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Nuemann, Marcuse and Kirchheimer were assigned to a group in the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) that worked on the analysis of political tendencies in Germany.  They were "specifically assigned to the identification of Nazi and anti-Nazi groups and individuals; the former were to be held accountable in the war crimes adjudication then being negotiated between the four Great Powers, and the latter were to be called upon for cooperation in post-war reconstruction. For his source materials he drew upon official and military intelligence reports, extensive OSS interviews with refugees, and special OSS agents and contacts in occupied Europe; it was his duty to evaluate the reliability of each of the items of intelligence that reached him, and assemble them all into a coherent analysis on points of strength and weakness in the Reich." (Katz, 1980:116).  At the end of 1944, Neumann, Marcuse, and Kirchheimer were involved in preparing a [[Denazification|De-nazification Guide]].  
 
Nuemann, Marcuse and Kirchheimer were assigned to a group in the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) that worked on the analysis of political tendencies in Germany.  They were "specifically assigned to the identification of Nazi and anti-Nazi groups and individuals; the former were to be held accountable in the war crimes adjudication then being negotiated between the four Great Powers, and the latter were to be called upon for cooperation in post-war reconstruction. For his source materials he drew upon official and military intelligence reports, extensive OSS interviews with refugees, and special OSS agents and contacts in occupied Europe; it was his duty to evaluate the reliability of each of the items of intelligence that reached him, and assemble them all into a coherent analysis on points of strength and weakness in the Reich." (Katz, 1980:116).  At the end of 1944, Neumann, Marcuse, and Kirchheimer were involved in preparing a [[Denazification|De-nazification Guide]].  
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On 3 April 1943 the New York KGB station informed Moscow "Zarubina met for the first time with [Neumann] who promised to pass us all the data coming through his hands.  According to [Neumann] he is getting many copies of reports from American ambassadors ... has access to materials referring to Germany."  In the same report Neumann conveyed to [[Elizabeth Zarubina]] the substance of conversations between [[Pope Pius XII]] and [[Cardinal Francis Spellman]], and official Spanish conversations with Italian and German generals and industrialists regarding prospects of a coup to remove [[Hitler]].." <ref>KGB File 28734, Vol. 1, pgs. 7, 8, 14, 15, 20, 23, 28. </ref>  Neumann also supplied information on [[Donald Wheeler]], who later couriered information from the OSS to Soviet intelligence, describing him as "a calm and [[Progressivism|progressive]] man". <ref>KGB File 45049, Vol. 2, pg. 9.</ref> U.S. [[Army Signals Intelligence]] analysts working at Arlington Hall intercepted a [[NKVD|Soviet intelligence]] message in June of 1943. The decrypted message listed several Soviet agents working in the OSS and the [[Office of War Information]]; five of the Soviet sources have been identified: [[Maurice Halperin]], [[Duncan Lee]], [[Julius Joseph]], Franz Neumann, and [[Bella Joseph]].  Shortly before the [[July 20 Plot|20 July 1944]] assassination attempt on Hitler's life, Neumann described in detail negotiations between the German dissident conspirators and [[Allen Dulles]].  New York ''Rezident'' [[Vasily Zarubin]] sent several reports to Moscow that month based on Neumann's information.  [[Anatoly Gorsky]], an official of the Soviet [[Chronology of Soviet secret police agencies|Committee of Information]] (KI), in his 1948 Memorandum on ''Compromised American Sources and Networks'' listed Neumann as a member of the "Redhead group" headed by Hede Massing. <ref>John Earl Haynes, ''Comparative Analysis of Cover Names (Code Names) in the Gorsky Memo and Cover Names in Venona'', 2005;  "'Ruff' ['Ersh' or 'Yeursch'] – Franz Neumann, former consultant in the Department of Research and Analysis of the OSS"; 'Ersh' is Russian for a type of fish known as 'Ruff' or 'Ruffe' in English but also has several other meanings, including that of a mixed beer and vodka drink.</ref>  Neumann received [[U.S._citizenship#Naturalized_citizens|naturalized American citizenship]] in late 1943, and after Zarubina left the United States in the later half of 1944 Neumann had no further contact with Soviet intelligence.
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On 3 April 1943 the New York KGB station informed Moscow "Zarubina met for the first time with Neumann who promised to pass us all the data coming through his hands.  According to Neumann he is getting many copies of reports from American ambassadors ... has access to materials referring to Germany."  In the same report Neumann conveyed to [[Elizabeth Zarubina]] the substance of conversations between [[Pope Pius XII]] and [[Cardinal Francis Spellman]], and official Spanish conversations with Italian and German generals and industrialists regarding prospects of a coup to remove [[Hitler]].." <ref>KGB File 28734, Vol. 1, pgs. 7, 8, 14, 15, 20, 23, 28. </ref>  Neumann also supplied information on [[Donald Wheeler]], who later couriered information from the OSS to Soviet intelligence, describing him as "a calm and [[Progressivism|progressive]] man". <ref>KGB File 45049, Vol. 2, pg. 9.</ref> U.S. [[Army Signals Intelligence]] analysts working at Arlington Hall intercepted a [[NKVD|Soviet intelligence]] message in June of 1943. The decrypted message listed several Soviet agents working in the OSS and the [[Office of War Information]]; five of the Soviet sources have been identified: [[Maurice Halperin]], [[Duncan Lee]], [[Julius Joseph]], Franz Neumann, and [[Bella Joseph]].  Shortly before the [[July 20 Plot|20 July 1944]] assassination attempt on Hitler's life, Neumann described in detail negotiations between the German dissident conspirators and [[Allen Dulles]].  New York ''Rezident'' [[Vasily Zarubin]] sent several reports to Moscow that month based on Neumann's information.  [[Anatoly Gorsky]], an official of the Soviet [[Chronology of Soviet secret police agencies|Committee of Information]] (KI), in his 1948 Memorandum on ''Compromised American Sources and Networks'' listed Neumann as a member of the "Redhead group" headed by Hede Massing. <ref>John Earl Haynes, ''Comparative Analysis of Cover Names (Code Names) in the Gorsky Memo and Cover Names in Venona'', 2005;  "'Ruff' ['Ersh' or 'Yeursch'] – Franz Neumann, former consultant in the Department of Research and Analysis of the OSS"; 'Ersh' is Russian for a type of fish known as 'Ruff' or 'Ruffe' in English but also has several other meanings, including that of a mixed beer and vodka drink.</ref>  Neumann received [[U.S._citizenship#Naturalized_citizens|naturalized American citizenship]] in late 1943, and after Zarubina left the United States in the later half of 1944 Neumann had no further contact with Soviet intelligence.
    
