalysis and the Hiss case. Eduard Mark, Intelligence and National Security, Volume 18, Number 3, September 2003 , pp. 45-72(28)</ref> A [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] investigation determined that Hiss was responsible for the employment of 494 persons on the United Nations initial staff.  <ref>Activities of U.S. Citizens Employed by the UN, second report of the [[SISS]] (March 22, 1954), p. 12.</ref>  With the leaks in the Silvermaster case, [[Elizabeth Bentley]] was called to testify in late July 1948, and [[Whittaker Chambers]], a [[CPUSA]] defector from the 1930s, a few days later repeated information he had given to President [[Franklin Roosevelt]]'s Assistant Secretary of State [[Adolf Berle]] in 1939 - firsthand knowledge of Hiss's espionage activity - information that Berle in person relayed to President Roosevelt. <ref>Toladano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 83 (pg. 91 pdf).</ref><ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,811892-1,00.html The Case of Alger Hiss], Time magazine, Feb. 13, 1950. Contemporaneous report 3 days after Sen. McCarthy's Wheeling, West Virginia Speech.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_47_17/ai_80900413 Hiss defenders covering for the `old man'], by Ralph De Toledano, Insight on the News, Dec 17, 2001.</ref> Ambassador to the Soviet Union [[William Bullitt]] had likewise warned FDR as early as 1939 that Hiss was an agent of the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>Toladano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 86 (pg. 94 pdf).</ref>

==White and the IMF==

==White and the IMF==

In May of 1941 Assistant Secretary of the Treasury [[Harry Dexter White]] met for lunch with [[Vitali Pavlov]], [[KGB]] assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the United States and Canada. White had been carefully selected by [[Iskhak Akhmerov]], who ran  the [[Silvermaster group]] and knew White.  The purpose was to present a series of policy initiatives for White to inject into Washington's [[foreign policy]] discussion which involved Soviet efforts to provoke tensions in U.S. Japanese relations.  The strategy was to encourage Japan's war party to view the United States as Japan's main enemy, rather than Soviet Union after several recent clashes on the [[Manchukuo]] border and [[Comintern]] support to the [[Maoist]] [[CCP]]. Pavlov handed White an outline of themes to promote among key U.S. policymakers including a demand, to be wrapped in tough rhetoric, that Japan recall its armed forces from China. <ref>Vitali Pavlov, "Operation Snow," News of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Moscow, August 1995, pgs. 5-6.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>  The Soviet Union had occupied Xinjiang (Sinkiang) since 1934. <ref>See also [http://www.worldstatesmen.org/China_prov.html#Xinjiang Sinkiang],[http://www.worldstatesmen.org/China_Foreign_colonies.html Chinese Eastern Railroad Zone][http://www.worldstatesmen.org/China.html#PRC Kiangsi Soviet Republic], 1 Dec 1931 - 15 Oct 1934.</ref>

In May of 1941 Assistant Secretary of the Treasury [[Harry Dexter White]] met for lunch with [[Vitali Pavlov]], [[KGB]] assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the United States and Canada. White had been carefully selected by [[Iskhak Akhmerov]], who ran  the [[Silvermaster group]] and knew White.  The purpose was to present a series of policy initiatives for White to inject into Washington's [[foreign policy]] discussion which involved Soviet efforts to provoke tensions in U.S. Japanese relations.  The strategy was to encourage Japan's war party to view the United States as Japan's main enemy, rather than Soviet Union after several recent clashes on the [[Manchukuo]] border and [[Comintern]] support to the [[Maoist]] [[CCP]]. Pavlov handed White an outline of themes to promote among key U.S. policymakers including a demand, to be wrapped in tough rhetoric, that Japan recall its armed forces from China. <ref>Vitali Pavlov, "Operation Snow," News of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Moscow, August 1995, pgs. 5-6.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>  The Soviet Union had occupied Xinjiang (Sinkiang) since 1934. <ref>See also [http://www.worldstatesmen.org/China_prov.html#Xinjiang Sinkiang],[http://www.worldstatesmen.org/China_Foreign_colonies.html Chinese Eastern Railroad Zone][http://www.worldstatesmen.org/China.html#PRC Kiangsi Soviet Republic], 1 Dec 1931 - 15 Oct 1934.</ref>

President Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan and on July 26,1941 implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. which virtually ended all trade between the two countries.  The chief of the Japanese Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be doubtful Japan could win. The Japanese Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all military plans against Soviet Siberia, which had badly needed Red Army troops at that moment for the defense of Moscow pinned down,  and looked to the south instead for the oil resources. Due to White's involvement and influence, the administration set up a foreign policy that placed Soviet interests ahead of the United States.<ref> Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pp. 31, 33.</ref>

President Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan and on July 26,1941 implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. which virtually ended all trade between the two countries.  The chief of the Japanese Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be doubtful Japan could win. The Japanese Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all military plans against Soviet Siberia, which had badly needed Red Army troops at that moment for the defense of Moscow pinned down,  and looked to the south instead for the oil resources. Due to White's involvement and influence, the administration set up a foreign policy that placed Soviet interests ahead of the United States.<ref> Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History, Washington, DC :  Brassey’s, 2002, pgs. 31, 33.</ref>

 

In August, 1941, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin D. Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]]. On November 18, 1941, Secretary of the Treasury [[Henry Morgenthau]] sent to Secretary of State Hull a memorandum drafted by White on the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan. <ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White received through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>  At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref>  In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. <ref> Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Hull put in final shape the ultimatum. In this ten-point ultimatum, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo and Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because White’s demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> War between the United States and Japan - the lone obstacle to [[Comintern]] designs in the Far East - was the primary aim of Soviet foreign policy in the Far East.

In August, 1941, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin D. Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]]. On November 18, 1941, Secretary of the Treasury [[Henry Morgenthau]] sent to Secretary of State Hull a memorandum drafted by White on the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan. <ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White received through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>  At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref>  In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. <ref> Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Hull put in final shape the ultimatum. In this ten-point ultimatum, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo and Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because White’s demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> War between the United States and Japan - the lone obstacle to [[Comintern]] designs in the Far East - was the primary aim of Soviet foreign policy in the Far East.

