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| − | '''Chiang Kai-shek''' (also known as '''Jiang Jieshi''')<ref> His last name is Chiang, his first name is Kai-Shek. Most English language books call him Chiang Kai-shek</ref> ([[Traditional Chinese]]: 蔣介石; [[Simplified Chinese]]: 蒋介石; [[Hanyu Pinyin]]: Jiǎng Jièshí; [[Jyutping]]: Zoeng<sup>2</sup> Gaai<sup>3</sup> Sek<sup>6</sup>) was the leader of the [[Guomindang]] from 1925 following the death of [[Sun Yixian]] (Sun Yat-sen), and from 1928 until his death in 1975 was the paramount leader and (with brief interruptions) President of the [[Republic of China]]. Chiang ostensibly converted to [[Christianity]] (specifically, to [[Methodism]]) on his marriage to [[Song Meiling]] and was an ardent opponent of [[Communism]]. | + | '''Chiang Kai-shek''' (or '''Jiang Jieshi''' in the pinyin version)<ref> His last name is Chiang, his first name is Kai-Shek. When the Communists came to power they changed the system of translation and made his name Jiang Jieshi in English. Most English language books call him Chiang Kai-shek</ref> ([[Traditional Chinese]]: 蔣介石; [[Simplified Chinese]]: 蒋介石; [[Hanyu Pinyin]]: Jiǎng Jièshí; [[Jyutping]]: Zoeng<sup>2</sup> Gaai<sup>3</sup> Sek<sup>6</sup>) was the leader of the [[Kuomintang]] from 1925 following the death of [[Sun Yat-sen]], and from 1928 until his death in 1975 was the paramount leader and (with brief interruptions) President of the [[Republic of China]]. Chiang converted to Christianity when he married [[Soong Meiling]], a methodist; he became an ardent opponent of Communism. |
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| | === Early life === | | === Early life === |
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| − | Chiang was born in the port city of [[Ningbo]] ([[Wade-Giles]]: Ningpo) in [[ZheChiang]] province in 1887, and like many educated and patriotically-minded youths in the dying days of the [[Qing]] dynasty chose to follow a military career. He studied at a military academy in [[Japan]] between 1908 and 1910, where Chiang joined the Tongmenghui (United League) - which was shortly to merge with other revolutionary groups to become the [[Guomindang]] or Nationalist Party. At the time of the 1911 revolution Chiang was based in [[Shanghai]] and at that time became involved with the local secret societies and gangs who were to aid him later in his career. During the 'Second Revolution' of 1913 (against the reactionary rule of [[Yuan Shikai]]) Chiang led an attack on the Chiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai but the bungled operation was a disastrous failure and Chiang was forced to flee. He attached himself to the entourage of the Guomindang leader [[Sun Yat-sen]] and to the ramshackle Guomindang government which Sun set up in the southern metropolis of [[Guangzhou]] (Canton). When Sun concluded an alliance with the [[Comintern]] in 1923, brokered by the Soviet agent Adolph Joffe (the 'Sun-Joffe Agreement'), Chiang Jieshi was appointed commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy at Guangzhou, established with Soviet aid and with Soviet and other foreign communist advisers. The purpose of the Academy was to train a Nationalist army capable of uniting China under Guomindang rule. | + | Chiang was born in the port city of Ningpo in 1887, and like many educated and patriotically-minded youths in the dying days of the [[Qing]] dynasty chose to follow a military career. He studied at a military academy in Japan between 1908 and 1910, where Chiang joined the Tongmenghui (United League) - which was shortly to merge with other revolutionary groups to become the Kuomintang, usually called the KMT or Nationalist Party. At the time of the 1911 revolution Chiang was based in [[Shanghai]] and at that time became involved with the local secret societies and gangs who were to aid him later in his career. During the 'Second Revolution' of 1913 (against the reactionary rule of [[Yuan Shikai]]) Chiang led an attack on an arsenal in Shanghai but the bungled operation was a disastrous failure and Chiang was forced to flee. He attached himself to the entourage of the KMT leader [[Sun Yat-sen]] and to the ramshackle KMT government which Sun set up in the southern metropolis of Canton. When Sun concluded an alliance with the [[Comintern]] in 1923, brokered by the Soviet agent Adolph Joffe (the 'Sun-Joffe Agreement'), Chiang was appointed commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy at Canton, established with Soviet aid and with Soviet and other foreign communist advisers. The purpose of the Academy was to train a Nationalist army capable of uniting China under KMT rule. |
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| | === Northern Expedition === | | === Northern Expedition === |
