Changes

Upon his death, Margaret Thatcher commented: ''As Prime Minister, I worked closely with Ronald Reagan for eight of the most important years of all our lives. We talked regularly both before and after his presidency. And I have had time and cause to reflect on what made him a great president. Ronald Reagan knew his own mind. He had firm principles - and, I believe, right ones. He expounded them clearly, he acted upon them decisively. When the world threw problems at the White House, he was not baffled, or disorientated, or overwhelmed. He knew almost instinctively what to do. When his aides were preparing option papers for his decision, they were able to cut out entire rafts of proposals that they knew 'the Old Man' would never wear. When his allies came under Soviet or domestic pressure, they could look confidently to Washington for firm leadership. And when his enemies tested American resolve, they soon discovered that his resolve was firm and unyielding. Yet his ideas, though clear, were never simplistic. He saw the many sides of truth. Yes, he warned that the Soviet Union had an insatiable drive for military power and territorial expansion; but he also sensed it was being eaten away by systemic failures impossible to reform. Yes, he did not shrink from denouncing Moscow's 'evil empire'. But he realized that a man of goodwill might nonetheless emerge from within its dark corridors. So the President resisted Soviet expansion and pressed down on Soviet weakness at every point until the day came when communism began to collapse beneath the combined weight of these pressures and its own failures. And when a man of goodwill did emerge from the ruins, President Reagan stepped forward to shake his hand and to offer sincere cooperation. Nothing was more typical of Ronald Reagan than that large-hearted magnanimity - and nothing was more American.''<ref>[http://reagan2020.us/eulogies/thatcher.asp]</ref>

Upon his death, Margaret Thatcher commented: ''As Prime Minister, I worked closely with Ronald Reagan for eight of the most important years of all our lives. We talked regularly both before and after his presidency. And I have had time and cause to reflect on what made him a great president. Ronald Reagan knew his own mind. He had firm principles - and, I believe, right ones. He expounded them clearly, he acted upon them decisively. When the world threw problems at the White House, he was not baffled, or disorientated, or overwhelmed. He knew almost instinctively what to do. When his aides were preparing option papers for his decision, they were able to cut out entire rafts of proposals that they knew 'the Old Man' would never wear. When his allies came under Soviet or domestic pressure, they could look confidently to Washington for firm leadership. And when his enemies tested American resolve, they soon discovered that his resolve was firm and unyielding. Yet his ideas, though clear, were never simplistic. He saw the many sides of truth. Yes, he warned that the Soviet Union had an insatiable drive for military power and territorial expansion; but he also sensed it was being eaten away by systemic failures impossible to reform. Yes, he did not shrink from denouncing Moscow's 'evil empire'. But he realized that a man of goodwill might nonetheless emerge from within its dark corridors. So the President resisted Soviet expansion and pressed down on Soviet weakness at every point until the day came when communism began to collapse beneath the combined weight of these pressures and its own failures. And when a man of goodwill did emerge from the ruins, President Reagan stepped forward to shake his hand and to offer sincere cooperation. Nothing was more typical of Ronald Reagan than that large-hearted magnanimity - and nothing was more American.''<ref>[http://reagan2020.us/eulogies/thatcher.asp]</ref>

==Soviet Union==

===Soviet Union===

Shortly after taking office in 1981 Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 11-82, (NSDD 11-82), that explicitly made U.S. defense spending a form of economic warfare against the Soviets. The directive was known more unofficially as the Reagan Initiative. The United States would "exploit and demonstrate the enduring economic advantages of the West to develop a variety of [arms] systems that are difficult for the Soviets to counter, impose disproportionate costs, open up new areas of major military competition and obsolesce previous Soviet investment or employ sophisticated strategic options to achieve this end. Reagan's [[Strategic Defense Initiative]] (SDI), or "Star Wars" as the media referred to it, was a costly high tech research and development program designed to make arms spending a "rising burden on the Soviet economy."<ref>Peter Schweizer , [http://www.reason.com/news/show/28929.html ''Reagan's War: The Epic Story of His Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism''], New York: Doubleday, 2002.</ref>

Shortly after taking office in 1981 Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 11-82, (NSDD 11-82), that explicitly made U.S. defense spending a form of economic warfare against the Soviets. The directive was known more unofficially as the Reagan Initiative. The United States would "exploit and demonstrate the enduring economic advantages of the West to develop a variety of [arms] systems that are difficult for the Soviets to counter, impose disproportionate costs, open up new areas of major military competition and obsolesce previous Soviet investment or employ sophisticated strategic options to achieve this end. Reagan's [[Strategic Defense Initiative]] (SDI), or "Star Wars" as the media referred to it, was a costly high tech research and development program designed to make arms spending a "rising burden on the Soviet economy."<ref>Peter Schweizer , [http://www.reason.com/news/show/28929.html ''Reagan's War: The Epic Story of His Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism''], New York: Doubleday, 2002.</ref>

[[Image:Photo 4 250.jpg|right|250px|thumb|Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik]]

[[Image:Photo 4 250.jpg|right|250px|thumb|Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik]]

By the late 80s, the Soviet Union began unilateral force cuts and troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, and by May 1989 an unprecedented series of disclosures by senior Soviet officials revealed actual reductions in defense spending for the 1986-1990 and 1991-1995 Five Year Plan periods.<ref> Christopher Wilkinson NATO Review, [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9102-4.htm Soviet Defense Spending], NATO's Economics Directorate No. 2 - April 1991, Vol. 39 p. 16-22</ref> Genrikh Grofimenko, a former adviser to [[Leonid Brezhnev]], said "Ninety-nine percent of the Russian people believe that [the US] won the Cold War because of your president's insistence on SDI".<ref>Peter Schweizer, ''Reagan’s War''.</ref>