An 86 year old [[Pavel Sudoplatov]] wrote in his memoirs,  

An 86 year old [[Pavel Sudoplatov]] wrote in his memoirs,  

{{Cquote|My Administration for Special Tasks was responsible for sabotage, kidnapping, and assassination of our enemies beyond the country's borders. It was a special department working in the Soviet security service....I was also in charge <ref>[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&doc_id=43900&group_id=13349 Was Oppenheimer a Soviet Spy?] A Roundtable Discussion with Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Gregg Herken and [[Hayden Peake]]. The Cold War International History Project. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.  Peake, curator of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]’s (CIA) Historical Intelligence Collection [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/P_folder/peake.html], states, "The content of the ''Sacred Secrets'' Merkulov letter is also questioned on the point of whether it is or is not "smoking gun" evidence that Robert Oppenheimer was a Soviet source or agent while he worked on the atom bomb project during WWII. ...In short, I accept the letter and its implications." </ref> of the Soviet espionage effort to obtain the secrets of the [[atomic bomb]] from America and Great Britain. I set up a network of illegals <ref>H.B. Laes, Theory of Fielding, [http://web.archive.org/web/20050204173143/http://www.tof.blogspot.com/#kgborg KGB Organization]. Retieved September 04, 2007. [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/spycases_folder/bomb_folder/bombgenm-q.html]</ref> who convinced [[Robert Oppenheimer]]<ref>[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034F6F1-96B6-175C-9170648C02EA02F8&sort=Collection&item=Post%20Stalin%20succession%20struggle Merkulov to Beria], 2 October 1944.  The letters states, "In 1942 one of the leaders of scientific work on [uranium] in the USA, Professor Oppenheimer while being an unlisted (nglastny) member of the apparat of [[Comrade Browder]] informed us about the beginning of work.  On the request of Comrade Kheifitz, confirmed by Comrade Browder, he provided cooperation in access to research for several of our tested sources including a relative of [Comrade Browder]"</ref>, [[Enrico Fermi]], [[Leo Szilard]], [[Bruno Pontecorvo]], [[Alan Nunn May]], [[Klaus Fuchs]], and other scientists in America and Great Britain to share atomic secrets with us.<ref>Pavel Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks : Memoirs of an Unwanted Spymaster'', Little Brown and Company, London, 1994,  pg. 3. </ref>}}

{{Cquote|My Administration for Special Tasks was responsible for sabotage, kidnapping, and assassination of our enemies beyond the country's borders. It was a special department working in the Soviet security service....I was also in charge <ref>[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&doc_id=43900&group_id=13349 Was Oppenheimer a Soviet Spy?] A Roundtable Discussion with Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Gregg Herken and [[Hayden Peake]]. The Cold War International History Project. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.  Peake, curator of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]’s (CIA) Historical Intelligence Collection [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/P_folder/peake.html], states, "The content of the ''Sacred Secrets'' Merkulov letter is also questioned on the point of whether it is or is not "smoking gun" evidence that Robert Oppenheimer was a Soviet source or agent while he worked on the atom bomb project during WWII. ...In short, I accept the letter and its implications." </ref> of the Soviet espionage effort to obtain the secrets of the [[atomic bomb]] from America and Great Britain. I set up a network of illegals <ref>H.B. Laes, Theory of Fielding, [http://web.archive.org/web/20050204173143/http://www.tof.blogspot.com/#kgborg KGB Organization]. Retieved September 04, 2007. [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/spycases_folder/bomb_folder/bombgenm-q.html]</ref> who convinced [[Robert Oppenheimer]]<ref>[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034F6F1-96B6-175C-9170648C02EA02F8&sort=Collection&item=Post%20Stalin%20succession%20struggle Merkulov to Beria], 2 October 1944.  The letter states, "In 1942 one of the leaders of scientific work on [uranium] in the USA, Professor Oppenheimer while being an unlisted (nglastny) member of the apparat of [[Comrade Browder]] informed us about the beginning of work.  On the request of Comrade Kheifitz, confirmed by Comrade Browder, he provided cooperation in access to research for several of our tested sources including a relative of [Comrade Browder]"</ref>, [[Enrico Fermi]], [[Leo Szilard]], [[Bruno Pontecorvo]], [[Alan Nunn May]], [[Klaus Fuchs]], and other scientists in America and Great Britain to share atomic secrets with us.<ref>Pavel Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks : Memoirs of an Unwanted Spymaster'', Little Brown and Company, London, 1994,  pg. 3. </ref>}}

{{Cquote|The most vital information for developing the first Soviet atomic bomb came from scientists designing the American atomic bomb at [[Los Alamos]], New Mexico...Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard, and Szilard's secretary were often quoted in the NKVD files from 1942 to 1945 as sources for information on the development of the first American atomic bomb. It is in the record that on several occasions they agreed to share information on [[nuclear weapons]] with Soviet scientists. At first they were motivated by fear of [[Hitler]]; they believed that the Germans might produce the first atomic bomb. Then the Danish physicist [[Niels Bohr]] helped strengthen their own inclinations to share nuclear secrets with the world academic community. By sharing their knowledge with the Soviet Union, the chance of beating the Germans to the bomb would be increased. <ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 172. </ref>}}

{{Cquote|The most vital information for developing the first Soviet atomic bomb came from scientists designing the American atomic bomb at [[Los Alamos]], New Mexico...Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard, and Szilard's secretary were often quoted in the NKVD files from 1942 to 1945 as sources for information on the development of the first American atomic bomb. It is in the record that on several occasions they agreed to share information on [[nuclear weapons]] with Soviet scientists. At first they were motivated by fear of [[Hitler]]; they believed that the Germans might produce the first atomic bomb. Then the Danish physicist [[Niels Bohr]] helped strengthen their own inclinations to share nuclear secrets with the world academic community. By sharing their knowledge with the Soviet Union, the chance of beating the Germans to the bomb would be increased. <ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 172. </ref>}}

{{Cquote|[[Gregory Kheifetz]], our operative who had been successful in atomic espionage...described Oppenheimer as a man who thought of problems on a global scale. Oppenheimer saw the threat and promise of the atomic age and understood the ramifications for both military and peaceful applications. We always stressed that contacts with him should be carefully planned to maintain security, and should not be used for acquiring routine information. <ref>FBI Special Agent in Charge William Borden, who investigated Oppenheimer's [[CPUSA]] connections and was requested to make a determinaion of his findings, wrote "He was a vigorous supporter of the H-bomb program until August 6, 1945, (Hiroshima), on which day he personally urged each senior individual working in this field to desist... The central problem is assessing the degree of likelihood that he in fact... during the crucial 1939-1942 period...became an actual espionage and policy instrument of the Soviets. ... my opinion is that...the worst is in fact truth. [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Letter_from_William_L._Borden_to_J._Edgar_Hoover,_November_7,_1953 Letter from William L. Borden to J. Edgar Hoover], November 7, 1953.</ref> We knew that Oppenheimer would remain an influential person in America after the war <ref>McCarthy stated during the Executive Session hearings, "I noticed with some interest Oppenheimer’s articles in regard to the H-bomb, for example; he vigorously opposed our proceeding with any experimentation in the development of the H-bomb. When he lost out in that, he now has taken the position that we should not have an air force capable of delivering that bomb. Maybe I am simplifying it a bit, but in fact that is his argument. His argument has been that we should build a screen of defense around this nation."  McCarthy Hearings, Executive Session Transcripts, September 15, 1953, [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Volume3.pdf Vol. 3, Pgs. 37 - 38] pdf.</ref> and therefore our relations with him should not take the form of running a controlled agent. We understood that he and other members of the scientific community were best approached as friends, not as agents. Since Oppenheimer, Bohr, and Fermi were fierce opponents of violence, they would seek to prevent a nuclear war, creating a balance of power through sharing the secrets of atomic energy. This would be a crucial factor in establishing the new world order after the war, and we took advantage of this. <ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 195. </ref> }}