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| − | As commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy, Chiang had to work closely with Soviet advisors and [[Chinese Communist Party]] officials (the Guomindang and the CCP had formed a '[[united front]]' as a result of the Sun-Joffe Agreement, the CCP existing as 'bloc within' the Guomindang). [[Zhou Enlai]] (Wade-Giles: Chou En-lai) was a senior political commissar at the academy. However, Chiang was very suspicious of his Communist allies. Following the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, Chiang became the most powerful individual Guomindang leader, and on March 11 1926 launched a limited purge of communists in Guangzhou (the so-called 'Canton Coup'), as a result of which all his Soviet advisors were expelled. However, he did not dissolve the united front, and the CCP, under orders from Moscow, also continued to maintain the status quo. | + | As commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy, Chiang had to work closely with Soviet advisors and [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) officials (the KMT and the CCP had formed a "united front" as a result of the Sun-Joffe Agreement). Communist leader [[Chou En-lai]] was a senior political commissar at the academy. However, Chiang was very suspicious of his Communist allies. Following the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, Chiang became the most powerful individual KMT leader, and on March 11 1926 launched a limited purge of communists in Canton (the "Canton Coup"), as a result of which all his Soviet advisors were expelled from China. However, he did not dissolve the united front, and the CCP, under orders from Moscow, also continued to maintain the status quo. |
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| − | On July 1, 1926, Chiang launched the Northern Expedition. Guomindang armies marched north from Guangzhou in a bid to free China from the warring warlord factions which had been the sole fluctuating authority in the country since the death of [[Yuan Shikai]] in 1916, and to unify the country under Guomindang rule. However, Chiang was aided by the 'Guangxi Clique' of nationally-minded warlords; and the northern progress of the expedition was aided by carefully-timed popular uprisings planned by the CCP against local warlords. The goal was to unify the country under Guomindang rule. By September 1926 the Guomindang had captured [[Wuhan]] on the middle [[Yangtse]], and a Guomindang government was established there. Instead of continuing to press north, Chiang turned east and in March 1927 occupied [[Nanjing]], which was to become the Nationalist's capital city, and [[Shanghai]]. "Gui clique" (Guangxi warlords) in 1929 depended mainly on his successful military strategy. Before the war broke out he sought to settle the dispute peacefully, insisting on striking only after the enemy had struck first, leaving the impression that he was forced to accept a challenge. This bought him time to prepare for military action and won the support of the people. Just before the outbreak of hostilities he took well-thought-out steps to deploy troops, strengthen discipline, win over friendly forces, and split the enemy forces. After the war broke out he applied flexible strategy and tactics, effectively containing Feng Yuxiang's intended attack on [[Wuhan]] and thereby safeguarding the security of the city. These steps created favorable conditions for the armies from [[Hunan]] and [[Guangdong]] to eventually occupy the Gui clique's base in [[Guangxi]]. | + | ===Northern Expedition, 1926-1927=== |
| | + | On July 1, 1926, Chiang launched the Northern Expedition. His armies marched north from Canton in a bid to free China from the warring warlord factions which had been the sole fluctuating authority in the country since the death of [[Yuan Shikai]] in 1916, and to unify the country under KMT rule. However, Chiang was aided by the 'Guangxi Clique' of nationally-minded warlords; and the northern progress of the expedition was aided by carefully-timed popular uprisings planned by the CCP against local warlords. |
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| − | On April 12, 1927 Chiang again turned on the communists in the 'Shanghai Coup'. Chiang's troops and police rounded up and executed hundreds, probably rhousands of communists under Moscow's control. Chiang was now the undisputed leader of the Guomindang and the most powerful man in China. In 1928 two northern warlords, Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang, pledged their loyalty to him, and Yan's troops drove the last major warlord opponent, Zhang Zuolin, out of Peking. The Northern Expedition was over, and Chiang was master of China.
