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Line 135: − + + + + + + + + + + + + + − At first the United States was on the defensive, losing the Philippines, and other countries under U.S. military protection. The battle of the Coral Sea was the first major engagement with the Japanese that resulted in a draw and set the stage for the battle of Midway a month later. That one battle changed the direction of the war forever, crushing Japanese offensive sea power in one strike. After that, the Japanese were forced to be on the defensive for the rest of the war and never seriously threatened the American military again. In order to shorten the war, the U.S. military chose to adopt a policy of island hopping that including bypassing most of the extensive Japanese holdings to instead focus on a relatively straight path leading to Japan.+ − [[Image:Ww2-asia usma.edu pic.gif|thumb|300px|left|Time Line of Pacific War]] − − − − Army Chief of Staff [[George C. Marshall]] believed that Japan would fight to the last man. Marshall insisted on preparing for a land invasion of Japan with an army of 2,000,000 men anticipating a tremendous number of casualties. Marshall further insisted that the Soviet Union becoming involved in the war was necessary to fight the Kwantung army Japan had in Manchuria. Marshall apparently was unaware that this army was deteriorated by levies for use in other parts of the Pacific.+
→Far Eastern Theatre
==Far Eastern Theatre==
==Far Eastern Theatre==
The Soviet Union was allied with Japan through the [[Matsuoka pact]] while giving aid and direction to the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP), its [[Comintern]] ally, to subvert the Kuomintang (KMT) government. This duplicity of motives and actions bore out tragic and disastrous events -- most specifically the eventual [[slavery|enslavement]] of 550 million Chinese people and a deeply partisan crisis in American domestic politics. The Soviet Union agreed to President Roosevelt's "Great Design" for a [[United Nations]] with "Four Policeman" to enforce the peace, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Nationalist Government avowed in the [[Joint Four Power Declaration]] of United Nations at the Moscow conference of October 1943<ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html Joint Four Power Declaration], Moscow Conference, October, 1943.</ref> But [[Stalinist]] agents in several countries, including [[propagandist]]s in American academia and media along with subversive infiltrators in key [[U.S. Government]] positions, were able to subvert American [[foreign policy]].
After Pearl Harbor, the Japanese juggernaut seemed unstoppable. In the south, they conquered the [[Philippines]], the oil-rich Dutch East Indies, Malaysia, and extended their reach as far as the Solomon Islands. In the west, they seized [[Burma]] and the vital port at [[Rangoon]], and even attacked British forces at [[Ceylon]]. The Japanese empire now reached as far as [[Wake Island]] in the east and the [[Aleutian Islands]] to the north. Attacks on Japanese targets, including the Doolittle raid, boasted American morale, but did little material damage. In May 1942, Japanese forces were finally halted at the [[Battle of the Coral Sea]], which cost the Americans a precious [[aircraft carrier]], but saved southern [[New Guinea]]. At the [[Battle of Midway]] a month later, the Japanese lost four of their best carriers, suffering a blow to their sea power from which they never recovered.
The Americans took the offensive in August with a landing on the island of [[Guadalcanal]]. The overall American offensive strategy was two-pronged. Forces in the south advanced up the Solomon island chain and New Guinea, while in the central Pacific, Marines took island after island, including Tarawa, Eniwetok, [[Saipan]], and [[Guam]]. The two lines of attack came together at the Philippines.
Integral to the strategy was the policy of island hopping. Many Japanese strongholds were bypassed, allowing the American forces to concentrate on more strategically significant islands. For example, Truk and Rabaul were home to major Japanese air and naval bases, but once the bases were neutralized, there was no reason to take on the troops there. This policy not only saved thousands of American (and Japanese) lives, it shortened the war by at least several months.
The American invasion of the Philippines took place in late October of 1944 when Marines landed on Leyte Island. A few days later, the US Navy shattered what was left of Japanese naval power in the [[Battle of Leyte Gulf]]. The Japanese fought hard, however, and Leyte took two months to secure. When the Americans landed on the other islands, they found the troops there equally unwilling to retreat, but with American superiority in almost every area, the outcome was never really in doubt. [[Manila]] was captured by March, and the American position had become solid enough that leaders could start preparing for the final stage: [[Operation Downfall|the invasion of Japan]]. The first step was taken when the island of [[Okinawa]] was captured in June after two months of heavy fighting. Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, was scheduled for November 1945, followed by Operation Coronet, the invasion of Honshu, in March of 1946.
The Japanese, soldiers and civilians alike, were expected to put up a fierce defense. Army Chief of Staff [[George C. Marshall]] believed that Japan would fight to the last man, and insisted on preparing for a land invasion of Japan with an army of 2,000,000 men anticipating a tremendous number of casualties. Some analysts estimated the number of projected casualties from Operation Olympic alone at 250,000 dead and wounded.<ref>Historical Atlas of the U.S. Navy, by Craig L. Symonds, the Naval Institute, 1995</ref> For this reason, many considered Soviet assistance necessary to the success of the invasion.