=== Nurermberg ===
 
=== Nurermberg ===
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the twenty-two Nuremberg defendants, and various Nazi organizations.  From mid-September 1945, Neumann’s R&A team prepared and supervised materials for a series of indictments with other OSS colleagues responsible for both interrogation and document analysis.  Donovan initially directed Neumann to examine religious persecution under the Nazi regime.   
 
the twenty-two Nuremberg defendants, and various Nazi organizations.  From mid-September 1945, Neumann’s R&A team prepared and supervised materials for a series of indictments with other OSS colleagues responsible for both interrogation and document analysis.  Donovan initially directed Neumann to examine religious persecution under the Nazi regime.   
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The reports analysis of "the problem of establishing criminal responsibility" provided the prosecutorial strategy.  The thinking was to show that measures taken against the [[Christian Church]]es were an integral part of National Socialism. It also attempted to show that measures were criminal from the standpoint of German or international law, depending where a given act was committed.  This applied the typical Frankfurt School methodology of "immanent critique" to argue that the Nazi regime can be convicted most effectively by demonstrating that it violated not only the laws of ‘foreign’ occuppied countries, but also the very ‘Germanic’ traditions it claimed to uphold. The report claimed key articles of the [[Weimar Constitution]] "were never formally abrogated by the National Socialist regime, … were left untouched and still remain theoretically in force."  Furthermore: "respect for the principle of religious freedom", continued to be reiterated in various official policy statements of the Nazi regime, and in various "enactments of the National Socialist state, particularly the Concordat of 20 July 1933."
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The reports analysis of "the problem of establishing criminal responsibility" provided the prosecutorial strategy.  The thinking was to show that measures taken against the [[Christian Church]]es were an integral part of National Socialism. It also attempted to show that measures were criminal from the standpoint of German or international law, depending where a given act was committed.  This applied the typical Frankfurt School methodology of "immanent critique" to argue that the Nazi regime can be convicted most effectively by demonstrating that it violated not only the laws of ‘foreign’ occupied countries, but also the very ‘Germanic’ traditions it claimed to uphold. The report claimed key articles of the [[Weimar Constitution]] "were never formally abrogated by the National Socialist regime, … were left untouched and still remain theoretically in force."  Furthermore: "respect for the principle of religious freedom", continued to be reiterated in various official policy statements of the Nazi regime, and in various "enactments of the National Socialist state, particularly the Concordat of 20 July 1933."
    
The material on religious persecution is placed in the wider context of how these agencies committed crimes against humanity as an integral part of the Nazi’s master plan, its conspiracy to seize and consolidate ideological control and totalitarian power within Germany by eradicating sources of actual and potential opposition. This material formed part of the evidence on which these agencies were judged to be criminal organisations.  Neumann's group wrote,  
 
The material on religious persecution is placed in the wider context of how these agencies committed crimes against humanity as an integral part of the Nazi’s master plan, its conspiracy to seize and consolidate ideological control and totalitarian power within Germany by eradicating sources of actual and potential opposition. This material formed part of the evidence on which these agencies were judged to be criminal organisations.  Neumann's group wrote,  
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