Changes

==Cold War Secrecy==

==Cold War Secrecy==

The Commission findings regarding government secrecy in the early Cold War period have led to a reevaluation of many public perceptions regarding the period.  By 1950, the United States Government was in possession of information which the American public did not know: proof of a serious attack on American security by the Soviet Union, with considerable assistance from an enemy within. Soviet authorities knew the U.S. government knew. Only the American people were denied this information. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appa7.html Moynihan Commssion on Government Secrecy, Appendix A, ''The Cold War''] (1997).</ref>

The Commission findings regarding government secrecy in the early Cold War period have led to a reevaluation of many public perceptions regarding the period.  By 1950, the United States Government was in possession of information which the American public did not know: proof of a serious attack on American security by the Soviet Union, with considerable assistance from an enemy within. Soviet authorities knew the U.S. government knew. Only the American people were denied this information. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appa7.html Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, Appendix A, ''The Cold War''] (1997).</ref>

One revelation of the [[VENONA]] intercepts is that many Americans who spied for the Soviet Union were never prosecuted. To do so the Government would have to reveal what it knew. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appa6.html Moynihan Commssion on Government Secrecy, Appendix A, ''The Experience of The Bomb''] (1997).</ref>  On 29 May 1946, FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] sent a high administration official a memorandum reporting “an enormous Soviet espionage ring in Washington."  Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson was at the top of the list.  Truman distrusted Hoover and suspected Hoover of playing political games.  Acheson's inclusion at the top of the list automatically discredited other accusations which were on target, [[Alger Hiss]] and [[Greg Silvermaster|Nathan Gregory Silvermaster]]. [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/hoovlet.html]  In late August or early September 1947, the [[Arlington Hall|Army Security Agency]] informed the [[FBI]] it had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages.  Truman had never been told of the existence of the Venona project, , and always insisted [[Republican Party (United States)#Second half of the twentieth century|Republicans]] had trumped up the loyalty issue. The first fact is, that a significant Communist conspiracy was in place in Washington, New York, and Hollywood. President Truman was almost willfully obtuse as regards American Communism. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Moynihan Commssion on Government Secrecy, Chairmans Forward] (1997).</ref> There were no Communists in Kansas City politics where he came from.  Apart from intellectual circles in Manhattan and a few metropolitan centers elsewhere, and the labor movement, Communists were unknown.  Truman has been criticized for putting domestic politics above [[National Security|American security]].   

One revelation of the [[VENONA]] intercepts is that many Americans who spied for the Soviet Union were never prosecuted. To do so the Government would have to reveal what it knew. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appa6.html Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, Appendix A, ''The Experience of The Bomb''] (1997).</ref>  On 29 May 1946, FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] sent a high administration official a memorandum reporting “an enormous Soviet espionage ring in Washington."  Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson was at the top of the list.  Truman distrusted Hoover and suspected Hoover of playing political games.  Acheson's inclusion at the top of the list automatically discredited other accusations which were on target, [[Alger Hiss]] and [[Greg Silvermaster|Nathan Gregory Silvermaster]]. [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/hoovlet.html]  In late August or early September 1947, the [[Arlington Hall|Army Security Agency]] informed the [[FBI]] it had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages.  Truman had never been told of the existence of the Venona project, , and always insisted [[Republican Party (United States)#Second half of the twentieth century|Republicans]] had trumped up the loyalty issue. The first fact is, that a significant Communist conspiracy was in place in Washington, New York, and Hollywood. President Truman was almost willfully obtuse as regards American Communism. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, Chairmans Forward] (1997).</ref> There were no Communists in Kansas City politics where he came from.  Apart from intellectual circles in Manhattan and a few metropolitan centers elsewhere, and the labor movement, Communists were unknown.  Truman has been criticized for putting domestic politics above [[National Security|American security]].   

