Changes

::In my view, a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among the "unalienable Rights" with which the Declaration of Independence proclaims "all Men ... are endowed by their Creator." And in my view that right is also among the "other [rights] retained by the people" which the Ninth Amendment says the Constitution's enumeration of rights "shall not be construed to deny or disparage." The Declaration of Independence, however, is not a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts; and the Constitution's refusal to "deny or disparage" other rights is far removed from affirming any one of them, and even farther removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might be, and to enforce the judges' list against laws duly enacted by the people. Consequently, while I would think it entirely compatible with the commitment to representative democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns, that the state has no power to interfere with parents' authority over the rearing of their children, I do not believe that the power which the Constitution confers upon me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my view) infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right.

::In my view, a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among the "unalienable Rights" with which the Declaration of Independence proclaims "all Men ... are endowed by their Creator." And in my view that right is also among the "other [rights] retained by the people" which the Ninth Amendment says the Constitution's enumeration of rights "shall not be construed to deny or disparage." The Declaration of Independence, however, is not a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts; and the Constitution's refusal to "deny or disparage" other rights is far removed from affirming any one of them, and even farther removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might be, and to enforce the judges' list against laws duly enacted by the people. Consequently, while I would think it entirely compatible with the commitment to representative democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns, that the state has no power to interfere with parents' authority over the rearing of their children, I do not believe that the power which the Constitution confers upon me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my view) infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right.

::Only three holdings of this Court rest in whole or in part upon a substantive constitutional right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children 1 -- two of them from an era rich in substantive due process holdings that have since been repudiated. ''See'' ''[[Meyer v. Nebraska]]'', 262 U.S. 390'', 399, 401, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923);'' Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925); ''Wisconsin v. Yoder'', 406 U.S. 205, 232-233, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972). ''Cf.'' ''West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish'', 300 U.S. 379, 81 L. Ed. 703, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937) (overruling ''Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D.C.'', 261 U.S. 525, 67 L. Ed. 785, 43 S. Ct. 394 (1923)). The sheer diversity of today's opinions persuades me that the theory of unenumerated parental rights underlying these three cases has small claim to stare decisis protection. A legal principle that can be thought to produce such diverse outcomes in the relatively simple case before us here is not a legal principle that has induced substantial reliance. While I would not now overrule those earlier cases (that has not been urged), neither would I extend the theory upon which they rested to this new context.

::Only three holdings of this Court rest in whole or in part upon a substantive constitutional right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children 1 -- two of them from an era rich in substantive due process holdings that have since been repudiated. ''See'' ''[[Meyer v. Nebraska]]'', 262 U.S. 390'', 399, 401, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923);'' Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925); ''Wisconsin v. Yoder'', 406 U.S. 205, 232-233, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972). ''Cf.'' ''West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish'', 300 U.S. 379, 81 L. Ed. 703, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937) (overruling ''[[Adkins v. Children's Hospital|Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D.C.]]'', 261 U.S. 525, 67 L. Ed. 785, 43 S. Ct. 394 (1923)). The sheer diversity of today's opinions persuades me that the theory of unenumerated parental rights underlying these three cases has small claim to stare decisis protection. A legal principle that can be thought to produce such diverse outcomes in the relatively simple case before us here is not a legal principle that has induced substantial reliance. While I would not now overrule those earlier cases (that has not been urged), neither would I extend the theory upon which they rested to this new context.

*In ''United States v. Carlton'', 512 U.S. 26, 40-41 (1994), Justice Scalia concurred separately and added this paragraph (joined by Justice Thomas):

*In ''United States v. Carlton'', 512 U.S. 26, 40-41 (1994), Justice Scalia concurred separately and added this paragraph (joined by Justice Thomas):