{{Cquote|[[Gregory Kheifetz]], our operative who had been successful in atomic espionage...described Oppenheimer as a man who thought of problems on a global scale. Oppenheimer saw the threat and promise of the atomic age and understood the ramifications for both military and peaceful applications. We always stressed that contacts with him should be carefully planned to maintain security, and should not be used for acquiring routine information. <ref>FBI Special Agent in Charge William Borden, who investigated Oppenheimer's [[CPUSA]] connections and was requested to make a determinaion of his findings, wrote "He was a vigorous supporter of the H-bomb program until August 6, 1945, (Hiroshima), on which day he personally urged each senior individual working in this field to desist... The central problem is assessing the degree of likelihood that he in fact... during the crucial 1939-1942 period...became an actual espionage and policy instrument of the Soviets. ... my opinion is that...the worst is in fact truth.” [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Letter_from_William_L._Borden_to_J._Edgar_Hoover,_November_7,_1953 Letter from William L. Borden to J. Edgar Hoover], November 7, 1953.</ref> We knew that Oppenheimer would remain an influential person in America after the war <ref>McCarthy stated during the Executive Session hearings, "I noticed with some interest Oppenheimer’s articles in regard to the H-bomb, for example; he vigorously opposed our proceeding with any experimentation in the development of the H-bomb. When he lost out in that, he now has taken the position that we should not have an air force capable of delivering that bomb. Maybe I am simplifying it a bit, but in fact that is his argument. His argument has been that we should build a screen of defense around this nation."  McCarthy Hearings, Executive Session Transcripts, September 15, 1953, [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Volume3.pdf Vol. 3, Pgs. 37 - 38] pdf.</ref> and therefore our relations with him should not take the form of running a controlled agent. We understood that he and other members of the scientific community were best approached as friends, not as agents. Since Oppenheimer, Bohr, and Fermi were fierce opponents of violence, they would seek to prevent a nuclear war, creating a balance of power through sharing the secrets of atomic energy. This would be a crucial factor in establishing the new world order after the war, and we took advantage of this. <ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 195. </ref> }}

{{Cquote|In developing Oppenheimer as a source, [[Vassili Zarubin]]'s wife, Elizabeth, was essential. ...In 1941 [[Elizabeth Zarubina]] was a captain in the [[KGB]]. After her husband's posting to Washington, she traveled to California frequently to cultivate the Oppenheimer family through social contacts arranged by Kheifets. Kheifets then introduced Elizabeth to Oppenheimer's wife, Katherine, who was sympathetic to the Soviet Union and Communist ideals, and the two worked out a system for future meetings." <ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 190. </ref>}}

{{Cquote|In developing Oppenheimer as a source, [[Vassili Zarubin]]'s wife, Elizabeth, was essential. ...In 1941 [[Elizabeth Zarubina]] was a captain in the [[KGB]]. After her husband's posting to Washington, she traveled to California frequently to cultivate the Oppenheimer family through social contacts arranged by Kheifets. Kheifets then introduced Elizabeth to Oppenheimer's wife, Katherine, who was sympathetic to the Soviet Union and Communist ideals, and the two worked out a system for future meetings." <ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 190. </ref>}}

On January 1, 1942, the Soviet and [[Chinese Nationalist]] ambassadors in Washington joined with President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] and British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] in signing the [[Allied_powers#United_Nations_Declaration|Declaration by United Nations]]. Twenty-two other nations added their signatures creating the wartime alliance.  The [[Atlantic Charter]] was hailed as "a common program of purposes."  FDR apparently himself thought up the name "United Nations."  

On January 1, 1942, the Soviet and [[Chinese Nationalist]] ambassadors in Washington joined with President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] and British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] in signing the [[Allied_powers#United_Nations_Declaration|Declaration by United Nations]]. Twenty-two other nations added their signatures creating the wartime alliance.  The [[Atlantic Charter]] was hailed as "a common program of purposes."  FDR apparently himself thought up the name "United Nations."  

The order in which the declaration was signed, first by the four major powers and then the other nations, reflected FDR's belief in the moral concept of "trusteeship of the powerful" for the well-being of the less powerful. The central proposal was the prompt creation of the United Nations Authority composed of all the signers in FDR's "Great Design",<ref>''The Roosevelt Myth'', John T. Flynn, Fox and Wilkes, 1948, Book 3, Chapter 9, Section 2. ''Roosevelt's Great Design and Casablanca'', [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/The_Roosevelt_Myth-John_T_Flynn-1948-444pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=276&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pgs. 345] pdf.</ref> led by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Nationalist China. The President privately referred to these four major powers as the Four Policemen. <ref>Townsend Hooper and Douglas Brinkley, [http://www.ninehundred.net/~jveon/fdrbook.html ''FDR and the Creation of the U.N''], New Haven, 2000, pgs. 45 50.</ref>  In October 1943 at the [[Moscow Conference]] the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the [[Kuomintang]] committed themselves to "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organisation...after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation... they will confer and co-operate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period. " <ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html Joint Four Power Declaration], Moscow Conference, October, 1943.</ref>

The order in which the declaration was signed, first by the four major powers and then the other nations, reflected FDR's belief in the moral concept of "trusteeship of the powerful" for the well-being of the less powerful. The central proposal was the prompt creation of the United Nations Authority composed of all the signers in FDR's "Great Design",<ref>''The Roosevelt Myth'', John T. Flynn, Fox and Wilkes, 1948, Book 3, Chapter 9, Section 2. ''Roosevelt's Great Design and Casablanca'', [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/The_Roosevelt_Myth-John_T_Flynn-1948-444pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=276&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pg. 345] pdf.</ref> led by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Nationalist China. The President privately referred to these four major powers as the Four Policemen. <ref>Townsend Hooper and Douglas Brinkley, [http://www.ninehundred.net/~jveon/fdrbook.html ''FDR and the Creation of the U.N''], New Haven, 2000, pgs. 45 50.</ref>  In October 1943 at the [[Moscow Conference]] the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the [[Kuomintang]] committed themselves to "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organisation...after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation... they will confer and co-operate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period. " <ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html Joint Four Power Declaration], Moscow Conference, October, 1943.</ref>

