Changes

The public debt in 1932 when FDR took office was $22 billion and largely was a heritage of [[World War I]].<ref>''The Roosevelt Myth'', John T. Flynn, Fox and Wilkes, 1948, [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/The_Roosevelt_Myth-John_T_Flynn-1948-444pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=276&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pg. 129] pdf.</ref> Widespread public disillusionment felt that a handful of arms producers had benefited from the war while the nation had been left with a [[public debt]] in the form of credits which had been extended to foreign purchasers of arms.  [[Bernard Baruch]] described how the law functioned: "We will sell to any belligerent anything except lethal weapons, but the terms are 'cash on the barrel-head and come and get it."

The public debt in 1932 when FDR took office was $22 billion and largely was a heritage of [[World War I]].<ref>''The Roosevelt Myth'', John T. Flynn, Fox and Wilkes, 1948, [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/The_Roosevelt_Myth-John_T_Flynn-1948-444pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=276&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pg. 129] pdf.</ref> Widespread public disillusionment felt that a handful of arms producers had benefited from the war while the nation had been left with a [[public debt]] in the form of credits which had been extended to foreign purchasers of arms.  [[Bernard Baruch]] described how the law functioned: "We will sell to any belligerent anything except lethal weapons, but the terms are 'cash on the barrel-head and come and get it."

The original Neutrality was extended to expire on May 1, 1936. It was renewed with a "cash and carry" provision for two years. The basic feature, a prohibition on loans to belligerent governments remained intact.  The new act required that, if the president proclaimed the existence of a state of war between others nations, or a civil war that endangered the peace of the Untied States, the shipment of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, excluding raw materials, would be embargoed.  

The original Neutrality Act was extended to expire on May 1, 1936. It was renewed with a "cash and carry" provision for two years. The basic feature, a prohibition on loans to belligerent governments remained intact.  The new act required that, if the president proclaimed the existence of a state of war between others nations, or a civil war that endangered the peace of the United States, the shipment of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, excluding raw materials, would be embargoed.  

On July 7, 1937 Japanese troops stationed in North China, under terms of the [[Boxer Protocol of 1900]], clashed with elements of the [[Kuomintang]] army near the Marco Polo Bridge, ten miles west of Beijing.  An all-out Japanese invasion of China followed.  By the end of the month, Beijing was occupied and the following month Shanghai was attacked.  The Neutrality Act required the president to implement its provisions when a state of war existed, but Roosevelt did not invoke the act.  Twenty-five members of the House signed a statement demanding the immediate application of the arms embargo in order to “stop the feeding of the war which means destruction of thousands of lives in the Orient and of war to all the world.”  FDR permitted American munitions to reach China via British ships destined for Hong Kong.  ''[[Time magazine]]'' speculated, "though in the long run Japan might need U. S. supplies more than China, the immediate effect of an embargo would be to the advantage of Japan, whose ships could still presumably conduct a "cash and carry" trade with the U. S."<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,930929-1,00.html Manslaughter in Shanghai], ''Time'' magazine, Aug. 30, 1937.</ref>

On July 7, 1937 Japanese troops stationed in North China, under terms of the [[Boxer Protocol of 1900]], clashed with elements of the [[Kuomintang]] army near the Marco Polo Bridge, ten miles west of Beijing.  An all-out Japanese invasion of China followed.  By the end of the month, Beijing was occupied and the following month Shanghai was attacked.  The Neutrality Act required the president to implement its provisions when a state of war existed, but Roosevelt did not invoke the act.  Twenty-five members of the House signed a statement demanding the immediate application of the arms embargo in order to “stop the feeding of the war which means destruction of thousands of lives in the Orient and of war to all the world.”  FDR permitted American munitions to reach China via British ships destined for Hong Kong.  ''[[Time magazine]]'' speculated, "though in the long run Japan might need U. S. supplies more than China, the immediate effect of an embargo would be to the advantage of Japan, whose ships could still presumably conduct a "cash and carry" trade with the U. S."<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,930929-1,00.html Manslaughter in Shanghai], ''Time'' magazine, Aug. 30, 1937.</ref>

