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The '''Neutrality Act''' was an Act of Congress providing for the prohibition of the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to belligerent countries; the prohibition of the transportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war by vessels of the United States for the use of belligerent states; for the registration and licensing of persons engaged in the business of manufacturing, exporting, or importing arms, ammunition, or implements of war; and restricting travel by American citizens on belligerent ships during war. <ref>[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/interwar/neutralityact.htm "Neutrality Act" of August 31, 1935], 49 stat. 1081; 22 U.S.C. 441 note, U.S. Department of State, Publication 1983, ''Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941'' (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943, pp. 265-271).</ref>

The '''Neutrality Act''' was an Act of Congress providing for the prohibition of the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to belligerent countries; the prohibition of the transportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war by vessels of the United States for the use of belligerent states; for the registration and licensing of persons engaged in the business of manufacturing, exporting, or importing arms, ammunition, or implements of war; and restricting travel by American citizens on belligerent ships during war. <ref>[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/interwar/neutralityact.htm "Neutrality Act" of August 31, 1935], 49 stat. 1081; 22 U.S.C. 441 note, U.S. Department of State, Publication 1983, ''Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941'' (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943, pp. 265-271).</ref>

In 1939 the U. S. supplied Japan with 59% of all war materials. The havoc wrought upon China by Japan using American made bombs dropped from American made airplanes was publicized as Japanese atrocities. (cf Porter Sargent, Bulletin #1 ''War Propaganda'', May 30, 1939).<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Getting_Us_Into_War-Porter_Sargent-1941-640pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=218&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pgs. 525 - 544 pdf], pdf</ref>

In 1939 the U. S. supplied Japan with 59% of all war materials. The havoc wrought upon China by Japan using American made bombs dropped from American made airplanes was publicized as Japanese atrocities. (cf Porter Sargent, Bulletin #1 ''War Propaganda'', May 30, 1939).<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Getting_Us_Into_War-Porter_Sargent-1941-640pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=218&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pgs. 525 - 544 pdf], pdf</ref>

''Time'' magazine referred to Thomas Lamont in its November 25, 1940 issue as a specialist on Japan. Years earlier Lamont visited Japan with [[Walter Lippmann]]. At the Academy of Political Science, Lamont responded to the question, "Should the U.S. tighten trade embargoes against Japan?" ''Time'' said "he pointed out inconsistencies and omissions in U.S. embargoes  that still permitted Japan to get war supplies."  The outcry against supplying Japan with the essentials for her aggressive war against China was met by an announcement from the [[Roosevelt Administration]] of 'embargoes' on the export of scrap and oil. Porter Sargent observed, "Subtle influences through the organizations of fund raising, public relations and communication by radio or print, make it possible to soft pedal the profit from arming Japan while promoting the use of armed force against her."<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, quoted in ''Getting Us into War'', Porter Sargent Publisher: P. Sargent, Boston, 1941, pg. 530.</ref> "Watertight as a fish-net" is how [[Owen Lattimore]], editor of ''Pacific Affairs'', characterized the embargo on November 9, 1940.  "The Royal Dutch-Shell group and a subsidiary of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company will supply 7,000,000 barrels of oil to Japan over six months," a ''New York Times'' dispatch of October 17 reported. "Arrangements have been virtually concluded for Japan to get 40 per cent of her oil requirements for the next six months in the Dutch Indies." [[I. F. Stone]] reported on the State Department's handling of the embargo in the October 5, 1940 issue of ''[[The Nation]]'',

''Time'' magazine referred to Thomas Lamont in its November 25, 1940 issue as a specialist on Japan. Years earlier Lamont visited Japan with [[Walter Lippmann]]. At the Academy of Political Science, Lamont responded to the question, "Should the U.S. tighten trade embargoes against Japan?" ''Time'' said "he pointed out inconsistencies and omissions in U.S. embargoes  that still permitted Japan to get war supplies."  The outcry against supplying Japan with the essentials for her aggressive war against China was met by an announcement from the [[Roosevelt Administration]] of 'embargoes' on the export of scrap and oil. Porter Sargent observed, "Subtle influences through the organizations of fund raising, public relations and communication by radio or print, make it possible to soft pedal the profit from arming Japan while promoting the use of armed force against her."<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, quoted in ''Getting Us into War'', Porter Sargent Publisher: P. Sargent, Boston, 1941, pg. 530.</ref> "Watertight as a fish-net" is how [[Comintern]] operative and editor of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] publication ''Pacific Affairs'', [[Owen Lattimore]] characterized the embargo on November 9, 1940.  "The Royal Dutch-Shell group and a subsidiary of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company will supply 7,000,000 barrels of oil to Japan over six months," a ''New York Times'' dispatch of October 17 reported. "Arrangements have been virtually concluded for Japan to get 40 per cent of her oil requirements for the next six months in the Dutch Indies." [[KGB]] source [[I. F. Stone]] reported on the State Department's handling of the embargo in the October 5, 1940 issue of ''[[The Nation]]'',

:"Within the department, over the objections of a more farsighted minority, the experts made a joke of the discourses by protecting the profits accruing to American business from the aggressions we were so nobly denouncing."  The trade "treaty expired in January of [1940], but it was not until July that an 'embargo' on oil and scrap was announced . . . . The details were left to the State Department experts. When the regulations were promulgated it was found that the only scrap 'embargoed'" was one little used of the 75 varieties of iron and steel scrap, and "the only petroleum 'embargoed' was aviation gas". Stone continued, "the 'embargo' itself was only a system of licensing. It is now revealed that few if any licenses were denied under these regulations . . . . The Japanese, with about a year's supply on hand, do not need our scrap as much as they did, and the scrap industry, with a defense boom in the offing, does not need Japanese orders . The big steel companies cannot oppose an embargo on scrap by claiming that we have an over-supply of steel and at the same time ask for a higher price for steel on the ground of a shortage . . . . Both big steel and the scrap industry have accepted the embargo with a curious equanimity. This may be the result of a new sense of patriotism or it may be something else." <ref>I.F. Stone, ''The Nation'', October 5, 1940.</ref>