[[KGB]] Agent and presidential adviser [[Lauchlin Currie]] secured for [[Comintern]] operative [[Owen Lattimore]] the appointment by Roosevelt as the American adviser for the [[Kuomintang]] and Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]].<ref>Testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck, February 15, 1952. U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Internal Security Subcommittee]], Institute of Pacific Relations Hearings, 82nd Congress, First Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Part 9, pp. 3209-10.</ref>  During the [[Communazi period]], the FBI issued a notice that Lattimore should be considered for custodial detention in the event of a national emergency. <ref>[http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=453 McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War in America], Newly Uncovered Secret Data Confirm Wisconsin Senator's Major Charges, ''Human Events'', M. Stanton Evans, 05/08/2003.</ref>  

[[KGB]] Agent and presidential adviser [[Lauchlin Currie]] secured for [[Comintern]] operative [[Owen Lattimore]] the appointment by Roosevelt as the American adviser for the [[Kuomintang]] and Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]].<ref>Testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck, February 15, 1952. U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Internal Security Subcommittee]], Institute of Pacific Relations Hearings, 82nd Congress, First Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Part 9, pp. 3209-10.</ref>  During the [[Communazi period]], the FBI issued a notice that Lattimore should be considered for custodial detention in the event of a national emergency. <ref>[http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=453 McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War in America], Newly Uncovered Secret Data Confirm Wisconsin Senator's Major Charges, ''Human Events'', M. Stanton Evans, 05/08/2003.</ref>  

On November 25, 1941 Lattimore dispatched from China an anxious cable to Currie in the [[White House]] arguing against a proposed diplomatic understanding between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the [[Silvermaster group]].<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the harsh ultimatum written by [[KGB]] Agent Harry Dexter White to Japan after Congress investigated the [[Pearl Harbor attack]]. <ref> Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref> Prof. Anthony Kubek has written that Lattimore, by this one act, designed to accomplish the Soviet objective of promoting war between the United States and Japan -- did more to promote the Sovietization of China than in any other act of Lattimore’s career. All Comintern designs for conquest of China hinged upon destroying Japan and the balance of power in the Pacific. <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103]  Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]</ref>

On November 25, 1941 Lattimore dispatched from China an anxious cable to Currie in the [[White House]] arguing against a proposed diplomatic understanding between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the [[Silvermaster group]].<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the harsh ultimatum written by [[KGB]] Agent Harry Dexter White to Japan after Congress investigated the [[Pearl Harbor attack]]. <ref> Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref> Prof. Anthony Kubek has written that Lattimore, by this one act, designed to accomplish the Soviet objective of promoting war between the United States and Japan -- did more to promote the Sovietization of China than in any other act of Lattimore’s career. All Comintern designs for conquest of China hinged upon destroying Japan and the balance of power in the Pacific. <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek wrote the Introduction of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103]  Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]</ref>

Defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified that Lattimore had been hand picked by the Comintern "to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and relations to the Soviet Union." Lattimore was thought to be a man "who could put out [[propaganda]] and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists." According to Budenz "the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy," but the language employed 'Was non-Soviet in character.' " <ref>Testimony of Louis Francis Budenz, August 22, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings. Part 2, pp. 522-23.</ref> When, on June 15 1943, Lattimore instructed Joseph Barnes<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791284,00.html ''Tongue-Tied''], [[Time magazine]], Feb. 07, 1944.</ref> to replace the non-Communist Chinese of the U.S. [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) with Communists, OWI did so. On July 14 [[Thomas A. Bisson]], in the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] (IPR) publication, ''Far Eastern Survey'', referred to [[Maoist]] forces as the "democratic China."  The disinformation was widely repeated among journalists and academics. Lattimore, [[Frederick Field]] and others, in the ''New York Times'' of May 14, 1944, wrote of China's "agrarian reformers." In July and August 1943, the Chinese Communist forces -- in the midst of the war -- joined with the Japanese armies to inflict a serious defeat on Kuomintang troops allied with the United States.  <ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Claxton Printers, 1953, pg. 36.</ref>

Defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified that Lattimore had been hand picked by the Comintern "to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and relations to the Soviet Union." Lattimore was thought to be a man "who could put out [[propaganda]] and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists." According to Budenz "the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy," but the language employed 'Was non-Soviet in character.' " <ref>Testimony of Louis Francis Budenz, August 22, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings. Part 2, pp. 522-23.</ref> When, on June 15 1943, Lattimore instructed Joseph Barnes<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791284,00.html ''Tongue-Tied''], [[Time magazine]], Feb. 07, 1944.</ref> to replace the non-Communist Chinese of the U.S. [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) with Communists, OWI did so. On July 14 [[Thomas A. Bisson]], in the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] (IPR) publication, ''Far Eastern Survey'', referred to [[Maoist]] forces as the "democratic China."  The disinformation was widely repeated among journalists and academics. Lattimore, [[Frederick Field]] and others, were later to write in the ''New York Times'' of China's "agrarian reformers." But in July and August 1943, the [[Moaist]]s  -- in the midst of the war -- joined with the Japanese armies to inflict a serious defeat on Kuomintang troops allied with the United States.  <ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Claxton Printers, 1953, pg. 36.</ref>

In the second half of 1944, the IPR published a fifty-six-page pamphlet, ''Our Job in Asia'', which was allegedly written by Vice President [[Henry Wallace]] after his official 3 month trip to Siberia, China, and Mongolia. <ref>''Yalta Betrayal'', Wittmer, 1953, pg. 58. Retrieved from GELO.com [http://www.ogleo.com/search/ogleo-History_of_CzechoslovakiaHistory of Czechoslovakia] 05/08/07.</ref>. "The Russians," the author of the pamphlet claimed, "have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their willingness to refrain from intervening in China's internal affairs." <ref> US Senate, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on the Judiciary, Institute of Pacific Relations, Report No. 2050, p. 223.</ref><ref>US Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Committee on the Judiciary, Institute of Pacific Relations, Part V, pp. 1302, 1206.</ref> The Senate Committee on the Judiciary was to find that the IPR in 1944, "disseminated and sought to popularize false information including information originating from Soviet and Communist sources." <ref>US Senate, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on the Judiciary, Institute of Pacific Relations, Report No. 2050, p. 223.</ref> Some years later Wallace admitted under oath that most of a book entitled ''Soviet Asia Mission'' written under his name detailing his Far Eastern trip actually had been written by Andrew J. Steiger, a person identified under oath as a [[Communist party]] member. The Communist party  advocated the violent overthrow of the [[United States]] Government and was an agency of a foreign government.<ref>U.S. Code Title 50 Chapter 23 Subchapter IV § 841 [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sec_50_00000841----000-.html Findings and declarations of fact], "The Congress finds and declares that the Communist Party of the United States, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the United States...the policies and programs of the Communist Party are secretly prescribed for it by the foreign leaders...the Communist Party acknowledges no constitutional or statutory limitations upon its conduct...gives scant indication of capacity ever to attain its ends by lawful political means. The peril inherent in its operation arises not from its numbers, but from its failure to acknowledge any limitation as to the nature of its activities, and its dedication to the proposition that the present [[Constitutional Republic|constitutional Government]] of the United States ultimately must be brought to ruin by any available means, including resort to force and violence. Holding that doctrine, its role as the agency of a hostile foreign power renders its existence a clear present and continuing danger to the security of the United States. It is the means whereby individuals are seduced into the service of the world Communist movement, trained to do its bidding, and directed and controlled in the conspiratorial performance of their revolutionary services."</ref> To Joseph Fels Barnes, Owen Lattimore, and Harriet Lucy Moore, all identified under oath as Communist party members, Wallace expressed his gratitude for their "invaluable assistance in preparing the manuscript." <ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Caxton Printers, 1953, pg. 59.</ref>

