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[[Image:FtMcHenry.jpg|right|300px|thumb|Fort McHenry today, flying a replica of the "Star Spangled Banner" that flew over the fort on September 13, 1814]]

[[Image:FtMcHenry.jpg|right|300px|thumb|Fort McHenry today, flying a replica of the "Star Spangled Banner" that flew over the fort on September 13, 1814]]

The '''War of 1812''' was a war declared by the United States against Great Britain (and its Empire), lasting from June 18, 1812 to February 18, 1815. The causes involved American grievances against Britain for suppressing American trade, impressing (sezing) sailors with U.S. papers, and inciting hostile Indian raids in the west. Britain, tied down by a much larger war with Napoleon's France, acted too late diplomatically to head off the conflict.   The fighting at sea was characterized by a tight British blockade that shut down most American shipping, together with some dramnatic naval battles. On land the war was a draw characterized by a series of invasions launched by the U.S. against Canada, and by the British against Washington, New York state, and New Orleans. All the invasions were abject failures. By late 1814, with France  and the Indian tribes apparently defeated, the causes for the war had largely vanished, and a treaty was agreed to that left the prewar boundaries unchanged.  Although the war was a draw, Americans celebrated a great victory--many called it their Second War of Independence-- and acclaimed General [[Andrew Jackson]] a national hero for his decisive victory at New Orleans. In Canada, anti-American and pro-British elements celebrated the repulse of an American invasion.  British had to deal with Napoleon's return and largely ignored the war.

The '''War of 1812''' was a war declared by the United States against Great Britain (and its Empire), lasting from June 18, 1812 to February 18, 1815. The causes involved American grievances against Britain for suppressing American trade, impressing (seizing) sailors with U.S. papers, and inciting hostile Indian raids in the west. Britain, tied down by a much larger war with Napoleon's France, acted too late diplomatically to head off the conflict. The war followed a series of failed efforts by the U.S. to use economic pressure through the [[Embargo of 1807]].

 

The fighting at sea was characterized by a tight British blockade that shut down most American shipping, together with some dramatic naval battles. On land the war was a draw characterized by a series of invasions launched by the U.S. against Canada, and by the British against Washington, New York state, and New Orleans. All the invasions were abject failures. By late 1814, with France  and the Indian tribes apparently defeated, the causes for the war had largely vanished, and a treaty was agreed to that left the prewar boundaries unchanged.  Although the war was a draw, Americans celebrated a great victory--many called it their Second War of Independence-- and acclaimed General [[Andrew Jackson]] a national hero for his decisive victory at New Orleans. In Canada, anti-American and pro-British elements celebrated the repulse of an American invasion.  British had to deal with Napoleon's return and largely ignored the war.

==Origins==

==Origins==

[[Image:7648ruy6g.gif|right|200px|thumb|[[James Madison]], fourth President of the United States]]

[[Image:7648ruy6g.gif|right|200px|thumb|[[James Madison]], fourth President of the United States]]

With Britain engaged in a life-and-death war with France, the efforts of a small country like the U.S. to remain neutral were futile. The British Royal Navy controlled the seas and stopped American shipments headed to France. Worse, the Royal Navy, needing more men, boarded American merchant ships and "impressed" (seized) 6000 sailors who were American citizens but had been born in Britain. Finally Americans were conviced that the British were using their base in western Canada to supply and encourage Indian raids on American frontier settle,ments.  

With Britain engaged in a life-and-death war with France, the efforts of a small country like the U.S. to remain neutral were futile. The British Royal Navy controlled the seas and stopped American shipments headed to France. Worse, the Royal Navy, needing more men, boarded American merchant ships and "impressed" (seized) 6000 sailors who were American citizens but had been born in Britain. Finally Americans were convinced that the British were using their base in western Canada to supply and encourage Indian raids on American frontier settlements.  

When a British warship in June 1807 attacked and disabled [[USS Chesapeake|USS ''Chesapeake'']],  and impressed several crewmen, a general wave of indignation rose in which even the maritime interests joined. This was an insult to the flag, but President [[Thomas Jefferson]] decided against war and instead tried to punich Britain by cutting off American trade. This annoyed the British some but outraged New England, where shipping was shut down and the economy badly hurt.<ref> New England started to industrialize to rebuild its economy.</ref>  

When a British warship in June 1807 attacked and disabled [[USS Chesapeake|USS ''Chesapeake'']],  and impressed several crewmen, a general wave of indignation rose in which even the maritime interests joined. This was an insult to the flag, but President [[Thomas Jefferson]] decided against war and instead tried to punish Britain by cutting off American trade. This annoyed the British some but outraged New England, where shipping was shut down and the economy badly hurt.<ref> New England started to industrialize to rebuild its economy.</ref>  

In the South and west, "war hawks," led by young Republicans such as [[Henry Clay]] and [[John C. Calhoun]], demanded war.  