By the late 80s, the Soviet Union began unilateral force cuts and troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, and by May 1989 an unprecedented series of disclosures by senior Soviet officials revealed actual reductions in defense spending for the 1986-1990 and 1991-1995 Five Year Plan periods.<ref> Christopher Wilkinson NATO Review, [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9102-4.htm Soviet Defense Spending], NATO's Economics Directorate No. 2 - April 1991, Vol. 39 p. 16-22</ref> Genrikh Grofimenko, a former adviser to [[Leonid Brezhnev]], said "Ninety-nine percent of the Russian people believe that [the US] won the Cold War because of your president's insistence on SDI".<ref>Peter Schweizer, ''Reagan’s War''.</ref>

==[[Containment]] and the [[Iran]]ian initiative==

===[[Containment]] and the [[Iran]]ian initiative===

In 1985, after Reagan won reelection to his second term, the focus turned from reviving the domestic economy to several foreign policy matters which had been lingering throughout the decade. One such matter involved Iran, a long time ally of the Western Allies since 1941 that had experienced an Islamic Revolution in 1979 after President Carter announced [[Human Rights]] had superseded [[Containment]] as the primary focus of American foreign policy{{fact}}. Since 1980, Iran had been enmeshed in a brutal trench war with neighboring Iraq which was emerging as a potent military threat in the region to other allies. Members of the National Security Council staff, along with CIA Director [[William Casey]], persuaded Reagan much could be gained and several problems could be addressed simultaneously with an overture to Iran to restore relations.

In 1985, after Reagan won reelection to his second term, the focus turned from reviving the domestic economy to several foreign policy matters which had been lingering throughout the decade. One such matter involved Iran, a long time ally of the Western Allies since 1941 that had experienced an Islamic Revolution in 1979 after President Carter announced [[Human Rights]] had superseded [[Containment]] as the primary focus of American foreign policy{{fact}}. Since 1980, Iran had been enmeshed in a brutal trench war with neighboring Iraq which was emerging as a potent military threat in the region to other allies. Members of the National Security Council staff, along with CIA Director [[William Casey]], persuaded Reagan much could be gained and several problems could be addressed simultaneously with an overture to Iran to restore relations.

The operation was known as the "[[Iran-Contra affair]]." After word got out about the operation in November 1986, investigations were made, leading to the convictions of several members of the Reagan administration. President Reagan himself testified before the Tower Commission that he had poor recollection of the details of the operation due in part to the heavy pain medications he had been on in that period.

The operation was known as the "[[Iran-Contra affair]]." After word got out about the operation in November 1986, investigations were made, leading to the convictions of several members of the Reagan administration. President Reagan himself testified before the Tower Commission that he had poor recollection of the details of the operation due in part to the heavy pain medications he had been on in that period.

==Cold War victory==

===Cold War victory===

Reagan is credited for ending the [[Cold War]] in victory for the United States. Historian Tony Judt in ''Postwar'' credits Soviet leader [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], while the political scientist Jan Kubik presents a viewpoint that credits [[Pope John Paul II]].<ref>[http://praguepost.com/articles/2007/02/28/letters-to-the-editor.php]</ref> Other historians contend structural weaknesses within the Communist bloc meant Reagan's actions were inconsequential to the end of [[communism]]. This is the view adopted by [[Russia]]ns themselves, and many political historians, citing ''[[perestroika]]'' and ''[[glasnost]]'' as beginning an inevitable slow fading of central power, and a collapse by irreconcilable differences between the central Soviet [[Politburo]] and the constituent republics, especially the [[Ukraine]].<ref>David Remnick, "Lenin's Tomb</ref> In the end, the consensus seems to point to all of the above, that hastened the demise of the Soviet Union; Internal factors, religious pressure brought by the Pope, Gorbachev's "Perestroika" and the united front of Ronald Reagan and [[Margaret Thatcher]], leading [[NATO]] and [[the West]] to embed a [[missile defense system]] in [[Western Europe]], and the economic superiority of [[Capitalism]], which simply out-spent and out-performed that of the Communist one. One thing that cannot be quantified is Reagan's ability to give [[hope]], his never-ending optimism that good would indeed triumph over evil. Many see that as key to bringing extra confidence to those locked behind the "[[Iron Curtain]]" to press even harder for reforms.

Reagan is credited for ending the [[Cold War]] in victory for the United States. Historian Tony Judt in ''Postwar'' credits Soviet leader [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], while the political scientist Jan Kubik presents a viewpoint that credits [[Pope John Paul II]].<ref>[http://praguepost.com/articles/2007/02/28/letters-to-the-editor.php]</ref> Other historians contend structural weaknesses within the Communist bloc meant Reagan's actions were inconsequential to the end of [[communism]]. This is the view adopted by [[Russia]]ns themselves, and many political historians, citing ''[[perestroika]]'' and ''[[glasnost]]'' as beginning an inevitable slow fading of central power, and a collapse by irreconcilable differences between the central Soviet [[Politburo]] and the constituent republics, especially the [[Ukraine]].<ref>David Remnick, "Lenin's Tomb</ref> In the end, the consensus seems to point to all of the above, that hastened the demise of the Soviet Union; Internal factors, religious pressure brought by the Pope, Gorbachev's "Perestroika" and the united front of Ronald Reagan and [[Margaret Thatcher]], leading [[NATO]] and [[the West]] to embed a [[missile defense system]] in [[Western Europe]], and the economic superiority of [[Capitalism]], which simply out-spent and out-performed that of the Communist one. One thing that cannot be quantified is Reagan's ability to give [[hope]], his never-ending optimism that good would indeed triumph over evil. Many see that as key to bringing extra confidence to those locked behind the "[[Iron Curtain]]" to press even harder for reforms.