| + | By September 1926 his KMT armies had captured [[Wuhan]] on the middle [[Yangtse]], and a KMT government was established there. Instead of continuing to press north, Chiang turned east and in March 1927 occupied [[Nanjing]], which was to become the Nationalist's capital city, and [[Shanghai]]. "Gui clique" (Guangxi warlords) in 1929 depended mainly on his successful military strategy. Before the war broke out he sought to settle the dispute peacefully, insisting on striking only after the enemy had struck first, leaving the impression that he was forced to accept a challenge. This bought him time to prepare for military action and won the support of the people. Just before the outbreak of hostilities he took well-thought-out steps to deploy troops, strengthen discipline, win over friendly forces, and split the enemy forces. After the war broke out he applied flexible strategy and tactics, effectively containing Feng Yuxiang's intended attack on [[Wuhan]] and thereby safeguarding the security of the city. These steps created favorable conditions for the armies from [[Hunan]] and Canton to eventually occupy the Gui clique's base in [[Guangxi]]. |
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| | + | After destroying the Communists' main base of power in Shanghai in April 1927, Chiang was now the undisputed leader of the Kuomintang and the most powerful man in China. In 1928 two northern warlords, Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang, pledged their loyalty to him, and Yan's troops drove the last major warlord opponent, Zhang Zuolin, out of Peking. The Northern Expedition was over, and Chiang was master of China. |
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| | === President of the Republic of China === | | === President of the Republic of China === |
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| − | The period of the 'Nanjing Republic' (1928-37) was too short and too troubled to enable a full assessment of what established Guomindang rule might have brought China. Chiang was faced by a series of serious internal and external problems: | + | The period of the 'Nanjing Republic' (1928-37) was too short and too troubled to enable a full assessment of what established Kuomintang rule might have brought China. Chiang was faced by a series of serious internal and external problems: |
| − | * Although President of China, his direct rule only extended to the lower Yangtse provinces; the rest of China continued to be ruled by warlords expressing greater or lesser degrees of loyalty to Chiang. In 1929-30 his erstwhile allies Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan rebelled against him and his rule was saved by the intervention of Zhang Xueliang.
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| − | * The communists, defeated in April 1927 and in a number of ill-planned urban uprisings later that year, had regrouped in the countryside and established a number of 'base areas' (most notably that of [[Mao Zedong]] in southern [[Chiangxi]] province). These bases were expanding, and efforts to eliminate the Chiangxi Soviet in a series of 'encirclement campaigns' in the early 1930s had failed. The fifth encirclement campaign of 1933-34 succeeded in destroying the Chiangxi base, and the communist Red Army went into retreat on the [[Long March]].
| + | Although President of China, his direct rule only extended to the lower Yangtse provinces; the rest of China continued to be ruled by warlords expressing greater or lesser degrees of loyalty to Chiang. In 1929-30 his erstwhile allies Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan rebelled against him and his rule was saved by the intervention of Zhang Xueliang. |
| − | * When the [[Japan]]ese invaded [[Manchuria]] in 1931, Chiang gave precedence to defeating the internal threat posed by the Chinese communists over resisting the Japanese invasion. Chiang expressed the view that 'communism was a disease of the internal organs, the Japanese a disease of the skin', and that to build a strong China it was necessary to defeat communism first, to an increasing number of Chinese his attitude appeared capitulationist and unpatriotic.
