Changes

Shortly after taking office in 1981 Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 11-82, (NSDD 11-82), that explicitly made U.S. defense spending a form of economic warfare against the Soviets. The directive was known more unofficially as the Reagan Initiative. The United States would "exploit and demonstrate the enduring economic advantages of the West to develop a variety of [arms] systems that are difficult for the Soviets to counter, impose disproportionate costs, open up new areas of major military competition and obsolesce previous Soviet investment or employ sophisticated strategic options to achieve this end. Reagan's [[Strategic Defense Initiative]] (SDI), or "Star Wars" as the media referred to it, was a costly high tech research and development program designed to make arms spending a "rising burden on the Soviet economy."<ref>Peter Schweizer , [http://www.reason.com/news/show/28929.html ''Reagan's War: The Epic Story of His Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism''], New York: Doubleday, 2002.</ref>

Shortly after taking office in 1981 Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 11-82, (NSDD 11-82), that explicitly made U.S. defense spending a form of economic warfare against the Soviets. The directive was known more unofficially as the Reagan Initiative. The United States would "exploit and demonstrate the enduring economic advantages of the West to develop a variety of [arms] systems that are difficult for the Soviets to counter, impose disproportionate costs, open up new areas of major military competition and obsolesce previous Soviet investment or employ sophisticated strategic options to achieve this end. Reagan's [[Strategic Defense Initiative]] (SDI), or "Star Wars" as the media referred to it, was a costly high tech research and development program designed to make arms spending a "rising burden on the Soviet economy."<ref>Peter Schweizer , [http://www.reason.com/news/show/28929.html ''Reagan's War: The Epic Story of His Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism''], New York: Doubleday, 2002.</ref>

[[Image:Photo 4 250.jpg|right|250px|thumb|Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik]]

[[Image:Photo 4 250.jpg|right|250px|thumb|Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik]]

The Reagan Initiative was also concerned with aiding nations in active conflict with the Soviet Union. One such group was the [[mujahideen]] of Afghanistan. This armament would be used to combat the Soviet Union, and later used by the Taliban against the United States.<ref>James A. Phillips, [http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/bg552.cfm ''Updating U.S. Strategy for Helping Afghan Freedom Fighters''], The Heritage Foundation.</ref>

The Reagan Initiative was also concerned with aiding nations in active conflict with the Soviet Union. One such group was the [[mujahideen]] of Afghanistan. This armament would be used to combat the Soviet Union, and later used by the Taliban against the United States.

A report by the CIA of the critical domestic economic problems and social discontent Soviet [[CPSU]] General Secretary Gorbachev provided a look what the sources of his principal dilemma-the very reforms needed to deal with the problems would threaten preservation of the [[nomenklatura]] and put at risk Gorbachev’s ability to maintain the power to bring about [[Perestroika]].<ref>CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: [https://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/russia/enter.html Chapter 5, Enter Gorbachev ], Douglas J. MacEachin, CIA Publications, 1996.</ref> Gorbachev requested a Summit with Reagan in Reykjavik in October 1986 to discuss the stresses competition from the Reagan’s defense posture was having on Soviet military spending and economy, and Gorbachev’s ability to carryout his plans of restructuring Communist control. Gorbachev told the [[Politburo]] in preparation for the Summit, "Our goal is to prevent the next round of arms race. If we do not do this ... will pulled into an arms race beyond our power, and we will lose this race, for we are presently at the limit of out capabilities."<ref>Notes of Politburo Meeting 4 October 1986, [http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/22/documents/reykjavik/ Gorbachev's instructions for the group preparing for Reykjavik]</ref>

A report by the CIA of the critical domestic economic problems and social discontent Soviet [[CPSU]] General Secretary Gorbachev provided a look what the sources of his principal dilemma-the very reforms needed to deal with the problems would threaten preservation of the [[nomenklatura]] and put at risk Gorbachev’s ability to maintain the power to bring about [[Perestroika]].<ref>CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: [https://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/russia/enter.html Chapter 5, Enter Gorbachev ], Douglas J. MacEachin, CIA Publications, 1996.</ref> Gorbachev requested a Summit with Reagan in Reykjavik in October 1986 to discuss the stresses competition from the Reagan’s defense posture was having on Soviet military spending and economy, and Gorbachev’s ability to carryout his plans of restructuring Communist control. Gorbachev told the [[Politburo]] in preparation for the Summit, "Our goal is to prevent the next round of arms race. If we do not do this ... will pulled into an arms race beyond our power, and we will lose this race, for we are presently at the limit of out capabilities."<ref>Notes of Politburo Meeting 4 October 1986, [http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/22/documents/reykjavik/ Gorbachev's instructions for the group preparing for Reykjavik]</ref>