In the second half of 1944, the IPR published a fifty-six-page pamphlet, ''Our Job in Asia'', which was allegedly written by Vice President [[Henry Wallace]] after his official 3 month trip to Siberia, China, and Mongolia. <ref>''Yalta Betrayal'', Wittmer, 1953, pg. 58. Retrieved from GELO.com [http://www.ogleo.com/search/ogleo-History_of_CzechoslovakiaHistory of Czechoslovakia] 05/08/07.</ref>. "The Russians," the author of the pamphlet claimed, "have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their willingness to refrain from intervening in China's internal affairs." <ref> US Senate, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on the Judiciary, Institute of Pacific Relations, Report No. 2050, p. 223.</ref><ref>US Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Committee on the Judiciary, Institute of Pacific Relations, Part V, pp. 1302, 1206.</ref> The Senate Committee on the Judiciary was to find that in 1944 the IPR, "disseminated and sought to popularize false information including information originating from Soviet and Communist sources." <ref>US Senate, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on the Judiciary, Institute of Pacific Relations, Report No. 2050, p. 223.</ref> Some years later Wallace admitted in testimony that most of a book entitled ''Soviet Asia Mission'' supposedly written by him detailing his official Far Eastern trip actually had been written by Andrew J. Steiger, a person identified under oath as a [[Communist party]] member. The Communist party  advocated the violent overthrow of the [[United States]] Government and was an agency of a foreign government.<ref>U.S. Code Title 50 Chapter 23 Subchapter IV § 841 [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sec_50_00000841----000-.html Findings and declarations of fact], "The Congress finds and declares that the Communist Party of the United States, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the United States...the policies and programs of the Communist Party are secretly prescribed for it by the foreign leaders...the Communist Party acknowledges no constitutional or statutory limitations upon its conduct...gives scant indication of capacity ever to attain its ends by lawful political means. The peril inherent in its operation arises …from its failure to acknowledge any limitation as to the nature of its activities, and its dedication to the proposition that the present [[Constitutional Republic|constitutional Government]] of the United States ultimately must be brought to ruin by any available means, including resort to force and violence. Holding that doctrine, its role as the agency of a hostile foreign power renders its existence a clear present and continuing danger to the security of the United States. It is the means whereby individuals are seduced into the service of the world Communist movement, trained to do its bidding, and directed and controlled in the conspiratorial performance of their revolutionary services."</ref> To Joseph Fels Barnes, Owen Lattimore, and Harriet Lucy Moore, all identified under oath as Communist party members, the Vice President expressed his gratitude for their "invaluable assistance in preparing the manuscript." <ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Caxton Printers, 1953, pg. 59.</ref>

Chiang Kai-shek himself claimed that Harry Dexter White and his staff sabotaged his government's economic policies.  The U.S. government made a commitment to Chiang in writing to supply $200 million in gold to Nationalist China <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', London, 1974, pg. 333.</ref> in 1943 at a time when inflation was spiraling out of control.<ref>John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, ''Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, New Haven Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 142-145 ISBN 0-300-08462-5 </ref> White's policy prevented the shipment until it was too late to be effective in stemming the inflation. In a December 9, 1944 memo to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, White wrote,  

Chiang Kai-shek himself claimed that Harry Dexter White and his staff sabotaged his government's economic policies.  The U.S. government made a commitment to Chiang in writing to supply $200 million in gold to Nationalist China <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', London, 1974, pg. 333.</ref> in 1943 to stabilize the Chinese currency at a time when inflation was spiraling out of control.<ref>John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, ''Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America'', New Haven Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 142-145 ISBN 0-300-08462-5 </ref> White's policy prevented the shipment until it was too late to be effective in stemming inflation. In a December 9, 1944 memo to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, White wrote,  

{{Cquote|We have stalled as much as we have dared and have succeeded in limiting gold shipments to $26 million during the past year.  We think it would be a serious mistake to permit further large shipments at this time. <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', pg. 326.</ref>}}

{{Cquote|We have stalled as much as we have dared and have succeeded in limiting gold shipments to $26 million during the past year.  We think it would be a serious mistake to permit further large shipments at this time. <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', pg. 326.</ref>}}

In July 1945 [[U.S. War Department]] memorandum entitled, ''The Chinese Communist Movement'', gave a depiction of the true nature of the CCP, reporting the Maoists allowed no opposition groups in their areas they controlled and were part of the international Comintern movement. <ref>Anne W. Carroll, [http://www.ewtn.com/library/HOMELIBR/FR89102.TXT ''Who Lost China''], 1996. Retrieved from www.ewtn com/library/ August 16, 2007.</ref>  Chiang believed that the Truman Doctrine of [[Containment]] of Moscow [[Subversion (political)|subversion]] would extend to China, and ordered an offensive when he heard of the new policy. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China:  A Political History, 1917-1980'',  Boulder CO 1982, pg. 208.</ref>  Truman however, made no effort to save China from Communism. U.S. Secretary of State [[George Marshall]] himself testified that such aid might have worked, but General David Barr's military mission was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref>  In the summer of 1946, Truman told Chiang to be more willing to compromise. Chiang replied that first the Communists must abandon "their policy to seize political power through the use of armed force, to overthrow the government and to install a [[totalitarian]] regime such as those with which [[Eastern Europe]] is now being engulfed." <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 429.</ref>

In July 1945 [[U.S. War Department]] memorandum entitled, ''The Chinese Communist Movement'', gave a depiction of the true nature of the CCP, reporting the Maoists allowed no opposition groups in the areas they controlled and were part of the international Comintern movement of violent revolution. <ref>Anne W. Carroll, [http://www.ewtn.com/library/HOMELIBR/FR89102.TXT ''Who Lost China''], 1996. Retrieved from www.ewtn com/library/ August 16, 2007.</ref>  Chiang believed that the [[Truman Doctrine]] of [[Containment|containing]] of Moscow directed [[Subversion (political)|subversion]] would extend to China, and ordered an offensive when he heard of the new policy. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China:  A Political History, 1917-1980'',  Boulder CO 1982, pg. 208.</ref>  Truman however, made no effort to save China from en[[slave]]ment. U.S. Secretary of State [[George Marshall]] himself testified that such aid might have worked, but General David Barr's military mission was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref>  In the summer of 1946, Truman told Chiang to be more willing to compromise. Chiang replied that first the Communists must abandon "their policy to seize political power through the use of armed force, to overthrow the government and to install a [[totalitarian]] regime such as those with which [[Eastern Europe]] is now being engulfed." <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 429.</ref>

[[Senator McCarthy]] repeatedly criticized IPR and its former chairman [[Philip Jessup]],  observing that Frederick Field, T.A. Bisson, and Lattimore were very active in IPR and worked to turn American China policy in favor of the CCP. John Carter Vincent, [[John Stewart Service]], [[Alger Hiss]], and John Paton Davies all had links to IPR. Jessup in 1949 was the principal editor of the State Department "white paper" on China that abandoned Chiang Kai-chek and the Kuomintang.