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| − | * Chiang married into the wealthy Song (Soong) family, his wife, Song Meiling (1897-2003), was the sister of Sun Yat-sen's leftist widow, Song Qingling (1892-1981)). One brother in law, T.V. Soong, was his Finance Minister.
| + | Chiang married into the wealthy Soong family, his wife, Soong Meiling (1897-2003), was American-educated Methodist sister of Sun Yat-sen's leftist widow, Soong Qingling (1892-1981)). One brother in law, T.V. Soong, was his Finance Minister and chief negotiator with the U.S. |
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| | + | ===Dealing with the Communists=== |
| | + | On April 12, 1927 Chiang again turned on the communists in the 'Shanghai Coup'. Chiang's troops and police rounded up and executed hundreds, probably thousands of communists under Moscow's control. |
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| | + | Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s the KMT was engaged in a Civil War with the Communist Party of China and its Red Army. Chiang Kai-shek used as system of repeated encirclement of the communists to try to eliminate them, only for the communists to out-maneuver and escape the snare each time. |
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| | + | The Communists, defeated in Shanghai April 1927 and in a number of ill-planned urban uprisings later that year, regrouped in the countryside and established a number of "base areas" (most notably that of [[Mao Zedong]] in southern [[Chiangxi]] province). These bases were expanding, and efforts to eliminate the Chiangxi Soviet in a series of "encirclement campaigns" in the early 1930s had failed. However Chiang's fifth encirclement campaign of 1933-34 succeeded in destroying the Chiangxi base, and the communist Red Army went into retreat on the "Long March"; only a fraction of the Communists survived. Mao Zedong now became the leader of the Communists. |
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| − | In December 1936, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, two KMT generals, kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek in Xi’an. This has since been referred to as the Xi’an Incident. At the beginning of the incident, the Communist leaders planned to kill Chiang but Stalinm intervened and forced the Communists to cooperate with him, in hopes a united China would tie down Japanese forces and thus reduce the threat to the Soviet Union.<ref>[http://en.epochtimes.com/news/4-12-13/24830.html ''On the Beginnings of the Chinese Communist Party''], The Epoch Times, Dec 13, 2004.</ref> | + | In December 1936, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, two KMT generals, kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek in Xi’an. This has since been referred to as the "Xi’an Incident." At the beginning of the incident, the Communist leaders planned to kill Chiang but Stalin intervened and forced the Communists to cooperate with him, in hopes a united China would tie down Japanese forces and thus reduce the threat to the Soviet Union.<ref>[http://en.epochtimes.com/news/4-12-13/24830.html ''On the Beginnings of the Chinese Communist Party''], The Epoch Times, Dec 13, 2004.</ref> |
| | The Red Army was soon turned into the Eighth Route Army and grew bigger and more powerful than before. | | The Red Army was soon turned into the Eighth Route Army and grew bigger and more powerful than before. |
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| − | === The Sino-Japanese War === | + | When Japan seized Manchuria in 1931, Chiang gave precedence to defeating the internal threat posed by the Chinese communists over resisting the Japanese invasion. In any case he had no army or base that could challenge Japan, and appealed instead to the [[League of Nations]], which was also powerless. Chiang argued that "communism was a disease of the internal organs, the Japanese a disease of the skin," and that to build a strong China it was necessary to defeat communism first. |
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| | + | In December 1936, Chiang was captured by General Chang Hsüeh-liang in what is now called the [[Xi'an Incident]]. The captors tried to force Chiang to stop fighting the Communists and to unite with them in fighting Japan. After lengthy negotiations, Chiang was released. The [[Second United Front]] between KMT and Communist leaders was formed soon afterward. This tentative truce between to the two parties was always uneasy and actual cooperation on a united military front was rare. |
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| | + | ===Rural policies=== |
| | + | Chiang took an instrumentalist view of rural cooperatives. He saw these rural institutions as mechanisms of political control on the one hand, and as social engineering instruments for mitigating class conflict in rural society on the other. Rooted in these views, the rural cooperative movement promoted by Chiang and the KMT government, from 1927 onward was aimed at countering the influence of the land reform policies implemented by the Chinese Communists in the areas under their control. |
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| | + | ===Relations with Japan=== |