[[Image:Ww2-asia usma.edu pic.gif|thumb|300px|left|Time Line of Pacific War]]
===Soviet Involvement===
The Soviet Union was allied with Japan through the [[Matsuoka pact]] while giving aid and direction to the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP), its [[Comintern]] ally, to subvert the Kuomintang (KMT) government. This duplicity of motives and actions bore out tragic and disastrous events -- most specifically the eventual [[slavery|enslavement]] of 550 million Chinese people and a deeply partisan crisis in American domestic politics. The Soviet Union agreed to President Roosevelt's "Great Design" for a [[United Nations]] with "Four Policeman" to enforce the peace, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Nationalist Government avowed in the [[Joint Four Power Declaration]] of United Nations at the Moscow conference of October 1943<ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html Joint Four Power Declaration], Moscow Conference, October, 1943.</ref> But [[Stalinist]] agents in several countries, including subversive infiltrators in key [[U.S. Government]] positions, were able to subvert American [[foreign policy]].
Stalin, throughout the war, had assured the United States through Ambassadors [[Averell Harriman]],<ref> John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia (NY:Viking, 1947) p. 226.</ref> Pat Hurley,<ref> William D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Truman and Roosevelt; Based on his Notes and Diaries Made at the Time; (NY:Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 147.</ref> and Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]]<ref>Cordell Hull, Memoirs (NY:Macmillian, 1948), Chapter 90, p. 1398.</ref> that he would enter the war against Japan. In 1943, to Hull, the promise had been made "without any strings to it." In 1944, when the matter was again discussed with Harriman, Stalin specified his conditions: "provided that the United States would assist in building up sixty divisions in Siberia" and "provided the political aspects of Russia's participation had been clarified."<ref> John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia (NY:Viking, 1947) p. 247.</ref> On the eve of [[Yalta conference]] the Japanese Foreign Minister asked the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo about the possibility of arranging for a settlement. Stalin did not communicate this to either Roosevelt of Churchill.<ref>''While You Slept: Our Tragedy in Asia and Who Made It'', John T. Flynn, New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1951, [http://www.mises.org/books/whileyouslept.pdf pg. 168] pdf.</ref>
Stalin, throughout the war, had assured the United States through Ambassadors [[Averell Harriman]],<ref> John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia (NY:Viking, 1947) p. 226.</ref> Pat Hurley,<ref> William D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Truman and Roosevelt; Based on his Notes and Diaries Made at the Time; (NY:Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 147.</ref> and Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]]<ref>Cordell Hull, Memoirs (NY:Macmillian, 1948), Chapter 90, p. 1398.</ref> that he would enter the war against Japan. In 1943, to Hull, the promise had been made "without any strings to it." In 1944, when the matter was again discussed with Harriman, Stalin specified his conditions: "provided that the United States would assist in building up sixty divisions in Siberia" and "provided the political aspects of Russia's participation had been clarified."<ref> John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia (NY:Viking, 1947) p. 247.</ref>
On the eve of [[Yalta conference]] the Japanese Foreign Minister asked the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo about the possibility of arranging for a settlement. Stalin did not communicate this to either Roosevelt of Churchill.<ref>''While You Slept: Our Tragedy in Asia and Who Made It'', John T. Flynn, New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1951, [http://www.mises.org/books/whileyouslept.pdf pg. 168] pdf.</ref> Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]] and General [[Douglas MacArthur]] assured Roosevelt on his way to the [[Yalta conference]] at a stopover in Hawaii just after Roosevelt's [[United States presidential election, 1944|nomination for his fourth term]] that as soon as they took the Philippines and the Marianas, Japan would be hopelessly cut off from supplies and that she would have to surrender.<ref>I Was There, Admiral William D. Leahy, New York, 1950, pgs. 245-259.</ref> But Gen. [[George c. Marshall]] was adamant. Admiral Leahy says that Marshall didn't seem to realize that the Navy had beaten Japan. .<ref>I Was There, Leahy, New York, pgs. 245-259.</ref>
Soviet involvement was controversial. Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]] and General [[Douglas MacArthur]] assured Roosevelt on his way to the [[Yalta conference]] at a stopover in Hawaii that as soon as they took the Philippines and the Marianas, Japan would be hopelessly cut off from supplies and that she would have to surrender.<ref>I Was There, Admiral William D. Leahy, New York, 1950, pgs. 245-259.</ref> (It should be noted, however, that this assessment was given before the battles of [[Iwo Jima]] and [[Okinawa]].) General George Marshall insisted that the Soviet Union becoming involved in the war was necessary to fight the Kwantung army Japan had in [[Manchuria]], although this army was deteriorated by levies for use in other parts of the Pacific. In his biography, Admiral Leahy says that Marshall didn't seem to realize that the Navy had beaten Japan.<ref>I Was There, Leahy, New York, pgs. 245-259.</ref> In 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken the position that Russian entry into the war against Japan was essential, and this was the prevailing view as late as February 1945, as evidenced by the concessions that Stalin won at Yalta. But by June, the Americans, shocked by Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe and no longer interested in establishing B-29 bases in Siberia, were not so desirous of ensuring Russian participation at any cost. They still wanted Stalin to attack the Japanese forces in Manchuria, but Stalin hardly needed any encouragement in this regard.<ref>The West Point Atlas of War, World War II: The Pacific, ed. by Brig. Gen. Vincent J. Esposito, Tess Press, 1959</ref>
==Japanese capitulation==
==Japanese capitulation==