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| | In early March, Grant personally examined the route and reported that "there was scarcely a chance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troops through an enemy's country." Despite his outlook, work on the canal continued and on March 17 the levee was cut. By the 23d the water levels of the Mississippi and Lake Providence were nearly equal, permitting vessels to be taken in. By the end of March, however, Grant had determined to move his army south overland from Milliken's Bend and the Lake Providence Expedition was abandoned. | | In early March, Grant personally examined the route and reported that "there was scarcely a chance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troops through an enemy's country." Despite his outlook, work on the canal continued and on March 17 the levee was cut. By the 23d the water levels of the Mississippi and Lake Providence were nearly equal, permitting vessels to be taken in. By the end of March, however, Grant had determined to move his army south overland from Milliken's Bend and the Lake Providence Expedition was abandoned. |
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| − | Federal efforts at Lake Providence had the unforseen result of protecting the right flank of Grant's column as it marched south from Milliken's Bend because the flooded interior waterways of Louisiana provided an extensive water barrier against Confederate raids. The flooded waterways also helped to shield Union enclaves at Lake Providence, Milliken's Bend, and Young's Point. | + | Federal efforts at Lake Providence had the unforeseen result of protecting the right flank of Grant's column as it marched south from Milliken's Bend because the flooded interior waterways of Louisiana provided an extensive water barrier against Confederate raids. The flooded waterways also helped to shield Union enclaves at Lake Providence, Milliken's Bend, and Young's Point. |
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| | ==Grant's march== | | ==Grant's march== |
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| | As the boats rounded De Soto Point, above Vicksburg, they were spotted by Confederate lookouts who spread the alarm. Bales of cotton soaked in turpentine and barrels of tar which lined the shore were set on fire by the Confederates to illuminate the river. Although each vessel was hit repeatedly, Porter's fleet successfully fought its way past the Confederate batteries with the loss of only one transport and headed toward a rendezvous with Grant on the Louisiana shore south of Vicksburg. | | As the boats rounded De Soto Point, above Vicksburg, they were spotted by Confederate lookouts who spread the alarm. Bales of cotton soaked in turpentine and barrels of tar which lined the shore were set on fire by the Confederates to illuminate the river. Although each vessel was hit repeatedly, Porter's fleet successfully fought its way past the Confederate batteries with the loss of only one transport and headed toward a rendezvous with Grant on the Louisiana shore south of Vicksburg. |
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| | ===Bombardment of Grand Gulf=== | | ===Bombardment of Grand Gulf=== |
| | It was Grant's intention to force a crossing of the river at Grand Gulf and move on "Fortress Vicksburg" from the south. For five hours on April 29, the Union fleet bombarded the Grand Gulf defenses in an attempt to silence the Confederate guns and prepare the way for a landing. The fleet, however, sustained heavy damage and failed to achieve its objective. Admiral Porter declared, "Grand Gulf is the strongest place on the Mississippi." | | It was Grant's intention to force a crossing of the river at Grand Gulf and move on "Fortress Vicksburg" from the south. For five hours on April 29, the Union fleet bombarded the Grand Gulf defenses in an attempt to silence the Confederate guns and prepare the way for a landing. The fleet, however, sustained heavy damage and failed to achieve its objective. Admiral Porter declared, "Grand Gulf is the strongest place on the Mississippi." |
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| | ==Battle of Champion Hill== | | ==Battle of Champion Hill== |
| − | Early on the morning of May 16, 1863, General Grant received news that Confederate forces were at Edwards Station preparing to march east. He ordered his columns forward. Moving westward from Bolton and Raymond, blueclad soldiers slogged over rapidly drying roads in three parallel columns. About 7 a.m. the southernmost column made contact with Confederate pickets near the Davis Plantation and shots rang out. | + | Early on the morning of May 16, 1863, General Grant received news that Confederate forces were at Edwards Station preparing to march east. He ordered his columns forward. Moving westward from Bolton and Raymond, blue-clad soldiers slogged over rapidly drying roads in three parallel columns. About 7 a.m. the southernmost column made contact with Confederate pickets near the Davis Plantation and shots rang out. |
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| | Once contact had been made, Lieutenant General [[John C. Pemberton]], the Confederate commander, quickly deployed his three divisions. The Confederate battleline, three miles in length, ran from southwest to northeast along the military crest of a ridge overlooking Jackson Creek. The crest of Champion Hill, on the left of the line, was picketed as a security measure. Pemberton's position was suited for defense and was especially formidable against attacks via the Middle and Raymond roads. The Confederate commander, however, was unaware that a strong Union force was pushing down the Jackson Road toward his unprotected left flank. If unchecked, this Union force would capture Edwards and cut the Confederates off from their base of operation--Vicksburg. | | Once contact had been made, Lieutenant General [[John C. Pemberton]], the Confederate commander, quickly deployed his three divisions. The Confederate battleline, three miles in length, ran from southwest to northeast along the military crest of a ridge overlooking Jackson Creek. The crest of Champion Hill, on the left of the line, was picketed as a security measure. Pemberton's position was suited for defense and was especially formidable against attacks via the Middle and Raymond roads. The Confederate commander, however, was unaware that a strong Union force was pushing down the Jackson Road toward his unprotected left flank. If unchecked, this Union force would capture Edwards and cut the Confederates off from their base of operation--Vicksburg. |