Changes

=== Commander in Chief ===  

=== Commander in Chief ===  

On May 19, 1942, pressured by Communist union officials of the American Communications Association, [[CIO]], Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, informed Rear Admiral Adolphus Staton that Communist radio operators were not to be removed from their ships. Less than six months earlier, Congress, with the lone dissenting vote of [[Vito Marcantonio]], enacted Public Law 351, which authorized the Secretary of the Navy to have all radio operators with a [[subversion (political)|subversive]] background taken off their ships. Rear Admiral Staton had recommended the removal of a number of Communists. In the presence of Rear Admiral S. C. Hooper and others, Knox instructed Rear Admiral Staton "that, in the opinion of the President, membership or suspected membership in the CPUSA was not sufficient to deprive a radio operator of his job." <ref>''America's Tradgedy-Today'', Major Hamilton A.  Long, (NY: Post Printing), pgs. 15-25.</ref> Expounding a memorandum bearing President Roosevelt's initials, Knox brushed aside the objections of Staton and Hooper, declaring that the order came from the President himself. Because the presidential command defied the law of the land, it was not put into writing. Consequently, the Communist radio operators returned to their ships and Rear Admirals Hooper and Staton were put on the inactive list.

On May 19, 1942, pressured by Communist union officials of the American Communications Association, [[CIO]], Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, informed Rear Admiral Adolphus Staton that Communist radio operators were not to be removed from their ships. Less than six months earlier, Congress, with the lone dissenting vote of [[Vito Marcantonio]], enacted Public Law 351, which authorized the Secretary of the Navy to have all radio operators with a [[subversion (political)|subversive]] background taken off their ships. Rear Admiral Staton had recommended the removal of a number of Communists. In the presence of Rear Admiral S. C. Hooper and others, Knox instructed Rear Admiral Staton "that, in the opinion of the President, membership or suspected membership in the CPUSA was not sufficient to deprive a radio operator of his job." <ref>''America's Tragedy-Today'', Major Hamilton A.  Long, (NY: Post Printing), pgs. 15-25.</ref> Expounding a memorandum bearing President Roosevelt's initials, Knox brushed aside the objections of Staton and Hooper, declaring that the order came from the President himself. Because the presidential command defied the law of the land, it was not put into writing. Consequently, the Communist radio operators returned to their ships and Rear Admirals Hooper and Staton were put on the inactive list.

Stalin publicly disbanded the [[Comintern]] in 1943. A Moscow message to all stations on 12 September 1943, message number 142, relating to this event is one of the most interesting and historically important messages <ref>[http://www.nsa.gov/venona/venon00008.cfm Venona 142(a) Moscow to Canberra 12 September 1943]. Text reads: "change in circumstances - and in particular the dissolution of the [[Comintern]] - necessitates a change in the method used by the workers of our residencies to keep in touch with the leaders of the local [[Communist_Party_of_the_United_States_of_America#Secret_apparatus|Communist]] organizations on intelligence matters. <br/>

Stalin publicly disbanded the [[Comintern]] in 1943. A Moscow message to all stations on 12 September 1943, message number 142, relating to this event is one of the most interesting and historically important messages <ref>[http://www.nsa.gov/venona/venon00008.cfm Venona 142(a) Moscow to Canberra 12 September 1943]. Text reads: "change in circumstances - and in particular the dissolution of the [[Comintern]] - necessitates a change in the method used by the workers of our residencies to keep in touch with the leaders of the local [[Communist_Party_of_the_United_States_of_America#Secret_apparatus|Communist]] organizations on intelligence matters. <br/>

