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[[Image:pearlharborattack.jpg|right|thumb|250px|Battleship ''[[USS Arizona]]'' burns after her magazine was hit by a Japanese bomb.]]

[[Image:pearlharborattack.jpg|right|thumb|250px|Battleship ''[[USS Arizona]]'' burns after her magazine was hit by a Japanese bomb.]]

'''The Attack on Pearl Harbor''' was a military air strike by the [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] on the morning of December 7, 1941, that was designed to cripple the U.S. Fleet, enabling Japan to have free and unfettered access to much of the western [[Pacific Ocean]] and Southeast [[Asia]]. The attack resulted in the United States declaring war against the Axis powers the next day.

'''The Attack on Pearl Harbor''' was a military air strike by the [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] on the morning of December 7, 1941, that was designed to cripple the U.S. Fleet, enabling Japan to have free and unfettered access to much of the western [[Pacific Ocean]] and Southeast [[Asia]]. The attack resulted in the United States declaring war against Japan the next day.

==Prelude==

==Prelude==

The road to war between Japan and the United States began in the 1930s when differences over [[China]] drove the two nations apart. In 1931 Japan conquered [[Manchuria]], which until then had been part of China. In 1937 Japan began a long and ultimately unsuccessful campaign to conquer the rest of China. In 1940, the Japanese government allied their country with [[Nazi Germany]] in the [[Axis]] Alliance, and, in the following year, occupied all of Indochina.

The road to war between Japan and the United States began in the 1930s when differences over [[China]] drove the two nations apart. In 1931 Japan conquered [[Manchuria]], which until then had been part of China. In 1937 Japan began a long and ultimately unsuccessful campaign to conquer the rest of China. In 1940, the Japanese government allied their country with [[Nazi Germany]] in the [[Axis]] Alliance, and, in the following year, occupied all of Indochina.

The United States, which had important political and economic interests in East Asia, was alarmed by these Japanese moves. The U.S. increased military and financial aid to China, and embarked on a program of strengthening its military power in the Pacific. Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] sought to make America's economic policy ambiguous so that Japan might be deterred by fear of sanctions not yet imposed and won by hopes of concessions not yet granted. Such a policy obtained Roosevelt's explicit approval while at the same time it more aggressive elements in Japan to take control.

The U.S. increased military and financial aid to China, and embarked on a program of strengthening its military power in the Pacific. Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] sought to make America's economic policy ambiguous so that Japan might be deterred by fear of sanctions not yet imposed and won by hopes of concessions not yet granted. Such a policy obtained Roosevelt's explicit approval while at the same time it more aggressive elements in Japan to take control.

Roosevelt accepted a plan for economic sanctions presented by Treasury Assistant [[Harry Dexter White]]. On July 26, 1941, a full scale economic blockade was implemented, all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. were froze and trade virtually ended between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The Japanese Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>   

Roosevelt accepted a plan for economic sanctions presented by Treasury Assistant [[Harry Dexter White]]. On July 26, 1941, a full scale economic blockade was implemented, all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. were frozen and trade virtually ended between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The Japanese Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>   

Because Japan was poor in natural resources, its government viewed these steps, especially the embargo on oil, as a threat to the nation's survival. Japan's leaders responded by resolving to seize the resource-rich territories of Southeast Asia, even though that move would certainly result in war with the United States.  A proposal by Japanese Premier [[Fumimaro Konoe]] for a personal meeting with Roosevelt was rejected. Hull abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put in final shape an ultimatum. Hull's use of the harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme. <ref>''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time'', Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pgs. 735 - 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>

Because Japan was poor in natural resources, its government viewed these steps, especially the embargo on oil, as a threat to the nation's survival. Japan's leaders responded by resolving to seize the resource-rich territories of Southeast Asia, even though that move would certainly result in war with the United States.  A proposal by Japanese Premier [[Fumimaro Konoe]] for a personal meeting with Roosevelt was rejected. Hull abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put in final shape an ultimatum. Hull's use of harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme. <ref>''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time'', Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pgs. 735 - 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>

