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Ed: you're missing Hume's point a bit -
:Even if non-materialist forces can be causes (which I agree with), they are still important causes. For example, if I decided to have a hamburger for lunch, I may be influenced by the smell (external) and a series of previous events (including my past experiences) from the start of creation. Some of that would be my reflection on what I like, and would be non-physical, but it is still a causal line from the moment of creation. To me, that would argue for a deterministic outlook, because the non-physical causes would still be considered causally related. Personally, I have no problem with that as a compatiblist, but I really don't understand any real way for us to have thoughts that aren't "caused" one way or another. I don't think that Hume was, in terms of philosophy of mind, a materialist, so I think this could also fit in with his arguments. [[User:Sulli|Sulli]] 13:26, 8 December 2008 (EST)
:Even if non-materialist forces can be causes (which I agree with), they are still important causes. For example, if I decided to have a hamburger for lunch, I may be influenced by the smell (external) and a series of previous events (including my past experiences) from the start of creation. Some of that would be my reflection on what I like, and would be non-physical, but it is still a causal line from the moment of creation. To me, that would argue for a deterministic outlook, because the non-physical causes would still be considered causally related. Personally, I have no problem with that as a compatiblist, but I really don't understand any real way for us to have thoughts that aren't "caused" one way or another. I don't think that Hume was, in terms of philosophy of mind, a materialist, so I think this could also fit in with his arguments. [[User:Sulli|Sulli]] 13:26, 8 December 2008 (EST)
:Ed, you misunderstand Hume's argument. This particular error is quite common, as elsewhere Hume argues against, e.g., the possibility of miraculous events. That said: Hume is not a physicalist in the modern sense used by philosophers of mind. The dichotomy is this: Either some event is caused or it is not. This isn't a false dilemma (what I think you mean by "fallacy of the excluded middle"; the excluded middle is just the Aristotelian term for the claim "either P is true or it is false") -- it is, as far as I at least can tell, a tautology. This event is what we'll call a "choice". Now, if the choice is caused, it is determined, because for P to cause Q, if P were to happen, Q must follow (this is basic Lewisian counterfactual causation). That's what "caused" means. The other option is, of course, that the event is uncaused. But for something to be uncaused is for it to be random.
:The only way to attack Hume here is on the nature of causation. You claim, without support, that Hume's problem is a materialist one, but this is just not the case. Even if what "causes" our choices is our willing, if there's a genuine causal relationship, there's no freedom in our willing. It's a nasty little problem indeed. The best way out is probably a quasi-Aristotelian move to posit that each free individual is an uncaused causer, but there are some severe problems there that I'm sure you can see. [[User:StevenK|StevenK]] 18:47, 8 December 2008 (EST)