Notes: [a] This message is known to have been sent also to NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, and OTTAWA.</ref> in the entire corpus of [[VENONA]] translations. This message clearly discloses the [[KGB]]'s connection to the Comintern and to the national Communist parties. <ref>''Counterintelligence Reader'', National Counterintelligence Center, United States,  [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch4_a.htm Vol. 2, Ch. 4], n.d.</ref> Shortly afterwards Rear Admiral Staton, a Congressional Medal of Honor recipient, was asked to testify before the Cox Committee of House of Representatives on the [[White House]] efforts to protect Communists in the Armed Forces. Staton complied in executive session. Before he could appear in public hearings, [[Adlai Stevenson]], assistant to Secretary Knox, instructed him that "there were White House orders" forbidding him to testify. <ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,777835,00.html ''Cox's Circus''], Time magazine, Monday, Jul. 19, 1943.</ref> By that time Counter-Intelligence officers had obtained irrefutable proof that the CPUSA had developed an extensive plan to abolish the Armed Forces' counter-subversive system. <ref>Long, op.cit., pg. 12.</ref>  

Notes: [a] This message is known to have been sent also to NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, and OTTAWA.</ref> in the entire corpus of [[VENONA]] translations. This message clearly discloses the [[KGB]]'s connection to the Comintern and to the national Communist parties. <ref>''Counterintelligence Reader'', National Counterintelligence Center, United States,  [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch4_a.htm Vol. 2, Ch. 4], n.d.</ref> Shortly afterwards Rear Admiral Staton, a Congressional Medal of Honor recipient, was asked to testify before the Cox Committee of House of Representatives on the [[White House]] efforts to protect Communists in the Armed Forces. Staton complied in executive session. Before he could appear in public hearings, [[Adlai Stevenson]], assistant to Secretary Knox, instructed him that "there were White House orders" forbidding him to testify. <ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,777835,00.html ''Cox's Circus''], Time magazine, Monday, Jul. 19, 1943.</ref> By that time Counter-Intelligence officers had obtained irrefutable proof that the CPUSA had developed an extensive plan to abolish the Armed Forces' counter-subversive system. <ref>Long, op.cit., pg. 12.</ref>  

Roosevelt himself was responsible for the order of January 1, 1944 which abolished the entire setup of the Counter-Intelligence Corps in the [[War Department]].<ref>''America's Tradgedy-Today'', Major Hamilton A. Long, New York : Post Printing), pg. 12.</ref>  On February 19 the War Department issued the order which purposely disorganized the counter-subversive  reporting system of the Armed Forces. <ref>Long, op.cit., p. 13</ref>  On May 19, the day after learning of the secret order to destroy the War Department records on subversives, Senator [[StyIes Bridges]], a member of the Military Affairs Committee, demanded an explanation from Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]]. Lieutenant General McNarney, Army Chief of Staff deputy, was "vague, evasive and obstructive." Bridges told McNarney "he could forgive an officer who makes a mistake or loses a battle, but that an officer who betrays the security of his country should be taken out and shot."  McNarney admitted the order had been issued from "higher authority." After much wrangling, Secretary Stimson in a letter of May 27 promised to prevent the destruction of records on subversives. <ref>Long, op.cit., pgs. 28-31.</ref>

Roosevelt himself was responsible for the order of January 1, 1944 which abolished the entire setup of the Counter-Intelligence Corps in the [[War Department]].<ref>Long, op.cit., pg. 12.</ref>  On February 19 the War Department issued the order which purposely disorganized the counter-subversive  reporting system of the Armed Forces. <ref>Long, op.cit., pg. 13</ref>  On May 19, the day after learning of the secret order to destroy the War Department records on subversives, Senator [[StyIes Bridges]], a member of the Military Affairs Committee, demanded an explanation from Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]]. Lieutenant General McNarney, Army Chief of Staff deputy, was "vague, evasive and obstructive." Bridges told McNarney "he could forgive an officer who makes a mistake or loses a battle, but that an officer who betrays the security of his country should be taken out and shot."  McNarney admitted the order had been issued from "higher authority." After much wrangling, Secretary Stimson in a letter of May 27 promised to prevent the destruction of records on subversives. <ref>Long, op.cit., pgs. 28-31.</ref>

The War Department, on December 30, 1944, issued a secret order which expressly condoned "divided loyalty" and established as a guiding rule that "the subversive-suspect should be given the benefit of all reasonable doubt."

The War Department, on December 30, 1944, issued a secret order which expressly condoned "divided loyalty" and established as a guiding rule that "the subversive-suspect should be given the benefit of all reasonable doubt."