In the South and west, "war hawks," led by young Republicans such as [[Henry Clay]] and [[John C. Calhoun]], demanded war.  

President [[James Madison]] tried to negotiate. Comgress passed "Nacon's Bill #2" in 1810 that promised if Britain or France allowed American shipping, the U.S. would put an embargo on the other country. [[Napoleon]] tricked the U.S. into believing, falsely, that France had dropped its restrictions.  Madison then slapped an embargo on trade to britain (which was by far the largest trading partner of the U.S.).  The British failed to act quickly, and by the time London dropped its restrictions, the U.S. had reached the point of no return. In June 1812, the main cause of the war for the U.S. was defined as the need to protect republican values against British imperialism.  Madison sent a war message to Congress on June 1 listing all the complaints against Britain and asking for a declaration of war. With New England vehemently opposed, Congress declared war on June 18.

President [[James Madison]] tried to negotiate. Congress passed "Macon's Bill #2" in 1810 that promised if Britain or France allowed American shipping, the U.S. would put an embargo on the other country. [[Napoleon]] tricked the U.S. into believing, falsely, that France had dropped its restrictions.  Madison then slapped an embargo on trade to Britain (which was by far the largest trading partner of the U.S.).  The British failed to act quickly, and by the time London dropped its restrictions, the U.S. had reached the point of no return. In June 1812, the main cause of the war for the U.S. was defined as the need to protect republican values against British imperialism.  Madison sent a war message to Congress on June 1 listing all the complaints against Britain and asking for a declaration of war. With New England vehemently opposed, Congress declared war on June 18.

===Myths of the origins===

===Myths of the origins===

Many Canadians falsely believe that a main cause of the war was American expansionism or desire for Canadian land. The topic was much discussed among historians before 1940, but is rarely cited by experts any more.<ref> it was refuted by [http://www.jstor.org/pss/1896211 Warren H. Goodman, "The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations," ''Mississippi Valley Historical Review'', v 28 (September, 1941), 171-86. in JSTOR].</ref> The myth was propounded after the war by pro-British Canadians who tried to incite anti-Americanism.<ref> W. Arthur Bowler, "Propaganda in Upper Canada in the War of 1812," ''American Review of Canadian Studies'' (1988) 28:11-32; C.P. Stacey, "The War of 1812 in Canadian History" in Morris Zaslow and Wesley B. Turner, eds. ''The Defended Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812'' (Toronto, 1964)</ref>

Many Canadians falsely believe that a main cause of the war was American expansionism or desire for Canadian land. The topic was much discussed among historians before 1940, but is rarely cited by experts any more.<ref> it was refuted by [http://www.jstor.org/pss/1896211 Warren H. Goodman, "The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations," ''Mississippi Valley Historical Review'', v 28 (September, 1941), 171-86. in JSTOR].</ref> The myth was propounded after the war by pro-British Canadians who tried to incite anti-Americanism.<ref> W. Arthur Bowler, "Propaganda in Upper Canada in the War of 1812," ''American Review of Canadian Studies'' (1988) 28:11-32; C.P. Stacey, "The War of 1812 in Canadian History" in Morris Zaslow and Wesley B. Turner, eds. ''The Defended Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812'' (Toronto, 1964)</ref>

==The Strategic Pattern==

==The Strategic Pattern==

The fundamental military strategy of the United States was simple enough. The primary undertaking would be the conquest of Canada. The United States also planned an immediate naval offensive, whereby a swarm of privateers and the small Navy would be set loose on the high seas to destroy British commerce. The old invasion route into Canada by way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River led directly to the most populous and most important part of the enemy’s territory. The capture of Montreal would cut the line of communications upon which the British defense of Upper Canada depended, making the fall of that province inevitable. But this invasion route was near the center of disaffection in the United States from which little local support could be expected. The places where enthusiasm for the war ran high and where the Canadian forces were weak offered a safer theater of operations, though one with fewer strategic opportunities. Thus, in violation of the principles of objective and economy of force, the fi rst assaults were delivered across the Detroit River and across the Niagara River between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario rather than along the Hudson–Lake Champlain–Montreal line of advance.  

The fundamental military strategy of the United States was simple enough. The primary undertaking would be the conquest of Canada. The United States also planned an immediate naval offensive, whereby a swarm of privateers and the small Navy would be set loose on the high seas to destroy British commerce. The old invasion route into Canada by way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River led directly to the most populous and most important part of the enemy’s territory. The capture of Montreal would cut the line of communications upon which the British defense of Upper Canada depended, making the fall of that province inevitable. But this invasion route was near the center of disaffection in the United States from which little local support could be expected. The places where enthusiasm for the war ran high and where the Canadian forces were weak offered a safer theater of operations, though one with fewer strategic opportunities. Thus, in violation of the principles of objective and economy of force, the first assaults were delivered across the Detroit River and across the Niagara River between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario rather than along the Hudson–Lake Champlain–Montreal line of advance.  

