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President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] and his top advisers, such as Treasury Secretary [[Henry Morgenthau]] and [[Lend-Lease]] administrator [[Harry Hopkins]], were strongly committed to support China against Japan. Public opinion was strongly hostile to Japan; isolationism (opposition to war in Europe) played little role. [[Lend Lease]] aid in began in 1940 with the goal of building a large powerful Chinese army that would hold down most of the Japanese army, and after the war play a role as a major world power in the United Nations.  That goal was highly unrealistic, as Japan controlled the financial, economic and transportation centers in China, and most of the people, leaving the Nationalists in control in poor, remote mountainous regions, with their capital in Chungking. In addition, the Communists controlled their own remote sphere in the northwest. China was unable to feed or clothe its soldiers, who lacked equipment, discipline, and skilled sergeants, junior officers, and senior officers.  Nevertheless, cost was no object and dollars poured in. After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. and Britain agreed to set up a [[CBI|China-Burma-India theater]], with Chiang as supreme commander, and an American as chief of staff, and in command of American forces in China and Lend Lease supplies. The U.S. sent in General [[Joseph Stilwell]], an energitic fighter who spoke Chinese but lacked diplomatic skills. Stilwell feuded incessantly with Chiang, and with his air commander Air Force Major General [[Claire Chennault]], head of the Flying Tigers operation.  Chiang supported Chennault.  
 
President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] and his top advisers, such as Treasury Secretary [[Henry Morgenthau]] and [[Lend-Lease]] administrator [[Harry Hopkins]], were strongly committed to support China against Japan. Public opinion was strongly hostile to Japan; isolationism (opposition to war in Europe) played little role. [[Lend Lease]] aid in began in 1940 with the goal of building a large powerful Chinese army that would hold down most of the Japanese army, and after the war play a role as a major world power in the United Nations.  That goal was highly unrealistic, as Japan controlled the financial, economic and transportation centers in China, and most of the people, leaving the Nationalists in control in poor, remote mountainous regions, with their capital in Chungking. In addition, the Communists controlled their own remote sphere in the northwest. China was unable to feed or clothe its soldiers, who lacked equipment, discipline, and skilled sergeants, junior officers, and senior officers.  Nevertheless, cost was no object and dollars poured in. After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. and Britain agreed to set up a [[CBI|China-Burma-India theater]], with Chiang as supreme commander, and an American as chief of staff, and in command of American forces in China and Lend Lease supplies. The U.S. sent in General [[Joseph Stilwell]], an energitic fighter who spoke Chinese but lacked diplomatic skills. Stilwell feuded incessantly with Chiang, and with his air commander Air Force Major General [[Claire Chennault]], head of the Flying Tigers operation.  Chiang supported Chennault.  
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[[Image:58742big.jpg|thumb|350px|Japanese expansion into China, 1931-45]]
    
The American strategy was to build up air power in China, but not send significant numbers of American combat troops because they could not be easily supplied. Japan had long since cut off the coastline, and in March 1942 it cut the only overland road into China, the [[Burma Road]].  Supplies had to be flown in "over the Hump" (over the Himalayan mountains) from India at fantastic cost until the [[Ledo Road]] cutoff could be built and the Burma Road reopened.  The British, meanwhile, had a low opinion of China's capabilities and gave minimal cooperation to Chiang and Stilwell. They considered Burma important not because it was a link to China, but because Japanese conquest threatened India. The British therefore conducted numerous large-scale campaigns in Burma, as did Stilwell. Coordination was weak. All were failures before the summer of 1944.  
 
The American strategy was to build up air power in China, but not send significant numbers of American combat troops because they could not be easily supplied. Japan had long since cut off the coastline, and in March 1942 it cut the only overland road into China, the [[Burma Road]].  Supplies had to be flown in "over the Hump" (over the Himalayan mountains) from India at fantastic cost until the [[Ledo Road]] cutoff could be built and the Burma Road reopened.  The British, meanwhile, had a low opinion of China's capabilities and gave minimal cooperation to Chiang and Stilwell. They considered Burma important not because it was a link to China, but because Japanese conquest threatened India. The British therefore conducted numerous large-scale campaigns in Burma, as did Stilwell. Coordination was weak. All were failures before the summer of 1944.  
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