[[Senator McCarthy]] repeatedly criticized IPR and its former chairman [[Philip Jessup]],  observing that Frederick Field, T.A. Bisson, and Lattimore were very active in IPR and worked to turn American China policy in favor of the CCP. John Carter Vincent, [[John Stewart Service]], [[Alger Hiss]], and John Paton Davies all had links to IPR. Jessup in 1949 was the principal editor of the State Department "white paper" on China that abandoned Chiang Kai-chek and the Kuomintang.

[[Image:FrankCoegroup.jpg|frame|right

[[Image:FrankCoegroup.jpg|frame|right

|'''CCP Chairman [[Mao Zedong]] with Israel Epstein (first left), Soviet spies [[Anna Louise Strong]] (third left), [[Frank Coe]] (second right), and [[Solomon Adler]] (first right). [[New Deal]] economists Coe and Adler defected to Maoist China rather than face prosecution in the United States. Chinese history refers to the time their economic theories were implemented as the [[Three Years of Disasters]].  By 1959, Coe was writing articles justifying the [[Rectification campaign]], which the ''Epoch Times'' in 2004 called the "darkest and most ferocious power game ever played out in the human world".<ref>[http://english.epochtimes.com/news/4-12-11/24830.html Rectification in Yan’an—Creating the Most Fearsome Methods in Persecution], The Beginnings of the Chinese Communist Party, Epoch Times Commentaries on the Chinese Communist Party - Part 2, Dec 11, 2004.</ref>]]

|'''CCP Chairman [[Mao Zedong]] with Israel Epstein (first left), Soviet spies [[Anna Louise Strong]] (third left), [[Frank Coe]] (second right), and [[Solomon Adler]] (first right). [[New Deal]] economists Coe and Adler defected to Maoist China rather than face prosecution in the United States. Chinese history recalls the time their economic theories were implemented as the [[Three Years of Disasters]].  By 1959, Coe was writing articles justifying the [[Rectification campaign]], which the ''Epoch Times'' in 2004 referred to as the "darkest and most ferocious power game ever played out in the human world".<ref>[http://english.epochtimes.com/news/4-12-11/24830.html Rectification in Yan’an—Creating the Most Fearsome Methods in Persecution], The Beginnings of the Chinese Communist Party, Epoch Times Commentaries on the Chinese Communist Party - Part 2, Dec 11, 2004.</ref>]]

The [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] (SISS) looked extensively into the problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials, specifically Harry Dexter White. Part of its report looked into the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in [[China]] and was published as the ''Morgenthau Diary''. <ref>[http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103 Guide to the Records of the U.S. Senate at the National Archives, Records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65].</ref> The report stated,  

The [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] (SISS) looked extensively into the problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials, specifically Harry Dexter White. Part of its report looked into the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in [[China]] and was published as the ''Morgenthau Diary''. <ref>[http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103 Guide to the Records of the U.S. Senate at the National Archives, Records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65].</ref> The report stated in 1967,  

:"The concentration of Communist sympathizers in the [[Treasury Department]], and particularly the Division of Monetary Research, is now a matter of record. White was the first director of that division; those who succeeded him in the directorship were [[Frank Coe]] and [[Harold Glasser]]. Also attached to the Division of Monetary Research were [[Lud Ullman|William Ludwig Ullman]], [[Irving Kaplan]], and [[Victor Perlo]]. White, Coe, Glasser, Kaplan, and Perlo were all identified as participants in the Communist conspiracy…." <ref>United States Government Printing Office, Report on the Morgenthau Diaries prepared by the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary appointed to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, Introduction, by Dr. Anthony Kubek, Professor of History at Dallas University, November 1967, two volumes, v.i., pg. 80.</ref>

:"The concentration of Communist sympathizers in the [[Treasury Department]], and particularly the Division of Monetary Research, is now a matter of record. White was the first director of that division; those who succeeded him in the directorship were [[Frank Coe]] and [[Harold Glasser]]. Also attached to the Division of Monetary Research were [[Lud Ullman|William Ludwig Ullman]], [[Irving Kaplan]], and [[Victor Perlo]]. White, Coe, Glasser, Kaplan, and Perlo were all identified as participants in the Communist conspiracy…." <ref> Report on the Morgenthau Diaries prepared by the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary appointed to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, Introduction, by Dr. Anthony Kubek, Professor of History at Dallas University, November 1967, United States Government Printing Office, two volumes, v.i., pg. 80.</ref>

During the hearings, 46 persons connected with the IPR were identified as Communist Party members. <ref>U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Washington 1952, pg. 11.</ref><ref>[http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?print=yes&id=455 McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War in America], by M. Stanton Evans, ''Human Events'', 05/30/1997. Updated 05/08/2003.</ref>  In the final report the SISS noted:

During the hearings, 46 persons connected with the IPR were identified as Communist Party members. <ref>U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Washington 1952, pg. 11.</ref><ref>[http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?print=yes&id=455 McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War in America], by M. Stanton Evans, ''Human Events'', 05/30/1997. Updated 05/08/2003.</ref>  In the final report the SISS noted:

==Korea and the nuclear arms race==

==Korea and the nuclear arms race==

 

==Extrajudicial means==

==Extrajudicial means==

Defector [[Louis Budenz]] stated publicly he could identify 400 members of the Communist conspiracy which had delivered the know-how to build the [[atomic bomb]] to the Soviet Union.  This number of 400 was closely corroborated by the 349 codenames the cryptographers in the Venona project had discovered and FBI field investigators were working to identify.  Defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]] also identified 81 persons involved in espionage, and Soviet cipher clerk [[Igor Gouzenko]] yielded up names too when he defected in Canada.

Defector [[Louis Budenz]] stated publicly he could identify 400 members of the Communist conspiracy which had delivered the know-how to build the [[atomic bomb]] to the Soviet Union.  This number of 400 was closely corroborated by the 349 codenames the cryptographers in the Venona project discovered and FBI field investigators sought to identify.  Defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]] also identified 81 persons involved in espionage, and Soviet cipher clerk [[Igor Gouzenko]] yielded valuable information when he defected in Canada.