KGB agent [[Frederick V . Field]]<ref>In the final report the [[SISS]] stated: "The IPR itself was like a specialized political flypaper in its attractive power for Communists. . . . British Communists like [[Michael Greenberg]]...Chinese Communists like Chi Chao-ting, Chen Han-seng, Chu Tong, Y.Y. Hsu;...Japanese Communists (and espionage agents) like Saionji and Ozaki (Hozumi); United States Communists like James S. Allen, Frederick V. Field, William M. Mandel, Harriet Moore, Lawrence Rosinger, and [[Alger Hiss]]....The IPR has been considered by the [[American Communist Party]] and by Soviet officials as an instrument of Communist policy, propaganda and [[military intelligence]]. The IPR disseminated and sought to popularize false information including information originating from Soviet and Communist sources. . . . The IPR was a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American far eastern policies toward Communist objectives. . ." U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Washington 1952.</ref> in the [[IPR]]'s ''Far Eastern Survey: America's Stake in the Far East'', Porter Sargent observed "gives the cost of our foreign service in Eastern Asia as $905,754 and adds to this detailed figures totaling approximately $300,000 for State and [[United States Department of Commerce|Commerce Department]]s, and a proportion of the cost of our Army and Navy running to hundreds of millions annually . To this might be added subsidies for our Pacific merchant marine. This great relief to the British Treasury could not have been continued had it not been skillfully concealed from the American people."<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, pg. 527, quoted in the ''North American Review'', Winter, 1938-39.</ref>  Roosevelt biographer Robert Sherwood quoted the ''[[Daily Worker]]'' about Commerce Secretary [[Harry Hopkins]], "The secret diplomacy involved in the Hopkins appointment can put the American people on the alert-in insisting that no further aid be given British imperialism, since such aid brings the shadow of war closer and closer to our homes."<ref>''Roosevelt and Hopkins : An Intimate History'', Robert E. Sherwood, New York Harper and Brothers, 1948, [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Roosevelt_and_Hopkins-An_Intimate_History-Robert_E_Sherwood-1948-1034pgs-GOV-POL.sml.pdf&id=252&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pg. 233] pdf.</ref>

KGB agent [[Frederick V . Field]]<ref>In the final report the [[SISS]] stated: "The IPR itself was like a specialized political flypaper in its attractive power for Communists. . . . British Communists like [[Michael Greenberg]]...Chinese Communists like Chi Chao-ting, Chen Han-seng, Chu Tong, Y.Y. Hsu;...Japanese Communists (and espionage agents) like Saionji and Ozaki (Hozumi); United States Communists like James S. Allen, Frederick V. Field, William M. Mandel, Harriet Moore, Lawrence Rosinger, and [[Alger Hiss]]....The IPR has been considered by the [[American Communist Party]] and by Soviet officials as an instrument of Communist policy, propaganda and [[military intelligence]]. The IPR disseminated and sought to popularize false information including information originating from Soviet and Communist sources. . . . The IPR was a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American far eastern policies toward Communist objectives. . ." U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Washington 1952.</ref> in the [[IPR]]'s ''Far Eastern Survey: America's Stake in the Far East'', Porter Sargent observed "gives the cost of our foreign service in Eastern Asia as $905,754 and adds to this detailed figures totaling approximately $300,000 for State and [[United States Department of Commerce|Commerce Department]]s, and a proportion of the cost of our Army and Navy running to hundreds of millions annually . To this might be added subsidies for our Pacific merchant marine. This great relief to the British Treasury could not have been continued had it not been skillfully concealed from the American people."<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, pg. 527, quoted in the ''North American Review'', Winter, 1938-39.</ref>  Roosevelt biographer Robert Sherwood quoted the ''[[Daily Worker]]'' about Commerce Secretary [[Harry Hopkins]], "The secret diplomacy involved in the Hopkins appointment can put the American people on the alert-in insisting that no further aid be given British imperialism, since such aid brings the shadow of war closer and closer to our homes."<ref>''Roosevelt and Hopkins : An Intimate History'', Robert E. Sherwood, New York Harper and Brothers, 1948, [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Roosevelt_and_Hopkins-An_Intimate_History-Robert_E_Sherwood-1948-1034pgs-GOV-POL.sml.pdf&id=252&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pg. 233] pdf.</ref>

===Far Easter trade===

===Far Eastern trade===

Of American trade with the Far East, Japan's share had been double, and at times nearly triple, that of China for the previous forty years to World War II.<ref>Whitney Griswold in ''Our Policy in the Far East'', Harper's, August, 1940, quote in Porter Sargent, ''Prodding Japan into War'', Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, pg. 535 - 535, fn. 1.</ref> From 1931 to 1935, an annual average of 19% of the total foreign trade of the U.S. was with the Far East.  Of this sum, in 1935, 43% represented American trade with Japan, 24% with the Dutch Empire, India, British Malaya and French Indo-China, 18 % with the Philippines, and 14% with China and Hongkong (3% of total U.S. foreign trade). Thus, approximately 8.17% of U.S. total foreign trade, or about $312,000,000, was with Japan and 3.42%, or $130,410,000, constituted American trade with China and Hongkong. <ref>Griswold, ''The Far Eastern Policy of the U.S.'', p 468.</ref>

Of American trade with the Far East, Japan's share had been double, and at times nearly triple, that of China for the previous forty years to World War II.<ref>Whitney Griswold in ''Our Policy in the Far East'', Harper's, August, 1940, quote in Porter Sargent, ''Prodding Japan into War'', Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, pg. 535 - 535, fn. 1.</ref> From 1931 to 1935, an annual average of 19% of the total foreign trade of the U.S. was with the Far East.  Of this sum, in 1935, 43% represented American trade with Japan, 24% with the Dutch Empire, India, British Malaya and French Indo-China, 18 % with the Philippines, and 14% with China and Hongkong (3% of total U.S. foreign trade). Thus, approximately 8.17% of U.S. total foreign trade, or about $312,000,000, was with Japan and 3.42%, or $130,410,000, constituted American trade with China and Hongkong. <ref>Griswold, ''The Far Eastern Policy of the U.S.'', p 468.</ref>