        

        

The war progressed through three distinct stages. In the first, lasting until the spring of 1813, England was so hard pressed in Europe that it could spare neither men nor ships in any great number for the conflict in North America. The United States was free to take the initiative, to invade Canada, and to send out cruisers and privateers against enemy shipping. During the second stage, lasting from early 1813 to the beginning of 1814, Britain was able to establish a tight blockade but still could not materially reinforce the troops in Canada. During this stage the American Army, having gained experience, won its first successes. The third stage, in 1814, was marked by the constant arrival in North America of British regulars and naval reinforcements, which enabled the enemy to raid the North American coast almost at will and to take the offensive in several quarters. At the same time, in this final stage of the war American forces fought their best fights and won their most brilliant victories.

The war progressed through three distinct stages. In the first, lasting until the spring of 1813, England was so hard pressed in Europe that it could spare neither men nor ships in any great number for the conflict in North America. The United States was free to take the initiative, to invade Canada, and to send out cruisers and privateers against enemy shipping. During the second stage, lasting from early 1813 to the beginning of 1814, Britain was able to establish a tight blockade but still could not materially reinforce the troops in Canada. During this stage the American Army, having gained experience, won its first successes. The third stage, in 1814, was marked by the constant arrival in North America of British regulars and naval reinforcements, which enabled the enemy to raid the North American coast almost at will and to take the offensive in several quarters. At the same time, in this final stage of the war American forces fought their best fights and won their most brilliant victories.

On the same day Prevost sailed against Sacket’s Harbor, General Dearborn at the western end of Lake Ontario was invading Canada with an army of 4,000 men. The operation began with a well-executed and stubbornly resisted amphibious assault led by Col. Winfield Scott and Comdr. [[Oliver Hazard Perry]], U.S. Navy, with Chauncey’s fleet providing fire support. Outnumbered by more than two to one, the British retreated, abandoning Fort George and Queenston to the Americans.  An immediate pursuit might have sealed the victory; but Dearborn, after occupying Fort George, waited several days and then sent about 2,000 men after the enemy. The detachment advanced to within ten miles of the British and camped for the night with slight regard for security and even less for the enemy’s audacity. During the night a force of about 700 British soldiers attacked the camp and thoroughly routed the Americans. Dearborn withdrew his entire army to Fort George. About two weeks later, a 500-man detachment ventured fifteen miles outside the fort and, when attacked, surrendered to a force of British and Indians that was half as large. After these reverses there was no further action of consequence on the Niagara front for the remainder of the year. Dearborn, again incapacitated by illness, resigned his commission in early July. Both armies were hard hit by disease, and the American forces were further reduced by the renewal of the war in the west and by an attempt against Montreal.  

On the same day Prevost sailed against Sacket’s Harbor, General Dearborn at the western end of Lake Ontario was invading Canada with an army of 4,000 men. The operation began with a well-executed and stubbornly resisted amphibious assault led by Col. Winfield Scott and Comdr. [[Oliver Hazard Perry]], U.S. Navy, with Chauncey’s fleet providing fire support. Outnumbered by more than two to one, the British retreated, abandoning Fort George and Queenston to the Americans.  An immediate pursuit might have sealed the victory; but Dearborn, after occupying Fort George, waited several days and then sent about 2,000 men after the enemy. The detachment advanced to within ten miles of the British and camped for the night with slight regard for security and even less for the enemy’s audacity. During the night a force of about 700 British soldiers attacked the camp and thoroughly routed the Americans. Dearborn withdrew his entire army to Fort George. About two weeks later, a 500-man detachment ventured fifteen miles outside the fort and, when attacked, surrendered to a force of British and Indians that was half as large. After these reverses there was no further action of consequence on the Niagara front for the remainder of the year. Dearborn, again incapacitated by illness, resigned his commission in early July. Both armies were hard hit by disease, and the American forces were further reduced by the renewal of the war in the west and by an attempt against Montreal.  

        

        

Hull’s disaster at Detroit in 1812 and Harrison’s unsuccessful winter campaign had clearly shown that any offensive action in that quarter depended upon first gaining control of Lake Erie. Commander Perry had been assigned the task of building a fleet and seizing control of the lake. Throughout the spring and summer of 1813, except for the time he had joined Dearborn’s force, the 27-year-old Perry had been busy at Presque Isle assembling his fl eet, guns, and crews. By the beginning of August his force was superior to that of the British in every respect except long-range armament. Sailing up the lake, he anchored in Put-in-Bay, near the line still held by General Harrison in the vicinity of Forts Meigs and Stephenson. There, on September 10 Perry met the British Fleet, defeated it, and gained control of Lake Erie.  

