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==The Duelfer Report==

==The Duelfer Report==

In 2004, the [[Iraq Survey Group]] released what has been called the [[Duelfer Report]].  According to the Duelfer Report half of the picture rests with entities outside Iraq.  In Saddam’s efforts to influence United Nations Security Council  members, namely Russia, France, and China to end sanctions, Saddam’s ordered the Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to formulate and implement a strategy aimed at these Security Council members and international public opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions and undermining its subsequent Oil For Food program by diplomatic and economic means.  Saddam also made use of “Protocols” or government-to-government economic trade agreements to generate a large amount of revenue outside the purview of the UN.  The success emboldened Saddam to pursue his reconstitution efforts of conventional, dual-use, and WMD-related programs starting in 1997.<ref>Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 9 (pdf)</ref>

In 2004, the [[Iraq Survey Group]], ISG, whose intelligence analysts are managed by Charles Duelfer, a former State Department official and deputy chief of the U.N.-led arms-inspection teams, released what has been called the [[Duelfer Report]]. The ISG found "hundreds of cases of activities that were prohibited" under U.N. Security Council resolutions, a senior administration official was quoted as saying. <ref> http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=38213 </ref> <b>Both Duelfer and his predecessor, David Kay, reported to Congress that the evidence they had found on the ground in Iraq showed Saddam's regime was in "material violation" of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441,</b> the last of 17 resolutions that promised "serious consequences" if Iraq did not make a complete disclosure of its weapons programs and dismantle them in a verifiable manner.  The United States cited Iraq's refusal to comply with these demands as one justification for going to war.

 

 

Both Duelfer and Kay found Iraq had "a clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses with equipment that was suitable to continuing its prohibited chemical- and biological-weapons [BW] programs," the official said. "They found a prison laboratory where we suspect they tested biological weapons on human subjects." "Reference strains" of a wide variety of biological-weapons agents were found beneath the sink in the home of a prominent Iraqi BW scientist. "We thought it was a big deal," a senior administration official said. "But it has been written off [by the press] as a sort of 'starter set.'" They found equipment for "uranium-enrichment centrifuges" whose only plausible use was as part of a clandestine nuclear-weapons program. In all these cases, "Iraqi scientists had been told before the war not to declare their activities to the U.N. inspectors," the official said.

 

 

How did this happen? According to the Duelfer Report half of the picture rests with entities outside Iraq.  In Saddam’s efforts to influence United Nations Security Council  members, namely Russia, France, and China to end sanctions, Saddam’s ordered the Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to formulate and implement a strategy aimed at these Security Council members and international public opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions and undermining its subsequent Oil For Food program by diplomatic and economic means.  Saddam also made use of “Protocols” or government-to-government economic trade agreements to generate a large amount of revenue outside the purview of the UN.  The success emboldened Saddam to pursue his reconstitution efforts of conventional, dual-use, and WMD-related programs starting in 1997.<ref>Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 9 (pdf)</ref>

The Regime’s authorities devised front companies that had close relationships with foreign government officials who worked to procure illicit goods, services, and technologies for Iraq’s WMD-related, conventional arms, and/or dual-use goods programs. Saddam used the ''Mukhabarat'', or Iraqi Intelligence Servise (IIS) to  facilitate importation of UN sanctioned and dual-use goods through Syria, Jordan, Belarus, Turkey and others.  Numerous foreign trade intermediaries disguised illicit items, hid the identity of the end user, and/or changed the final destination of the item to move it to the region. For a cut of the profits they smuggled prohibited items to entry points along the Iraqi border.  Companies in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen assisted Saddam with the acquisition of prohibited items through deceptive trade practices. In the case of Syria and Yemen, this included support from agencies or personnel within the government itself.

The Regime’s authorities devised front companies that had close relationships with foreign government officials who worked to procure illicit goods, services, and technologies for Iraq’s WMD-related, conventional arms, and/or dual-use goods programs. Saddam used the ''Mukhabarat'', or Iraqi Intelligence Servise (IIS) to  facilitate importation of UN sanctioned and dual-use goods through Syria, Jordan, Belarus, Turkey and others.  Numerous foreign trade intermediaries disguised illicit items, hid the identity of the end user, and/or changed the final destination of the item to move it to the region. For a cut of the profits they smuggled prohibited items to entry points along the Iraqi border.  Companies in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen assisted Saddam with the acquisition of prohibited items through deceptive trade practices. In the case of Syria and Yemen, this included support from agencies or personnel within the government itself.