| | + | After the "Mukden Incident" of September 18, 1931 and Japan's rapid seizure of Manchuria, Chiang realized that the vast disparity in national strength and military power between China and Japan put China at great risk. Therefore he rejected advice to fight back by people who called him an appeaser and did his best to avoid all-out war, using "peace" as a way to postpone war. On the other hand, he gathered allies widely, adjusted policies, maintained domestic order, built "national defense strongholds," organized a southwestern base area, and prepared to fight against Japan. However, the Japanese began negotiating with regional Chinese leaders and promoted a "north China autonomy movement" for the five northern provinces that weakened Nationalist control. <ref>Stephen G. Craft, "Opponents of Appeasement: Western-educated Chinese Diplomats and Intellectuals and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1932-37." ''Modern Asian Studies'' 2001 35(1): 195-216. Issn: 0026-749x [http://www.jstor.org/pss/313092 in Jstor ] </ref> |
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| | + | Full scale war — the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] began at the Marco Polo bridge near Peking in July 1937. |
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| | + | ==1937-1948== |
| | + | Chiang was in full charge of the KMT after 1927, with the title of "generalissimo"; he thus ruled that part of China controlled by the KMT. With the Japanese gaining more Chinese territory, the policy of "trading space for time" (Chinese: 以空間換取時間) was adopted. Chiang moved, not only his government, but much of China's industrial production, several hundred miles west to the interior city of Chunking, in the remote mountains of [[Sichuan]] province. |
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| | + | The U.S. was eager to use China to defeat Japan. The idea was that millions of Chinese soldiers, equipped and trained by the U.S. Army and heavily funded by the U.S. Treasury, would eventually overrun the Japanese invaders. The strategy never came close to working. |
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| | + | In September 1943, Chiang Kai-shek formally became president of the central executive committee of the KMT, and was recognized as the head of state and head of government of free China. In November 1943 Chiang attended the [[Cairo Conference]], where he, President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], and Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] drafted the Cairo declaration proclaiming Allied war objectives for the Far East. China was assured a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council when it formed in 1945.<Ref> Chiang and his son controlled the seat until 1970, when the UN voted to give it to the Communist regime.</ref> |
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| | + | Chiang was elected tsung-tsai (director-general) of the Kuomintang on May 17, 1945. After 1927 he never had a serious contender who might threaten his control of the party. |
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| − | === Conclusion of the Chineses Civil War ===
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| − | When the Japanese surrendered, the Chinese Nationalist army far outnumbered the Red revolutionary army. Then appeared [[Stalin]]'s army of 1,250,000 men armed with American guns, planes, tanks and munitions and other supplies and the balance began to alter. And the [[Maoist]]s had immense quantities of munitions laid down by the Japanese in the Manchuria.
| + | === Conclusion of the Chinese Civil War === |
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| − | General [[George C. Marshall]] was sent by [[President Truman]] as his personal representative to China, arriving on December 20, 1945. His specific instructions from Secretary of State [[James Byrnes]] were to insist on a coalition government as a condition for continued aid to the Nationalists. <ref>Forrest C. Pogue, ''George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959'', New York 1987, pg. 61.</ref> [[CCP]] leader [[Mao Zedong]] had already said publicly in April 1945 that a coalition government with the Chinese Nationalists would result in the defeat of "reactionary American imperialism." <ref>"On Coalition Government," address to the April 1945 Seventh National Convention of the Chinese Communist Party, quoted in Anthony Kubek, ''How the Far East Was Lost'', Chicago 1963, pg. 238.</ref> In the summer of 1946, Truman told Chiang to be more willing to compromise. Chiang replied that first the Communists must abandon "their policy to seize political power through the use of armed force, to overthrow the government and to install a [[totalitarian]] regime such as those with which [[Eastern Europe]] is now being engulfed." <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 429.</ref> | + | General [[George C. Marshall]] was sent in late 1945 by President Truman to resolve the Chinese civil war, hopefully by creating a new shared power arrangement between the Communists and Chiang's Nationalists. His specific instructions from Secretary of State [[James Byrnes]] were to insist on a coalition government as a condition for continued aid to the Nationalists. <ref>Forrest C. Pogue, ''George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959'', (1987), p. 61.