The prosecutors in the internal-security cases of the 1940s did not know they had not been given all, or even the best government evidence, against [[Julius Rosenberg]], [[Ethel Rosenberg]], and others.  The Venona materials would have been [[incontrovertible evidence|conclusive]] in establishing the cast of characters in the Soviet spy networks. <ref>Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ''Secrecy: The American Experience'', (New Haven: Yale University Press 1998), pg. 54.</ref>  Government secrecy allowed critics of the Rosenberg and Hiss cases to construct elaborate theories about frame-ups and cover-ups. For years the Rosenbergs' defenders demanded that the government reveal its secrets about the case.  When Secrecy Commission forced the disclosure of documents, the secrets revealed the government's case was even stronger. <ref>Ibid, pg. 62.</ref> "Over the years," said Ronald Radosh, "the Rosenbergs' defenders have loudly demanded the release of government documents on the case, only to deny the documents' significance once they are made public." <ref>Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, ''The Rosenberg File'', 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pgs. 471-72.</ref>  As archives of the Cold War are opened, the original case made against Soviet espionage in the United States has received ever more conclusive corroboration. <ref>Moynihan, ''Secrecy'', pg. 52.</ref>

The prosecutors in the internal-security cases of the 1940s did not know they had not been given all, or even the best government evidence, against [[Julius Rosenberg]], [[Ethel Rosenberg]], and others.  The Venona materials would have been [[incontrovertible evidence|conclusive]] in establishing the cast of characters in the Soviet spy networks. <ref>Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ''Secrecy: The American Experience'', (New Haven: Yale University Press 1998), pg. 54.</ref>  Government secrecy allowed critics of the Rosenberg and Hiss cases to construct elaborate theories about frame-ups and cover-ups. For years the Rosenbergs' defenders demanded that the government reveal its secrets about the case.  When Secrecy Commission forced the disclosure of documents, the secrets revealed the government's case was even stronger. <ref>Ibid, pg. 62.</ref> "Over the years," said Ronald Radosh, "the Rosenbergs' defenders have loudly demanded the release of government documents on the case, only to deny the documents' significance once they are made public." <ref>Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, ''The Rosenberg File'', 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pgs. 471-72.</ref>  As archives of the Cold War are opened, the original case made against Soviet espionage in the United States has received ever more conclusive corroboration. <ref>Moynihan, ''Secrecy'', pg. 52.</ref>

==Loyalty==

==Loyalty==

The idea of loyalty <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appa3.html Moynihan Commssion on Government Secrecy, Appendix A, ''Loyalty''] (1997).</ref>  implies that there is much information within a bureaucracy which could be used to injure the Government, or the [[national interest]] if revealed by disloyal persons to hostile nations or, for that matter, to internal elements hostile to our “way of life.”  It appears that the three-tiered gradation of today, Confidential/ Secret/Top Secret was adopted by the U.S. military from British forces in France in 1917, and was institutionalized with the [[Espionage Act of 1917]].  The U.S. Civil Service Commission, established by the [[Pendleton Act]] in 1883, was debarring persons relating to “loyalty” as late as 1921, when the United States formally terminated the [[World War I]].

The idea of loyalty <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appa3.html Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, Appendix A, ''Loyalty''] (1997).</ref>  implies that there is much information within a bureaucracy which could be used to injure the Government, or the [[national interest]] if revealed by disloyal persons to hostile nations or, for that matter, to internal elements hostile to our “way of life.”  It appears that the three-tiered gradation of today, Confidential/ Secret/Top Secret was adopted by the U.S. military from British forces in France in 1917, and was institutionalized with the [[Espionage Act of 1917]].  The U.S. Civil Service Commission, established by the [[Pendleton Act]] in 1883, was debarring persons relating to “loyalty” as late as 1921, when the United States formally terminated the [[World War I]].

The Commission Report quotes [[Max Weber]], "Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret...Bureaucracy naturally welcomes a poorly informed and hence a powerless parliament—at least in so far as ignorance somehow agrees with the bureaucracy’s interests." <ref>Max Weber, ''Essays in Sociology'', trans. and ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 233-34; ''Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft'' (''Economy and Society''), 1922.</ref>

The Commission Report quotes [[Max Weber]], "Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret...Bureaucracy naturally welcomes a poorly informed and hence a powerless parliament—at least in so far as ignorance somehow agrees with the bureaucracy’s interests." <ref>Max Weber, ''Essays in Sociology'', trans. and ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 233-34; ''Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft'' (''Economy and Society''), 1922.</ref>

