Changes

::::Of course the North Vietnamese wanted to overthrow the South.  That's patently obvious and quite beside the point.  Johnson wanted an clear attack against ''American'' forces which would allow him to escalate operations and give him political capital.  The left-wing view is that Johnson was convinced the attacks were real and was forced by necessity, thus absolving him of blame or responsibility. [[User:RodWeathers|- Rod Weathers]] 12:57, 15 January 2009 (EST)

::::Of course the North Vietnamese wanted to overthrow the South.  That's patently obvious and quite beside the point.  Johnson wanted an clear attack against ''American'' forces which would allow him to escalate operations and give him political capital.  The left-wing view is that Johnson was convinced the attacks were real and was forced by necessity, thus absolving him of blame or responsibility. [[User:RodWeathers|- Rod Weathers]] 12:57, 15 January 2009 (EST)

::No. Better read the biography by Dallek (2004):

::No. Better read the biography by Dallek (2004):

:::"George Ball and Senator J. William Fulbright later said that the stepped up operations in July and August were meant to provoke Hanoi into a response that would allow the United States to begin air attacks on North Vietnam. Fulbright, in fact, held this view at the time of the attack. In a telephone conversation on the morning of August 3, Fulbright told Ball  

:::"George Ball and Senator J. William Fulbright later said that the stepped up operations in July and August were meant to provoke Hanoi into a response that would allow the United States to begin air attacks on North Vietnam. Fulbright, in fact, held this view at the time of the attack. In a telephone conversation on the morning of August 3, Fulbright told Ball that “he was a little suspicious and thought probably that the incident was asked for.”  

that “he was a little suspicious and thought probably that the incident was asked for.”  

:::"But McNamara and Bundy dispute that. MacNamara told his biographer Deborah Shapley: “I don't believe that the president, or I, or Dean Rusk, or Mac Bundy were planning, in the sense of anticipating or embarking upon ‘overt war’ with North Vietnam in 1964. I know that the president didn't intend ‘overt war’ and I didn't intend ‘overt war’ in 1964. Johnson didn't have plans for military action other than to continue on as we were.” Likewise, Bundy told Shapley, Johnson “didn't want to take decisions on this issue in an election year.”  

:::"But McNamara and Bundy dispute that. MacNamara told his biographer Deborah Shapley: “I don't believe that the president, or I, or Dean Rusk, or Mac Bundy were planning, in the sense of anticipating or embarking upon ‘overt war’ with North Vietnam in 1964. I know that the president didn't intend ‘overt war’ and I didn't intend ‘overt war’ in 1964. Johnson didn't have plans for military action other than to continue on as we were.” Likewise, Bundy told Shapley, Johnson “didn't want to take decisions on this issue in an election year.”  

:::"Johnson's response to the August 2 attack in the Gulf bears out the MacNamara and Bundy assertions. Though Johnson was determined to show Hanoi that the United States would not be intimidated, his initial impulse was to play down the incident and keep it from escalating into a confrontation that would agitate unwanted questions about military action during the presidential campaign." [end of Dallek quote] [[User:RJJensen|RJJensen]] 13:03, 15 January 2009 (EST)

:::"Johnson's response to the August 2 attack in the Gulf bears out the MacNamara and Bundy assertions. Though Johnson was determined to show Hanoi that the United States would not be intimidated, his initial impulse was to play down the incident and keep it from escalating into a confrontation that would agitate unwanted questions about military action during the presidential campaign." [end of Dallek quote] [[User:RJJensen|RJJensen]] 13:03, 15 January 2009 (EST)

:::: I have read Dallek's biog., and have it 3 feet from me on my shelf.  He routinely interprets equivocal evidence in Johnson's favor, not surprising given the standard biographer's bias, and Dallek's firm emplacement in the post-revisionist historiographical school.  Yet even he notes that it was deceitful to the public.  Note page 179 (presuming you have the single-volume version): "At the same time Johnson authorized air strikes against North Vietnam and won an endorsement from Congress over an incident he knew was in doubt, he also misled the public about American actions in the gulf.  In describing Hanoi's attacks as deliberate, unprovoked aggression, he was conveniently omitting the 34-A operations, which CIA director McCone had told him were the basis of North Vietnam's attacks." [[User:RodWeathers|- Rod Weathers]] 13:25, 15 January 2009 (EST)

:::: I have read Dallek's biog., and have it 3 feet from me on my shelf.  He routinely interprets equivocal evidence in Johnson's favor, not surprising given the standard biographer's bias, and Dallek's firm emplacement in the post-revisionist historiographical school.  Yet even he notes that it was deceitful to the public.  Note page 179 (presuming you have the single-volume version): "At the same time Johnson authorized air strikes against North Vietnam and won an endorsement from Congress over an incident he knew was in doubt, he also misled the public about American actions in the gulf.  In describing Hanoi's attacks as deliberate, unprovoked aggression, he was conveniently omitting the 34-A operations, which CIA director McCone had told him were the basis of North Vietnam's attacks." [[User:RodWeathers|- Rod Weathers]] 13:25, 15 January 2009 (EST)

:::::the standard conservative history is ''Triumph Forsdaken'' (2006) by Mark Moyer (a professor at Marine Corps University). His chapter 14 covers the Gulf of Tonkin episode, in which he states that the Communists deliberately made an unprovoked attack on the USS Maddox, and then apparently made a second attack on Aug 4. The Navy and the Joint Chiefs repored to Johnson that there was a second attack. Only months later did reanalysis show that there probably was no second attack. LBY and his top advisors formly believed there had been two attacks (actually there was only one). Moyar concludes that LBJ tried to minimize the attacks and did not want them discussed in the campaign because that would lead the public to demand more hawkish (Goldwaterish) responses. The 34-A operations were by South Vietnam, not the US. [[User:RJJensen|RJJensen]] 14:24, 15 January 2009 (EST)

:::::the standard conservative history is ''Triumph Forsdaken'' (2006) by Mark Moyer (a professor at Marine Corps University). His chapter 14 covers the Gulf of Tonkin episode, in which he states that the Communists deliberately made an unprovoked attack on the USS Maddox, and then apparently made a second attack on Aug 4. The Navy and the Joint Chiefs repored to Johnson that there was a second attack. Only months later did reanalysis show that there probably was no second attack. LBY and his top advisors formly believed there had been two attacks (actually there was only one). Moyar concludes that LBJ tried to minimize the attacks and did not want them discussed in the campaign because that would lead the public to demand more hawkish (Goldwaterish) responses. The 34-A operations were by South Vietnam, not the US. [[User:RJJensen|RJJensen]] 14:24, 15 January 2009 (EST)