In sum, some 205 total true identities of persons involved in espionage during World War II were known to the FBI by 1950, some being corroborated by multiple sources.  Given the secret nature of Venona, and the unwillingness to let the Soviet Union know the US was reading its codes, the known spies were eased out of government positions, and where prosecution could occur using sources other than Venona, a few cases were attempted.  But the priority was always to maintain the secrecy regarding the breaking of Soviet codes, remove security risks, and forego law enforcement while cryptographers and field investigators continued working to identify others.

In sum, some 205 total true identities of persons involved in espionage during World War II were known to the FBI by 1950, some being corroborated by multiple sources.  Given the secret nature of Venona, and the unwillingness to let the Soviet Union know the US was reading its codes, the known spies were eased out of government positions, and where prosecution could occur using sources other than Venona, a few cases were attempted.  But the priority was always to maintain the secrecy regarding the breaking of Soviet codes, remove security risks, and forego law enforcement while cryptographers and field investigators continued working to identify others.

So secret was Venona, that not even [[President Truman]] was informed. The revelation Truman had never been informed was the subject of much controversy and discussion when the Venona documents were declassified in 1995.  Given the extent of the Soviet penetration of the U.S. Government, including virtually all the U.S. security and intelligence services, the State and Treasury Departments, and even the [[White House]], the decision not to inform Truman appears to have been the logical and appropriate decision. <ref>Thomas Patrick Carroll, ''The Case Against Intelligence Openness'', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2001, Vol. 14, Nol. 4, pgs. 559 - 574. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600152617164]</ref> General [[Omar Bradley]] took it upon himself not to inform Truman, and told the few others with the knowledge of the Soviet attack on American security that he would inform the President if the need were to arise. <ref>[http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/830wsuop.asp?pg=2 The Origins of McCarthyism], What did Harry Truman know, and when did he know it? by Robert D. Novak, ''The Weekly Standard'', 06/30/2003, Volume 008, Issue 41.</ref>  

So secret was Venona, that not even [[President Truman]] was informed. The revelation Truman had never been informed was the subject of much controversy and discussion when the Venona documents were declassified in 1995.  Given the extent of the Soviet penetration of the U.S. Government, including virtually all the U.S. security and intelligence services, the State and Treasury Departments, and even the [[White House]], the decision not to inform Truman appears to have been the logical and appropriate decision. <ref>Thomas Patrick Carroll, ''The Case Against Intelligence Openness'', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2001, Vol. 14, Nol. 4, pgs. 559 - 574. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600152617164]</ref> General [[Omar Bradley]] took it upon himself not to inform Truman, and told the few others with the knowledge of the Soviet attack on American security that he would inform the President if the need were to arise. <ref>[http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/830wsuop.asp?pg=2 The Origins of McCarthyism], What did Harry Truman know, and when did he know it? by Robert D. Novak, ''The Weekly Standard'', 06/30/2003, Volume 008, Issue 41.</ref>  

After the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear test, and it became apparent to the public that the Soviet Union obtained the knowhow from American citizens employed by the federal government during the [[New Deal]], with the growing tensions of the times over the [[Berlin Airlift]], the loss of the U.S.'s wartime ally in China to the Chinese [[Comintern]] forces, and later the [[Korean War]], those with knowledge of Venona had as an immediate priority to remove Soviet operatives from sensitive positions.  President Truman had instituted a system of Loyalty checks through review boards, but Truman himself was unaware of the extent of the real danger. Hoover approached McCarthy with a plan to (a) ease more security risks out of government positions, (b) put pressure on friends and relatives to reveal what they knew about Soviet operatives based upon familial relations or association in various communist front organizations, and (c) gain more knowledge of spy’s contacts and operations.  It took a willingness on McCarthy's part to stretch the limits of Senate Rules, and there is no indication Hoover disclosed completely to McCarthy  the FBI's full knowledge of Soviet espionage activity in the United States for the prior two and half decades. The immediate crisis was so large and potentially catastrophic that McCarthy was willing to act with Hoover and the FBI to help remove the remaining security risks.

After the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear test, and it became apparent to the public that the Soviet Union obtained the knowhow from American citizens employed by the federal government during the [[New Deal]], with the growing tensions of the times over the [[Berlin Airlift]], the loss of the U.S.'s wartime ally in China to the Chinese [[Comintern]] forces, and later the [[Korean War]], those with knowledge of Venona had as an immediate priority to remove Soviet operatives from sensitive positions.  President Truman instituted a system of Loyalty checks through review boards, but Truman himself was unaware of the extent of the real danger. Hoover approached McCarthy with a plan to (a) ease more security risks out of government positions, (b) put pressure on friends and relatives to reveal what they knew about Soviet operatives based upon familial relations or association in various communist front organizations, and (c) gain more knowledge of spy’s contacts and operations.  It took a willingness on McCarthy's part to stretch the limits of Senate Rules, and there is no indication Hoover disclosed completely to McCarthy  the FBI's full knowledge of Soviet espionage activity in the United States for the prior two and half decades. The immediate crisis was so large and potentially catastrophic that McCarthy was willing to act with Hoover and the FBI to help remove the remaining security risks.

Most but not all of [[Senator McCarthy]]’s numbered cases were drawn from the “Lee List” or “108 list” of unresolved [[Department of State]] security cases compiled by the investigators for the House Appropriates Committee in 1947.  Robert E. Lee was the committee’s lead investigator and supervised preparation of the list.  The Tydings subcommittee also obtained this list.  The Lee list, also using numbers rather than names, was published in the proceeding of the subcommittee. <ref>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950).</ref>  

Most but not all of [[Senator McCarthy]]’s numbered cases were drawn from the “Lee List” or “108 list” of unresolved [[Department of State]] security cases compiled by the investigators for the House Appropriates Committee in 1947.  Robert E. Lee was the committee’s lead investigator and supervised preparation of the list.  The Tydings subcommittee also obtained this list.  The Lee list, using numbers rather than names, was published in the proceeding of the subcommittee. <ref>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950).</ref>  

   

   

Senator McCarthy furnished the [[Tydings Committee]] the real names attached to his numbered cases, and the Tydings Committee received the real names attached to the Lee list as well.  <ref>McCarthy to Tydings, 18 March 1950 with attached list.</ref>  Over the years that followed all of the names became public one way or another. Additionally, in a series of speeches McCarthy named others as secret Communists, spies, security risks, or participants in the Communist conspiracy.

