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conservative perspective: LBJ underestimated and downplayed the danger
::::::::::::There's no way around the fact that LBJ immediately whipped the public and Congress into a fervor by exaggerating the Gulf of Tonkin incident, for LBJ's enormous political benefit. Every historical account -- except perhaps Moyar -- seem to agree about the exaggeration. To go on national television as LBJ did, and then obtain the extraordinary congressional approval, ranks almost as high as the day after Pearl Harbor. That LBJ, the master of "The Treatment," obtain Goldwater's approval for this is of little significance.--[[User:Aschlafly|Andy Schlafly]] 09:06, 16 January 2009 (EST)
::::::::::::There's no way around the fact that LBJ immediately whipped the public and Congress into a fervor by exaggerating the Gulf of Tonkin incident, for LBJ's enormous political benefit. Every historical account -- except perhaps Moyar -- seem to agree about the exaggeration. To go on national television as LBJ did, and then obtain the extraordinary congressional approval, ranks almost as high as the day after Pearl Harbor. That LBJ, the master of "The Treatment," obtain Goldwater's approval for this is of little significance.--[[User:Aschlafly|Andy Schlafly]] 09:06, 16 January 2009 (EST)
:::::::::::::Moyar argues very convincingly that LBJ systematically downplayed the attack on the US Navy and the entire Red threat at this time; he rejected his military advice and insisted on hiding the critisis as much as possible. That. Moyar argues, caused him to lose the war. Looking at the newspapers, you notice that the issue simply vanished in a few days. [[User:RJJensen|RJJensen]] 11:10, 16 January 2009 (EST)