In this manner, a broader “security” program was established across the Government. The political pressure had increased with the passage of legislation in 1950 “[t]o protect the national security of the United States by permitting the summary suspension of employment of civilian officers and employees of various departments and agencies. . . .”  In addition, beginning in March 1948, the Attorney General’s List was published on a regular basis—with members of organizations included on such a list to be denied employment in the Federal government or defense industries as well as the right to a U.S. passport. During the 1952 presidential campaign, Dwight Eisenhower promised to root out Communists and other security risks from government and defense industry employment— suggesting that their presence had been tolerated too easily by the Truman administration despite the existence of rules to address “loyalty” concerns. In his first State of the Union address Eisenhower promised a new system “for keeping out the disloyal and the dangerous.”  Executive Order 10450 soon followed. Senator [[Joseph McCarthy]] praised the new Executive Order.  The ''New York Times'' reported, “The new program will require a new investigation of many thousands of employees previously investigated, as well as many more thousands who have had no security check.”   

In this manner, a broader “security” program was established across the Government. The political pressure had increased with the passage of legislation in 1950 “[t]o protect the national security of the United States by permitting the summary suspension of employment of civilian officers and employees of various departments and agencies. . . .”  In addition, beginning in March 1948, the Attorney General’s List was published on a regular basis—with members of organizations included on such a list to be denied employment in the Federal government or defense industries as well as the right to a U.S. passport. During the 1952 presidential campaign, Dwight Eisenhower promised to root out Communists and other security risks from government and defense industry employment— suggesting that their presence had been tolerated too easily by the Truman administration despite the existence of rules to address “loyalty” concerns. In his first State of the Union address Eisenhower promised a new system “for keeping out the disloyal and the dangerous.”  Executive Order 10450 soon followed. Senator [[Joseph McCarthy]] praised the new Executive Order.  The ''New York Times'' reported, “The new program will require a new investigation of many thousands of employees previously investigated, as well as many more thousands who have had no security check.”   

In November 1953, Attorney General [[Herbert Brownell]] would allege in a speech that Truman had nominated a Soviet spy—senior Treasury Department official [[Harry Dexter White]]—to serve as the U.S. Executive Director of the [[International Monetary Fund]], despite what Brownell said was the President’s awareness of White’s involvement in Soviet espionage. And on December 3, 1953, President Eisenhower directed that a “blank wall be placed between Dr. [[J. Robert Oppenheimer]] and secret data”—marking the beginning of the process that led to the [[Atomic Energy Commission]]’s suspension of Oppenheimer’s security clearance later in December and its 4-to-1 decision on June 28, 1954, against restoring the clearance. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appa8.html Moynihan Commssion on Government Secrecy, Appendix A, ''A Culture of Secrecy''] (1997).</ref>

In November 1953, Attorney General [[Herbert Brownell]] would allege in a speech that Truman had nominated a Soviet spy—senior Treasury Department official [[Harry Dexter White]]—to serve as the U.S. Executive Director of the [[International Monetary Fund]], despite what Brownell said was the President’s awareness of White’s involvement in Soviet espionage. And on December 3, 1953, President Eisenhower directed that a “blank wall be placed between Dr. [[J. Robert Oppenheimer]] and secret data”—marking the beginning of the process that led to the [[Atomic Energy Commission]]’s suspension of Oppenheimer’s security clearance later in December and its 4-to-1 decision on June 28, 1954, against restoring the clearance. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appa8.html Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, Appendix A, ''A Culture of Secrecy''] (1997).</ref>

==References==

==References==

*[http://hsgac.senate.gov/072600_moynihan.htm Statement of Sen. Daniel Moynihan before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 26 July 2000]

*[http://hsgac.senate.gov/072600_moynihan.htm Statement of Sen. Daniel Moynihan before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 26 July 2000]

*[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appb.html Commission's Authorizing Statute], P.L. 103-236; April 30, 1994.

*[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/appb.html Commission's Authorizing Statute], P.L. 103-236; April 30, 1994.

*[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/index.html Moynihan Commssion Report]

*[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/index.html Moynihan Commission Report]

[[Category:United States Government]]

[[Category:United States Government]]