Changes

Who ordered the shootdown on the Soviet military side is fairly well known and on the political side, the lines leading up to the General Secretary of the Communist Party and head of the Soviet Union Yuri Andropov, can confidently be conjectured by "working up" the Soviet hierarchical system of command. General Anatoli Kornukov, the Commander of Sokol Air Base on Sakhalin was the "tactical" commander of the shootdown and subordinate to the "strategic" commander of the shootdown - General [[Valeri Kamensky]] (General Kornukov would later become head of the Russian Air Force). General Kamensky was the Commander of the Soviet Far East Air Defence forces and would have informed both General Ivan Moseivich Tretyak [http://www.rescue007.org/rescue.htm]- his direct superior and Commander of the Soviet Far East Military District as his direct commander, and informed the Commander-in Chief of Air Defense Forces at the National Command Center in Kalinin. This was Gen. Alexandr Koldunov. (Maj. Victor Belenko, who served in one of the units that brought 007 down, but who had defected to Japan in his MiG 25 in 1976, says that at the first intrusion of KAL 007 over Kamchatka, Gen. Kamensky would already have informed his superior at the National Command Center at Kalinin and the intruder would have been tracked on the screen there until it had left Soviet territory}. As this was an emergency, the Commander in Chief of Soviet Air Forces (VVS), Chief Marshal of Aviation Pavel Kutakhov would have been informed. As the test of the illegal (Salt ll) SS-25 had been planned for that night with the missile coming down on the Klyuchi target range of Kamchatka [http://www.rescue007.org/how_kal_007_was_lost.htm] - where KAL 007 was to traverse in its first intrusion of Soviet territory- the head of the First Directorate of Strategic Concealment (Maskirovka), First Deputy Chief of Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev would have been present for any decision. Further, Chief of the Soviet General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense Nikolai Ogarkov would have been in on any decision and would have informed his superior and link with the Political echelon, Minister of Defense Dmitri Ustinov. Maj. It is then that Yuri Andropov would have been in position for decision for shootdown. The telecommunications for this linkage up the Military and then Political chain of command would have been effected well within the hours starting at the first intrusion into Soviet controlled airspace - 1551 GMT (Missile detonation was at 18:26:02 GMT).

Who ordered the shootdown on the Soviet military side is fairly well known and on the political side, the lines leading up to the General Secretary of the Communist Party and head of the Soviet Union Yuri Andropov, can confidently be conjectured by "working up" the Soviet hierarchical system of command. General Anatoli Kornukov, the Commander of Sokol Air Base on Sakhalin was the "tactical" commander of the shootdown and subordinate to the "strategic" commander of the shootdown - General [[Valeri Kamensky]] (General Kornukov would later become head of the Russian Air Force). General Kamensky was the Commander of the Soviet Far East Air Defence forces and would have informed both General Ivan Moseivich Tretyak [http://www.rescue007.org/rescue.htm]- his direct superior and Commander of the Soviet Far East Military District as his direct commander, and informed the Commander-in Chief of Air Defense Forces at the National Command Center in Kalinin. This was Gen. Alexandr Koldunov. (Maj. Victor Belenko, who served in one of the units that brought 007 down, but who had defected to Japan in his MiG 25 in 1976, says that at the first intrusion of KAL 007 over Kamchatka, Gen. Kamensky would already have informed his superior at the National Command Center at Kalinin and the intruder would have been tracked on the screen there until it had left Soviet territory}. As this was an emergency, the Commander in Chief of Soviet Air Forces (VVS), Chief Marshal of Aviation Pavel Kutakhov would have been informed. As the test of the illegal (Salt ll) SS-25 had been planned for that night with the missile coming down on the Klyuchi target range of Kamchatka [http://www.rescue007.org/how_kal_007_was_lost.htm] - where KAL 007 was to traverse in its first intrusion of Soviet territory- the head of the First Directorate of Strategic Concealment (Maskirovka), First Deputy Chief of Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev would have been present for any decision. Further, Chief of the Soviet General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense Nikolai Ogarkov would have been in on any decision and would have informed his superior and link with the Political echelon, Minister of Defense Dmitri Ustinov. Maj. It is then that Yuri Andropov would have been in position for decision for shootdown. The telecommunications for this linkage up the Military and then Political chain of command would have been effected well within the hours starting at the first intrusion into Soviet controlled airspace - 1551 GMT (Missile detonation was at 18:26:02 GMT).

==Conclusions==

==Conclusions and Aftermath==

The "black boxes" that were the data flight recorder and the cockpit voice recorder were hidden away for nearly ten years after their recovery by the Soviets, during which time they employed their own spin as to the nature of the flight.  So damning was the black box evidence against them that they had hoped it would never see the light of day.  Even Mikhail Gorbachev during his period of "glasnost" ("openness") kept assuring investigators that the black boxes did not exist.

The "black boxes" that were the data flight recorder and the cockpit voice recorder were hidden away for nearly ten years after their recovery by the Soviets, during which time they employed their own spin as to the nature of the flight.  So damning was the black box evidence against them that they had hoped it would never see the light of day.  Even Mikhail Gorbachev during his period of "glasnost" ("openness") kept assuring investigators that the black boxes did not exist.

"One of the greatest tragedies of the Cold War," he wrote, "was the shoot-down of the Korean Airlines Flight 007 by the Armed Forces of what was then the Soviet Union on September 1, 1983. . . The KAL-007 tragedy was one of the most tense incidences of the entire Cold War. However, now that relations between our two nations have improved substantially, I believe that it is time to resolve the mysteries surrounding this event. Clearing the air on this issue could help further to improve relations [http://www.rescue007.org/helms_letter.htm]." At about the same time a military memo boasting of the secret would make it's way into Yeltsin's hands, leading to the discovery of the black boxes as well as the top secret reports about them by the Soviet Defense Ministry.  Yeltsin would ultimately respond on January 8, 1993 by handing over to the International Civil Aviation Organization what the Russians had for so many years denied possessing: the tapes of the KAL 007's "Black Box" (its Digital Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder).  [http://web.archive.org/web/20010919141246/www.insightmag.com/archive/200104171.shtml][http://www.jamesoberg.com/russian/kal007.html]

"One of the greatest tragedies of the Cold War," he wrote, "was the shoot-down of the Korean Airlines Flight 007 by the Armed Forces of what was then the Soviet Union on September 1, 1983. . . The KAL-007 tragedy was one of the most tense incidences of the entire Cold War. However, now that relations between our two nations have improved substantially, I believe that it is time to resolve the mysteries surrounding this event. Clearing the air on this issue could help further to improve relations [http://www.rescue007.org/helms_letter.htm]." At about the same time a military memo boasting of the secret would make it's way into Yeltsin's hands, leading to the discovery of the black boxes as well as the top secret reports about them by the Soviet Defense Ministry.  Yeltsin would ultimately respond on January 8, 1993 by handing over to the International Civil Aviation Organization what the Russians had for so many years denied possessing: the tapes of the KAL 007's "Black Box" (its Digital Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder).  [http://web.archive.org/web/20010919141246/www.insightmag.com/archive/200104171.shtml][http://www.jamesoberg.com/russian/kal007.html]

Korean Airlines Flight 007 was a victim of the Cold War, a flight that had possibly simply gone off course in the wrong place and at the wrong time.  Careless discrepancies by the plane's pilot combined with Soviet paranoia helped to end the lives of 269 passengers and crew.

Korean Airlines Flight 007 was a victim of the Cold War, a flight that had possibly simply gone off course in the wrong place and at the wrong time.  Careless discrepancies by the plane's pilot combined with Soviet paranoia helped to end the lives of 269 passengers and crew.