:"Within the department, over the objections of a more farsighted minority, the experts made a joke of the discourses by protecting the profits accruing to American business from the aggressions we were so nobly denouncing."  The trade "treaty expired in January of [1940], but it was not until July that an 'embargo' on oil and scrap was announced . . . . The details were left to the State Department experts. When the regulations were promulgated it was found that the only scrap 'embargoed'" was one little used of the 75 varieties of iron and steel scrap, and "the only petroleum 'embargoed' was aviation gas". Stone continued, "the 'embargo' itself was only a system of licensing. It is now revealed that few if any licenses were denied under these regulations . . . . The Japanese, with about a year's supply on hand, do not need our scrap as much as they did, and the scrap industry, with a defense boom in the offing, does not need Japanese orders . The big steel companies cannot oppose an embargo on scrap by claiming that we have an over-supply of steel and at the same time ask for a higher price for steel on the ground of a shortage . . . . Both big steel and the scrap industry have accepted the embargo with a curious equanimity. This may be the result of a new sense of patriotism or it may be something else." <ref>I.F. Stone, ''The Nation'', October 5, 1940.</ref>

On July 26, 1941, Roosevelt accepted a plan for economic sanctions presented by Treasury Assistant [[Harry Dexter White]]. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. Because Japan was poor in natural resources, its government viewed these steps, especially the embargo on oil, as a threat to the nation's survival. Japan's leaders responded by resolving to seize the resource-rich territories of Southeast Asia, even though that move would certainly result in war with the United States.  White submitted an appeal to the President:

On July 26, 1941, Roosevelt accepted a plan for economic sanctions presented by [[KGB]] Agent and Treasury Assistant[[Harry Dexter White]]. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. Because Japan was poor in natural resources, its government viewed these steps, especially the embargo on oil, as a threat to the nation's survival. Japan's leaders responded by resolving to seize the resource-rich territories of Southeast Asia, even though that move would certainly result in war with the United States.  White submitted an appeal to the President:

{{Cquote|Oil - rivers of oil - will soon be flowing to the Japanese … To sell China to her enemies for the thirty blood-stained coins of gold will not only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far East, but will dim the bright lustre of America's world leadership… On this day, Mr. President, the whole country looks to you to save America's power as well as her sacred honor….<ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/comatph.html Communism at Pearl Harbor], How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. pg. 12. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled ''Morgenthau Diary'' (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White.</ref>}}

{{Cquote|Oil - rivers of oil - will soon be flowing to the Japanese … To sell China to her enemies for the thirty blood-stained coins of gold will not only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far East, but will dim the bright lustre of America's world leadership… On this day, Mr. President, the whole country looks to you to save America's power as well as her sacred honor….<ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/comatph.html Communism at Pearl Harbor], How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. pg. 12. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled ''Morgenthau Diary'' (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White.</ref>}}

The Soviet Union stood to gain vitally from U.S.- Japanese war.  On the 25th of November, U.S. Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] had stated the problem as one of "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot." <ref>As Stimson explained: "In spite of the risk involved... in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." Stimson's Testimony quoted in Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York: Creative Age, 1950), p. 473.</ref> It is significant that in the ten-point ultimatum sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because White's demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>In other words, Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim of Soviet [[foreign policy]] to advance the interests of the [[Comintern]] and the Soviet Union in the Far East <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, Dr. Anthony Kubek, pg. 19.  Kubek writing in 1959 during the interwar period between the [[Korean War]] and the [[Vietnam War]], two "hot wars" in the "[[cold war]]," concluded: "The United States destroyed the one power that was able to check the flow of that Red tide in the Far East. ...The present Soviet military might, which threatens our national security, is the direct product of billions of [[lend-lease]] aid, coddling of Communists in high places in the American Government and failure to understand the basic drives of world [[Communism]]. ...Never before in our history was Presidential leadership so devoid of vision and never before had the mistakes of our Chief Executive been so fraught with peril to our nation."</ref>

The Soviet Union stood to gain vitally from U.S.- Japanese war.  On the 25th of November, U.S. Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] had stated the problem as one of "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot." <ref>As Stimson explained: "In spite of the risk involved... in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." Stimson's Testimony quoted in Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York: Creative Age, 1950), p. 473.  In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General George C. Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> It is significant that in the ten-point ultimatum sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because White's demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>In other words, Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim of Soviet [[foreign policy]] to advance the interests of the [[Comintern]] and the Soviet Union in the Far East <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, Dr. Anthony Kubek, pg. 19.  Kubek writing in 1959 during the interwar period between the [[Korean War]] and the [[Vietnam War]], two "hot wars" in the "[[cold war]]," concluded: "The United States destroyed the one power that was able to check the flow of that Red tide in the Far East. ...The present Soviet military might, which threatens our national security, is the direct product of billions of [[lend-lease]] aid, coddling of Communists in high places in the American Government and failure to understand the basic drives of world [[Communism]]. ...Never before in our history was Presidential leadership so devoid of vision and never before had the mistakes of our Chief Executive been so fraught with peril to our nation."</ref>

==Second Sino-Japanese War==

==Second Sino-Japanese War==