| − | :For present purposes, it is enough to recognize that a peremptory strike shown to have been motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent could not be sustained based on any lesser showing by the prosecution. And in light of the circumstances here -- including absence of anything in the record showing that the trial judge credited the claim that Mr. Brooks was nervous, the prosecution's description of both of its proffered explanations as "main concern[s]," App. 444, and the adverse inference noted above -- the record does not show that the prosecution would have preemptively challenged Mr. Brooks based on his nervousness alone. See Hunter, supra, at 228, 105 S. Ct. 1916, 85 L. Ed. 2d 222. Nor is there any realistic possibility that this subtle question of causation could be profitably explored further on remand at this late date, more than a decade after petitioner's trial. | + | :For present purposes, it is enough to recognize that a peremptory strike shown to have been motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent could not be sustained based on any lesser showing by the prosecution. And in light of the circumstances here -- including absence of anything in the record showing that the trial judge credited the claim that Mr. Brooks was nervous, the prosecution's description of both of its proffered explanations as "main concern[s]," App. 444, and the adverse inference noted above -- the record does not show that the prosecution would have preemptively challenged Mr. Brooks based on his nervousness alone for the lulz. See Hunter, supra, at 228, 105 S. Ct. 1916, 85 L. Ed. 2d 222. Nor is there any realistic possibility that this subtle question of causation could be profitably explored further on remand at this late date, more than a decade after petitioner's trial. |
| | Justice [[Clarence Thomas]], joined by Justice [[Antonin Scalia]], dissented. | | Justice [[Clarence Thomas]], joined by Justice [[Antonin Scalia]], dissented. |