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| | [[Image:Kennedygryomykont8.jpg|right|thumb|325px|President Kennedy meeting with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko at the White House.]] | | [[Image:Kennedygryomykont8.jpg|right|thumb|325px|President Kennedy meeting with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko at the White House.]] |
| − | The Cuban Missile Crisis was one of the top climactic points of the [[Cold War]]. Tension had been building for some time between the Soviet Union, and The United States. Now, this tension had the potential to plummet the world into a nuclear war. | + | The '''Cuban Missile Crisis''' was one of the top climactic points of the [[Cold War]]. Tension had been building for some time between the Soviet Union, and The United States. Now, this tension had the potential to plummet the world into a nuclear war. |
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| − | The USSR had befriended the newly reformed [[Cuba]], and had been giving aid to them. Cuba, in thanks for this aid, allowed the USSR to begin placing nuclear missiles on their island. These two superpowers would make one last attempt at negotiating the placement of these missiles. While the entire crisis lasted for months afterwards, the "Thirteen Days" of October 15-28 was the most intense period of the crisis. <ref>Robert F. Kennedy - Thirteen Days</ref> | + | The USSR had befriended the newly reformed [[Cuba]], and had been giving aid to them. Cuba, in thanks for this aid, allowed the USSR to begin placing nuclear missiles on their island. These two superpowers would make one last attempt at negotiating the placement of these missiles. While the entire crisis lasted for months afterwards, the "Thirteen Days" of October 15-28 was the most intense period of the crisis.<ref>Robert F. Kennedy - Thirteen Days</ref> |
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| | ==Photography== | | ==Photography== |
| | [[Image:Cubaaerialphotographytq0.jpg|thumb|300px|An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.]] | | [[Image:Cubaaerialphotographytq0.jpg|thumb|300px|An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.]] |
| − | At the time, satellite technology was in its infancy. The satellites in orbit were few, as well as incapable of aiding the [[United States]] in resolving the conflict. Photography was found to be helpful in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and ''Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)'' range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the [[U-2]], or Utility 2. | + | At the time, satellite technology was in its infancy. The satellites in orbit were few, as well as incapable of aiding the [[United States]] in resolving the conflict. Photography was found to be helpful in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and ''Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)'' range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the [[U-2]], or Utility 2. |
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| − | New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s. <ref>Dino Burgioni - Eyeball To Eyeball</ref> | + | New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.<ref>Dino Burgioni - Eyeball To Eyeball</ref> |
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| | ==Photographic Interpretation== | | ==Photographic Interpretation== |
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| | ==Low Level Photography== | | ==Low Level Photography== |
| − | Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk. <ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis. | + | Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis. |
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| | ==ExComm== | | ==ExComm== |
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| | *Theodore C. Sorensen'', Special Counsel to the President'' | | *Theodore C. Sorensen'', Special Counsel to the President'' |
| | *Adlai E. Stevenson'', United States Ambassador to the United Nations'' | | *Adlai E. Stevenson'', United States Ambassador to the United Nations'' |
| − | *Maxwell D. Taylor'', Military Advisor to the President and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff'' | + | *Maxwell D. Taylor'', Military Adviser to the President and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff'' |
| | *Llewellyn E. Thompson'', United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union'' | | *Llewellyn E. Thompson'', United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union'' |
| | *Donald Wilson'', Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency'' | | *Donald Wilson'', Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency'' |
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| | ==Naval Quarantine== | | ==Naval Quarantine== |
| − | On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered. <ref name="thinkquest2">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/timeline.html</ref>The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around [[Cuba]], to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba<ref name="thinkquest2"/>, to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate. | + | On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered.<ref name="thinkquest2">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/timeline.html</ref>The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around [[Cuba]], to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba<ref name="thinkquest2"/>, to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate. |
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| | In analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis, it has been said that the quarantine was meant to be a form of communication, rather than a method of eliminating the missiles, as enough had already been delivered as to cause concern to the United States. | | In analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis, it has been said that the quarantine was meant to be a form of communication, rather than a method of eliminating the missiles, as enough had already been delivered as to cause concern to the United States. |
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| | "Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?... Don't wait for the translation! Yes or no?" Zorin responded, "I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and I do not wish to answer a question put to me in the manner in which a prosecutor does-" Stevenson interrupted and said, "You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer yes or no. You have denied that they exist, and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.... I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room." | | "Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?... Don't wait for the translation! Yes or no?" Zorin responded, "I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and I do not wish to answer a question put to me in the manner in which a prosecutor does-" Stevenson interrupted and said, "You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer yes or no. You have denied that they exist, and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.... I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room." |
| | <ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/people/a_stevenson.html</ref></blockquote> | | <ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/people/a_stevenson.html</ref></blockquote> |
| − | The United States followed up by publically showing the [[U-2]] photography for the first time, gaining international support in the process, while proving that the missiles did exist. | + | The United States followed up by publicly showing the [[U-2]] photography for the first time, gaining international support in the process, while proving that the missiles did exist. |
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| | ==Soviet Missiles in Cuba== | | ==Soviet Missiles in Cuba== |
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| | Using various techniques, the photo interpreters were able to provide specific measurements on the size of the missiles, which could be matched with other information gathered by the United Sates intelligence force. The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington D.C., Houston, TX, and practically anywhere in the southeastern United States.<ref name="thinkquest">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/recon_room.html</ref> | | Using various techniques, the photo interpreters were able to provide specific measurements on the size of the missiles, which could be matched with other information gathered by the United Sates intelligence force. The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington D.C., Houston, TX, and practically anywhere in the southeastern United States.<ref name="thinkquest">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/recon_room.html</ref> |
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| − | However, further dangers would develop. Soon after these missiles were discovered, U-2 flights uncovered installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,200 Nautical Miles (2,530 Miles). With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking anywhere in the United States, with the exception of the area around Seattle, WA. <ref name="thinkquest"/> | + | However, further dangers would develop. Soon after these missiles were discovered, U-2 flights uncovered installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,200 Nautical Miles (2,530 Miles). With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking anywhere in the United States, with the exception of the area around Seattle, WA.<ref name="thinkquest"/> |
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| | Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying [[U-2]]. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref> | | Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying [[U-2]]. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref> |
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| | ==Soviet military doctrine== | | ==Soviet military doctrine== |
| − | In the post-[[Stalin]] era, the [[Soviet military]] regained ascendancy in the [[Communist]] ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the [[Politburo]] with the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU) and the [[KGB]]. The Soviet military is constitued of five branches which includes the [[Strategic Rocket Forces]] who controlled [[nuclear weapons]]. Contrary to long held misperceptions in America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous to the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was deleagated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened. | + | In the post-[[Stalin]] era, the [[Soviet military]] regained ascendancy in the [[Communist]] ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the [[Politburo]] with the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU) and the [[KGB]]. The Soviet military is constitued of five branches which includes the [[Strategic Rocket Forces]] who controlled [[nuclear weapons]]. Contrary to long held misperceptions in America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous to the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was delegated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened. |
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| − | In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Societ nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the United States and other [[NATO]] allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analagous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analagous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analagous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the [[Cold War]], both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations. | + | In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Soviet nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the United States and other [[NATO]] allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analogous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analogous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analogous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the [[Cold War]], both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations. |
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| | ==Further reading== | | ==Further reading== |