Changes

In '''''Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.''''', 544 U.S. 528 (2005), the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] developed a more complex test for determining if a price-control regulation constitutes a "[[taking]]" requiring compensation under the [[Fifth Amendment]].

In '''''Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.''''', 544 U.S. 528 (2005), the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] developed a more complex test for determining if a price-control regulation constitutes a "[[taking]]" requiring compensation under the [[Fifth Amendment]].

Justice [[Sandra Day O'Connor]] wrote the opinion for a nearly unanimous Court, with only Justice [[Anthony Kennedy]] concurring separately.  Justice O'Connor held that:

Justice [[Sandra Day O'Connor]] wrote the opinion for a nearly unanimous [[Court]], with only Justice [[Anthony Kennedy]] concurring separately.  Justice O'Connor held that:

:In the case before us, the lower courts applied Agins' "substantially advances" formula to strike down a Hawaii statute that limits the rent that oil companies may charge to dealers who lease service stations owned by the companies. The lower courts held that the rent cap effects an uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because it does not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest in controlling retail gasoline prices. This case requires us to decide whether the "substantially advances" formula announced in Agins is an appropriate test for determining whether a regulation effects a Fifth Amendment taking. We conclude that it is not.

:In the case before us, the lower courts applied Agins' "substantially advances" formula to strike down a Hawaii statute that limits the rent that oil companies may charge to dealers who lease service stations owned by the companies. The lower courts held that the rent cap effects an uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because it does not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest in controlling retail gasoline prices. This case requires us to decide whether the "substantially advances" formula announced in Agins is an appropriate test for determining whether a regulation effects a Fifth Amendment taking. We conclude that it is not.