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Future may not be subject to knowledge.
''Free will'' and ''an omniscient deity'' are mutually exclusive. If either is encompassed by a theologically honest position, the other must be denied. --[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:24, 14 March 2007 (EDT)
''Free will'' and ''an omniscient deity'' are mutually exclusive. If either is encompassed by a theologically honest position, the other must be denied. --[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:24, 14 March 2007 (EDT)
:This argument assumes that the future is capable of being the subject of knowledge (a fairly widely held assumption, but one I, and many other philosophers, reject). That is, it assumes that a statement about the future is true or false, rather than indeterminate. If the future is indeterminate then an omniscient deity would be able to know all that is knowable and still not know what I am going to do in the future. Of course, this position raises problems with respect to prophesy and that may be a problem for some theists (but not necessarily for all theists if they reject prophesy or if they view prophesy as a promise of what God intends to do in the future). So, while you are right, free will and the common understanding of an omniscient deity are at odds, free will and an omniscient deity are not necessarily at odds.--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 15:34, 14 March 2007 (EDT)