On the 25th of November, U.S. Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] had stated the problem as one of "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot." <ref>As Stimson explained: "In spite of the risk involved... in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." Stimson's Testimony quoted in Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York: Creative Age, 1950), p. 473.</ref> Secretary Hull had solved the problem the next day. This was the conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board when it reported that the Hull note "touched the button that started the war." <ref>Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 137. [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/army/chap_3c.html]</ref>

On the 25th of November, U.S. Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] had stated the problem as one of "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot." <ref>As Stimson explained: "In spite of the risk involved... in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." Stimson's Testimony quoted in Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York: Creative Age, 1950), p. 473.</ref> Secretary Hull solved the problem the next day. This was the conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board when it reported that the Hull note "touched the button that started the war." <ref>Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 137. [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/army/chap_3c.html]</ref>

It is significant that in the ten-point ultimatum sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, eight of the drastic demands were written by [[Harry Dexter White]]. In other words, Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim of Soviet [[foreign policy]] to advance the interests of the [[Comintern]] and the Soviet Union in the Far East <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959, pg. 19. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103] Dr. Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]<br>

It is significant that in the ten-point ultimatum sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, eight of the drastic demands were written by [[Harry Dexter White]]. In other words, Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim of Soviet [[foreign policy]] to advance the interests of the [[Comintern]] and the Soviet Union in the Far East <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959, pg. 19. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103] Dr. Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]<br>

In October 1941 the naval general staff gave final approval to Yamamoto's plan, which called for the formation of an attack force commanded by Vice Admiral [[Chuichi Nagumo]]. It centered around six heavy aircraft carriers accompanied by 24 supporting vessels. A separate group of submarines was to sink any American warships which escaped the Japanese carrier force.

In October 1941 the naval general staff gave final approval to Yamamoto's plan, which called for the formation of an attack force commanded by Vice Admiral [[Chuichi Nagumo]]. It centered around six heavy aircraft carriers accompanied by 24 supporting vessels. A separate group of submarines was to sink any American warships which escaped the Japanese carrier force.

Nagumo's fleet assembled in the remote anchorage of Tankan Bay in the [[Kurile Islands]] and departed in strictest secrecy for Hawaii on November 26, 1941. The ships' route crossed the North Pacific and avoided normal shipping lanes. At dawn on December 7, 1941, the Japanese task force had approached undetected to a point slightly more than 200 miles north of Oahu. At this time the U.S. carriers were not at Pearl Harbor; on November 28, Admiral Kimmel sent USS ''Enterprise'' under Rear Admiral Willliam Halsey to deliver Marine Corps fighter planes to [[Wake Island]]. On December 4 ''Enterprise'' delivered the aircraft and on December 7 the task force was on its way back to Pearl Harbor. On December 5, Admiral Kimmel sent the USS ''Lexington'' with a task force under Rear Admiral Newton to deliver 25 scout bombers to [[Midway Island]]. The last Pacific carrier, USS ''Saratoga'', had left Pearl Harbor for upkeep and repairs on the West Coast.

Nagumo's fleet assembled in the remote anchorage of Tankan Bay in the [[Kurile Islands]] and departed in strictest secrecy for Hawaii on November 26, 1941. The ships' route crossed the North Pacific and avoided normal shipping lanes. At dawn on December 7, 1941, the Japanese task force had approached undetected to a point slightly more than 200 miles north of Oahu. At this time the U.S. carriers were not at Pearl Harbor; on November 28, Admiral Kimmel sent USS ''Enterprise'' under Rear Admiral William Halsey to deliver Marine Corps fighter planes to [[Wake Island]]. On December 4 ''Enterprise'' delivered the aircraft and on December 7 the task force was on its way back to Pearl Harbor. On December 5, Admiral Kimmel sent the USS ''Lexington'' with a task force under Rear Admiral Newton to deliver 25 scout bombers to [[Midway Island]]. The last Pacific carrier, USS ''Saratoga'', had left Pearl Harbor for upkeep and repairs on the West Coast.