Hull’s disaster at Detroit in 1812 and Harrison’s unsuccessful winter campaign had clearly shown that any offensive action in that quarter depended upon first gaining control of Lake Erie. Commander Perry had been assigned the task of building a fleet and seizing control of the lake. Throughout the spring and summer of 1813, except for the time he had joined Dearborn’s force, the 27-year-old Perry had been busy at Presque Isle assembling his fleet, guns, and crews. By the beginning of August his force was superior to that of the British in every respect except long-range armament. Sailing up the lake, he anchored in Put-in-Bay, near the line still held by General Harrison in the vicinity of Forts Meigs and Stephenson. There, on September 10 Perry met the British Fleet, defeated it, and gained control of Lake Erie.  

        

        

As soon as the damage to Perry’s ships and the captured British vessels had been repaired, Harrison embarked his army and sailed against Fort Malden. A regiment of mounted Kentucky rifl emen under Col. Richard M. Johnson moved along the shore of the lake toward Detroit. Vastly outnumbered on land and now open to attack from the water, the British abandoned both Forts Malden and Detroit and retreated eastward. Leaving a detachment to garrison the forts, Harrison set out after the enemy with the Kentucky cavalry regiments, five brigades of Kentucky volunteers, and a part of the 27th Infantry, a force of about 3,500 men. On October 5 he made contact with the British on the banks of the Thames River about eighty-five miles from Malden.  The enemy numbered about 2,900, of whom about 900 were British regulars and the remainder Indians under Tecumseh. Instead of attacking with infantry in the traditional line-against-line fashion, Harrison ordered a mounted attack. The maneuver succeeded completely. Unable to withstand the charging Kentuckians, the British surrendered in droves. The Indians were routed; Tecumseh, who had brought so much trouble to the western frontier, was killed. Among those who distinguished themselves that day was Commander Perry, who rode in the front rank of Johnson’s charge.  

As soon as the damage to Perry’s ships and the captured British vessels had been repaired, Harrison embarked his army and sailed against Fort Malden. A regiment of mounted Kentucky rifl emen under Col. Richard M. Johnson moved along the shore of the lake toward Detroit. Vastly outnumbered on land and now open to attack from the water, the British abandoned both Forts Malden and Detroit and retreated eastward. Leaving a detachment to garrison the forts, Harrison set out after the enemy with the Kentucky cavalry regiments, five brigades of Kentucky volunteers, and a part of the 27th Infantry, a force of about 3,500 men. On October 5 he made contact with the British on the banks of the Thames River about eighty-five miles from Malden.  The enemy numbered about 2,900, of whom about 900 were British regulars and the remainder Indians under Tecumseh. Instead of attacking with infantry in the traditional line-against-line fashion, Harrison ordered a mounted attack. The maneuver succeeded completely. Unable to withstand the charging Kentuckians, the British surrendered in droves. The Indians were routed; Tecumseh, who had brought so much trouble to the western frontier, was killed. Among those who distinguished themselves that day was Commander Perry, who rode in the front rank of Johnson’s charge.  

        

        

The much-maligned militia performed, on the whole, as well and as poorly as the Regular Army. The defeats and humiliations of the regular forces during the first years of the war matched those of the militia, just as in a later period the Kentucky volunteers at the Thames and the Maryland militia before Baltimore proved that the state citizen-soldier could perform well. The keys to the militiamen’s performance, of course, were training and leadership, the two areas over which the national government had little control. The militia, occasionally competent, was never dependable; though in relationship to the regulars its record was comparable. However, in the nationalistic period that followed the war, when the exploits of the regulars were justly celebrated, an ardent young Secretary of War, John Calhoun, would be able to convince Congress and the nation that the first line of American defense should be a standing army.  

The much-maligned militia performed, on the whole, as well and as poorly as the Regular Army. The defeats and humiliations of the regular forces during the first years of the war matched those of the militia, just as in a later period the Kentucky volunteers at the Thames and the Maryland militia before Baltimore proved that the state citizen-soldier could perform well. The keys to the militiamen’s performance, of course, were training and leadership, the two areas over which the national government had little control. The militia, occasionally competent, was never dependable; though in relationship to the regulars its record was comparable. However, in the nationalistic period that followed the war, when the exploits of the regulars were justly celebrated, an ardent young Secretary of War, John Calhoun, would be able to convince Congress and the nation that the first line of American defense should be a standing army.  

 

==Bibliography==

==Bibliography==