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===Verifiability Criterion of Meaning===

===Verifiability Criterion of Meaning===

Logical positivists, in the tradition of Hume, Kant, and several other thinkers preceding them, divided propositions into two groups, namely, the [[analytic]] and the [[synthetic]].  They called "analytic" those propositions belonging to pure logic.  They considered such statements to be tautological, and therefore not to say anything significant about the world.  That is not to say, however, that the logical positivists considered analytical propositions to be useless; rather, analytic statements were considered to be useful in relating ideas to one another and in understanding the workings of language.   

Logical positivists, in the tradition of Hume, Kant, and several other thinkers, divided propositions into two groups, namely, the [[analytic]] and the [[synthetic]].  They called "analytic" those propositions belonging to pure logic.  They considered such statements to be tautological, and therefore not to say anything significant about the world.  That is not to say, however, that the logical positivists considered analytical propositions to be useless; rather, analytic statements were considered to be useful in relating ideas to one another and in understanding the workings of language.   

Logical positivists called "synthetic" those propositions that make significant statements about the world.  In general, any proposition that is not a tautology would be considered synthetic.   

Logical positivists called "synthetic" those propositions that make significant statements about the world.  In general, any proposition that is not a tautology would be considered synthetic.   

Within synthetic propositions, logical positivists distinguished between those that were meaningful and those that were meaningless.  It in the articulation of this demarcation that the verifiability criterion of meaning makes its appearance.  While different logical positivist thinkers formulated the criterion differently, and its precise formulation continues to be problematic, the essential point is that a synthetic proposition is meaningful to a person only if insofar as the person is aware of what (theoretically possible, thought not necessarily practical) observations would verify or falsify the proposition.  This was interpreted to mean that the only meaningful sentences were those that could be "translated" into reports of direct observation, with the result that logical positivists believed that anyone uttering sentences that could not be so translated was simply babbling nonsense.   

Within synthetic propositions, logical positivists distinguished between those that were meaningful and those that were meaningless.  It in the articulation of this demarcation that the verifiability criterion of meaning makes its appearance.  While different logical positivist thinkers formulated the criterion differently, and its precise formulation continues to be problematic, the essential point is that a synthetic proposition is meaningful to a person only if insofar as the person is aware of what (theoretically possible, thought not necessarily practical) observations would verify or falsify the proposition.  This was interpreted to mean that the only meaningful sentences were those that could be "translated" into reports of direct observation, with the result that logical positivists believed that anyone uttering sentences that could not be so translated was simply babbling nonsense.   

It is important to note here that most logical positivists did not contend that such "babbling" was without any communicative value; rather, it can perhaps less abrasively be described cognitively meaningless, factually empty, devoid of truth-aptness.  In other words, while sentences that did not meet the criterion did not express truths or falsehoods, they could still be expressive of the emotions of the speaker.

It is important to note here that most logical positivists did not contend that such "babbling" was without any communicative value; rather, it can perhaps less abrasively be described cognitively meaningless, factually empty, devoid of truth-aptness.  In other words, while sentences that did not meet the criterion did not express truths or falsehoods, they could still be expressive of the emotions of the speaker.

===Theology and ethics===

===Theology and ethics===