==The attack==

==The attack==

At 6:00 a.m. on December 7, the six Japanese carriers launched a first wave of 181 planes composed of torpedo bombers, dive bombers, horizontal bombers and fighters. Even as they winged south, some elements of U.S. forces on Oahu realized there was something different about this Sunday morning.

At 6:00 a.m. on December 7, the six Japanese carriers launched a first wave of 181 planes composed of torpedo bombers, dive bombers, horizontal bombers and fighters. Even as they winged south, some elements of U.S. forces on Oahu realized there was something different about this Sunday morning.

There was a short lull in the fury of the attack at about 0830. At that time ''Nevada'', despite her wounds, managed to get underway and move down the channel toward the open sea. Before she could clear the harbor, a second wave of 170 Japanese planes, launched 30 minutes after the first, appeared over the harbor. They concentrated their attacks on the moving battleship, hoping to sink her in the channel and block the narrow entrance to Pearl Harbor. On orders from the harbor control tower, ''Nevada'' beached herself at Hospital Point and the channel remained clear.

There was a short lull in the fury of the attack at about 0830. At that time ''Nevada'', despite her wounds, managed to get underway and move down the channel toward the open sea. Before she could clear the harbor, a second wave of 170 Japanese planes, launched 30 minutes after the first, appeared over the harbor. They concentrated their attacks on the moving battleship, hoping to sink her in the channel and block the narrow entrance to Pearl Harbor. On orders from the harbor control tower, ''Nevada'' beached herself at Hospital Point and the channel remained clear.

==Aftermath==

==Aftermath==

When the attack ended shortly before 10:00 a.m., less than two hours after it began, the American forces has paid a fearful price. Twenty-one ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet were sunk or damaged: the battleships ''Arizona'', ''California'', ''Maryland'', ''Nevada'', ''Oklahoma'', ''Pennsylvania'', ''Tennessee'', and ''West Virginia''; cruisers ''Helena'' (CL-50), ''Honolulu'' (CL-48), and ''Raleigh'' (CL-7); the destroyers ''Cassin'' (DD-372), ''Downes'' (DD-375), ''Helm'' (DD-388), and ''Shaw'' (DD-373); seaplane tender ''Curtiss'' (AV-4); target ship (ex-battleship) ''Utah'' (AG-16); repair ship ''Vestal'' (AR-4); minelayer ''Oglala'' (CM-4); tug ''Sotoyomo'' (YT-9); and Floating Drydock Number 2. Aircraft losses were 188 destroyed and 159 damaged, the majority hit before the had a chance to take off. American dead numbered 2,403. That figure included 68 civilians, most of them killed by improperly fused anti-aircraft shells landing in Honolulu. There were 1,178 military and civilian wounded.

When the attack ended shortly before 10:00 a.m., less than two hours after it began, the American forces have paid a fearful price. Twenty-one ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet were sunk or damaged: the battleships ''Arizona'', ''California'', ''Maryland'', ''Nevada'', ''Oklahoma'', ''Pennsylvania'', ''Tennessee'', and ''West Virginia''; cruisers ''Helena'' (CL-50), ''Honolulu'' (CL-48), and ''Raleigh'' (CL-7); the destroyers ''Cassin'' (DD-372), ''Downes'' (DD-375), ''Helm'' (DD-388), and ''Shaw'' (DD-373); seaplane tender ''Curtiss'' (AV-4); target ship (ex-battleship) ''Utah'' (AG-16); repair ship ''Vestal'' (AR-4); minelayer ''Oglala'' (CM-4); tug ''Sotoyomo'' (YT-9); and Floating Drydock Number 2. Aircraft losses were 188 destroyed and 159 damaged, the majority hit before they had a chance to take off. American dead numbered 2,403. That figure included 68 civilians, most of them killed by improperly fused anti-aircraft shells landing in Honolulu. There were 1,178 military and civilian wounded.

Japanese losses were comparatively light. Twenty-nine planes, less than 10 percent of the attacking force, failed to return to their carriers.

Japanese losses were comparatively light. Twenty-nine planes, less than 10 percent of the attacking force, failed to return to their carriers.