Senator McCarthy furnished the [[Tydings Committee]] the real names attached to his numbered cases, and the Tydings Committee received the real names attached to the Lee list as well.  <ref>McCarthy to Tydings, 18 March 1950 with attached list.</ref>  Over the years that followed all of the names became public one way or another. Additionally, in a series of speeches McCarthy named others as secret Communists, spies, security risks, or participants in the Communist conspiracy.

*Beginning  24 June 1948 the first major crisis of the [[Cold War]] exposed the rift in the [[Allied Powers|Alliance of World War II]] which had defeated Germany, when Soviet troops blockaded access points to Berlin, sparking the first Berlin Crisis, and lasting a year.

*Beginning  24 June 1948 the first major crisis of the [[Cold War]] exposed the rift in the [[Allied Powers|Alliance of World War II]] which had defeated Germany, when Soviet troops blockaded access points to Berlin, sparking the first Berlin Crisis, and lasting a year.

*On 20 July General Secretary [[Eugene Dennis]] and 11 other [[CPUSA]] leaders were arrested and indicted under the [[Smith Act]] of conspiring to advocate violent overthrow of the US Government.

*On 20 July [[CPUSA]] General Secretary [[Eugene Dennis]] and 11 others were arrested and indicted under the [[Smith Act]] of conspiring to advocate violent overthrow of the US Government.

*On 31 July [[Elizabeth Bentley]] testifies before the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]] (HUAC), publicly accusing [[Harry Dexter White]] and [[White House]] adviser [[Lauchlin Currie]] of being [[Soviet agents]].

*On 31 July [[Elizabeth Bentley]] testifies before the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]] (HUAC), publicly accusing [[Harry Dexter White]] and [[White House]] adviser [[Lauchlin Currie]] of being [[Soviet agents]].

*3 August [[Whittaker Chambers]] names [[Harry Dexter White]] and the first General Secretary of the [[United Nations]] Charter meeting,, former State Department employee and confident of [[President Roosevelt]] at the [[Yalta Conference]], [[Alger Hiss]] as Communists in testimony before the HUAC.

*3 August [[Whittaker Chambers]] names the first General Secretary of the [[United Nations]] Charter meeting and confident of [[President Roosevelt]] at the [[Yalta Conference]], [[Alger Hiss]], as well as  [[Harry Dexter White]] as Communists in testimony before the HUAC.

*13 August Harry Dexter White, the first head of the [[International Monetary Fund]], a keystone post war institution, denies charges he is a Soviet agent before HUAC.

*13 August Harry Dexter White, the first head of the [[International Monetary Fund]], a keystone post war institution, denies charges he is a Soviet agent before HUAC and claims he’s a loyal [[New Deal [[Democrat]].

*On 16 August Harry Dexter White, died of a heart attack three days after denying involvement with KGB. His involvement was later positively determined by the FBI through evidence gathered by the Venona project as a Soviet agent code named "Jurist". <ref>[http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memorandum_identifying_Harry_Dexter_White_as_agent_Jurist FBI Memo Ladd to the Director, October 16, 1950], Identifying Harry Dexter White as agent Jurist.</ref>

*Three days later on 16 August Harry Dexter White died of a heart attack. His complicity in espionage  was later conclusively determined by the FBI through evidence gathered by the Venona project as a Soviet agent code named "Jurist". <ref>[http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memorandum_identifying_Harry_Dexter_White_as_agent_Jurist FBI Memo Ladd to the Director, October 16, 1950], Identifying Harry Dexter White as agent Jurist.</ref>

*In late summer of 1949, on 29 August the Soviet atomic bomb project was revealed when it exploded a replica of [[Fat Man]]; the [[Soviet Union]] had gained nuclear technology  by espionage from the United States, which spent $4 billion dollars (about $48 billion in today's dollars) to develop during World War II.

*In late summer of 1949, on 29 August the Soviet atomic bomb project was revealed when it exploded a replica of [[Fat Man]]; the [[Soviet Union]] gained nuclear technology  by espionage from the United State with the willing cooperation of government employees and American citizens.

*On 23 September 1949 Truman announces that the Soviets have exploded an atomic bomb.

*On 23 September 1949 Truman announces that the Soviets have exploded an atomic bomb.

*In May 1951, two members of the [[Cambridge Five]] — [[Donald MacLean]], Second Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., and [[Guy Burgess]] — defected to Moscow after it was discovered MacLean transmitted information on the atom bomb from the British Embassy to the Soviet Union during World War II.

*In May 1951, two members of the [[Cambridge Five]] — [[Donald MacLean]], Second Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., and [[Guy Burgess]] — defected to Moscow after it was discovered MacLean transmitted information on the atom bomb from the British Embassy to the Soviet Union during World War II.

==More spy cases==

==More spy cases==

McCarthy had a confrontation with Boston attorney Joseph Welch in televised hearings. Welch demanded that McCarthy name someone who had belonged to a [[Glossary_of_espionage_terms#Fronts_and_cutouts|Communist front]] organization, and then complained that it was cruel, reckless, and indecent to do so. McCarthy named Welch's associate Fred Fisher as a member of the [[National Lawyers Guild]], who Welch himself had previously outed to the NY Times six weeks earlier.[http://www.aim.org/aim_report/A4297_0_4_0_C/]

McCarthy had a confrontation with Boston attorney Joseph Welch in televised hearings. Welch demanded that McCarthy name someone who had belonged to a [[Glossary_of_espionage_terms#Fronts_and_cutouts|Communist front]] organization, and then complained that it was cruel, reckless, and indecent to do so. McCarthy named Welch's associate Fred Fisher as a member of the [[National Lawyers Guild]], who Welch himself had previously outed to the NY Times six weeks earlier.[http://www.aim.org/aim_report/A4297_0_4_0_C/]

Welch dishonestly pretended to be shocked, and famously said, "Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last?"

Welch dishonestly pretended to be shocked, and famously said, "Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last?"

{{cquote|Liberals invented the myth of McCarthyism to delegitimize impertinent questions about theiro own patriotism...Liberals demand that the nation treat enemies like friends and friends like enemies...Any evidence that anyone seeks to harm America is stridently rejected as "no evidence."<ref>Coulter, Ann ''Treason:  Liberal Treachery From the Cold War to the War on Terrorism''©2003 Crown Forum, New York, New York, pp. 1-2</ref>}}

 

{{cquote|it is difficult to grasp the importance of McCarthy's crusade. But there's a reason 'Communist' now sounds about as threatening as 'monarchist' …. McCarthy made it a disgrace to be a Communist. Domestic Communism could never recover.

Liberals invented the myth of McCarthyism to delegitimize impertinent questions about theiro own patriotism...Liberals demand that the nation treat enemies like friends and friends like enemies...Any evidence that anyone seeks to harm America is stridently rejected as "no evidence."<ref>Coulter, Ann ''Treason:  Liberal Treachery From the Cold War to the War on Terrorism''©2003 Crown Forum, New York, New York, pp. 1-2</ref>}}

==The New Left==

==The New Left==