Changes

Marshall held several meetings with [[Chiang Kai-shek]] or his delegates and with Mao's representative, [[Zhou Enlai]], and twice arranged ceasefires, in January and June of 1946. When the ceasefires was ordered the Communists held 57 counties. A year later they had 310—a violation of the truce. The Bolton Congressional report compiled a catalogue of the bridges, railway stations and other installations destroyed by the Communists during the ceasefire.<ref>Bolton Report, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Sub-Committee No. 5) on Communism in China, 1948.</ref><ref>''History of the Chinese Communist Party'', Jacques Guillermaz, London, 1972, pg. 445.</ref><ref>''China: A Political History, 1917-1980'', Richard C. Thornton, Boulder, CO, 1982, pg. 192.</ref> Marshall however imposed an embargo on the [[Chinese Nationalist government]].  All aid of all sorts to the Kuomintang was discontinued until the summer of 1947 by which time the balance had shifted. Even then what the U.S. sent was insufficient to stem the Communist tide.

Marshall held several meetings with [[Chiang Kai-shek]] or his delegates and with Mao's representative, [[Zhou Enlai]], and twice arranged ceasefires, in January and June of 1946. When the ceasefires was ordered the Communists held 57 counties. A year later they had 310—a violation of the truce. The Bolton Congressional report compiled a catalogue of the bridges, railway stations and other installations destroyed by the Communists during the ceasefire.<ref>Bolton Report, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Sub-Committee No. 5) on Communism in China, 1948.</ref><ref>''History of the Chinese Communist Party'', Jacques Guillermaz, London, 1972, pg. 445.</ref><ref>''China: A Political History, 1917-1980'', Richard C. Thornton, Boulder, CO, 1982, pg. 192.</ref> Marshall however imposed an embargo on the [[Chinese Nationalist government]].  All aid of all sorts to the Kuomintang was discontinued until the summer of 1947 by which time the balance had shifted. Even then what the U.S. sent was insufficient to stem the Communist tide.

Gen. [[Douglas MacArthur]]'s Chief of Intelligence told the U.S. [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] in 1951, "The real cause for the Communization of China is the long-range [[subversion|subversive]] operation, over the last two decades, conducted by professional Communists under orders of the [[Kremlin]]-controlled Third [[Comintern]]."<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,821608-3,00.html The Case Against [[I.P.R.]]]], ''[[Time magazine]]'', September 03, 1951.</ref>

Gen. [[Douglas MacArthur]]'s Chief of Intelligence told the U.S. [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] in 1951, "The real cause for the Communization of China is the long-range [[subversion|subversive]] operation, over the last two decades, conducted by professional Communists under orders of the [[Kremlin]]-controlled Third [[Comintern]]."<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,821608-3,00.html The Case Against [[I.P.R.]]]] ''[[Time magazine]]'', September 03, 1951.</ref>

==Ukrainian Resistance==

==Ukrainian Resistance==