:::I'm sorry if I wasn't clear. My point was simply that it could be the case that the future is not something that is knowable--at all--so even an all knowing entity (one that knows everything that is knowable) would not know the future. Such an entity would know all the posable outcomes (just as we know what results a dice-roll may have), but it would not know the future. this assumes a non-static future (which is an understanding of the nature of the future that is more compatible with free will than a static, even if unknown, future). This would mean an all knowing God would still not know the future--so God's foreknowledge would not be in conflict with free will. I'm not saying it is the right answer, I'm not sure what the right answer is, but it is one way to make free will and the existence of an all knowing being compatible. | :::I'm sorry if I wasn't clear. My point was simply that it could be the case that the future is not something that is knowable--at all--so even an all knowing entity (one that knows everything that is knowable) would not know the future. Such an entity would know all the posable outcomes (just as we know what results a dice-roll may have), but it would not know the future. this assumes a non-static future (which is an understanding of the nature of the future that is more compatible with free will than a static, even if unknown, future). This would mean an all knowing God would still not know the future--so God's foreknowledge would not be in conflict with free will. I'm not saying it is the right answer, I'm not sure what the right answer is, but it is one way to make free will and the existence of an all knowing being compatible. |