</ref> Communist leader Mao Zedong had already said publicly in April 1945 that a coalition government with the Chinese Nationalists would result in the defeat of "reactionary American imperialism." <ref>"On Coalition Government," address to the April 1945 Seventh National Convention of the Chinese Communist Party, quoted in Anthony Kubek, ''How the Far East Was Lost'', (1963), p. 238.</ref> In the summer of 1946, Truman told Chiang to be more willing to compromise. Chiang replied that first the Communists must abandon "their policy to seize political power through the use of armed force, to overthrow the government and to install a [[totalitarian]] regime such as those with which [[Eastern Europe]] is now being engulfed." <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', (1964), p. 429.</ref> |
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| − | American policy in China was largely being shaped by the so-called "China Hands" in the [[U.S. State Department]]: [[John Stewart Service]], [[John Paton Davies]], [[John Carter Vincent]], and others. Because they knew the Chinese language and had been in China for years, their recommendations carried much weight, and they played a major part in the fall of China. | + | American policy in China was largely being shaped by the so-called "China Hands" in the U.S. State Department: [[John Stewart Service]], [[John Paton Davies]], [[John Carter Vincent]], and others. Because they knew the Chinese language and had been in China for years, their recommendations carried much weight, and they played a major part in the fall of China. |
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| | The [[U.S. War Department]] however, had more realistic and clearer view of the situation. In July 1945, a memorandum entitled, ''The Chinese Communist Movement'', gave a depiction of the true nature of the Communist movement. The report stated the Maoists were more rigidly controlled than the KMT, allowed no opposition groups to exist in their areas (in contrast to the KMT), and were part of the [[Comintern|international Communist]] movement. <ref>Anne W. Carroll, [http://www.ewtn.com/library/HOMELIBR/FR89102.TXT ''Who Lost China''], 1996. Retrieved from www.ewtn com/library/ August 16, 2007.</ref> | | The [[U.S. War Department]] however, had more realistic and clearer view of the situation. In July 1945, a memorandum entitled, ''The Chinese Communist Movement'', gave a depiction of the true nature of the Communist movement. The report stated the Maoists were more rigidly controlled than the KMT, allowed no opposition groups to exist in their areas (in contrast to the KMT), and were part of the [[Comintern|international Communist]] movement. <ref>Anne W. Carroll, [http://www.ewtn.com/library/HOMELIBR/FR89102.TXT ''Who Lost China''], 1996. Retrieved from www.ewtn com/library/ August 16, 2007.</ref> |
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| − | Without committing U.S. combat troops and without supporting a coalition government, the [[Truman Doctrine]] saved Greece from Communism. Greece received weapons and financial support and, most importantly, operational advisers at the battalion level, who ensured that American aid was used effectively. Marshall himself testified that similar aid might have worked in China, but General David Barr's military mission to China was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref> Chiang believed that the Truman Doctrine to [[Containment|contain]] the spread of [[Comintern|International Communism]] directed from Moscow would be extended to China, and ordered an offensive as soon as word of the new policy reached him. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China: A Political History, 1917-1980'', Boulder CO 1982, pg. 208.</ref> Truman however, made no effort to save China from Communism. | + | Without committing U.S. combat troops and without supporting a coalition government, the [[Truman Doctrine]] saved Greece from Communism. Greece received weapons and financial support and, most importantly, operational advisers at the battalion level, who ensured that American aid was used effectively. Marshall himself testified that similar aid might have worked in China, but General David Barr's military mission to China was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref> Chiang believed that the Truman Doctrine to [[Containment|contain]] the spread of International Communism directed from Moscow would be extended to China, and ordered an offensive as soon as word of the new policy reached him. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China: A Political History, 1917-1980'', (1982), pg. 208.</ref> Truman however, made no effort to save China from Communism. |
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| | Chiang was forced from the Chinese mainland to the island of [[Taiwan]] in 1949, where he resumed his position as president, albeit of a massively reduced territory. | | Chiang was forced from the Chinese mainland to the island of [[Taiwan]] in 1949, where he resumed his position as president, albeit of a massively reduced territory. |