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The Luftwaffe used its aircraft in a strategic manner in the early campaigns in Poland and France in 1939-40.  

The Luftwaffe used its aircraft in a strategic manner in the early campaigns in Poland and France in 1939-40.  

==Battle of Britain: 1940==

==Battle of Britain: 1940==

The [[Battle of Britain]], August to September. 1940, was fought for air supremacy over Britain. Hitler wanted to threaten an invasion, but with a weak navy he could not counter the Royal Navy unless the Luftwaffe defeated the RAF.<ref>An invasion was unlikely; over a third of the days were bad flying weather that grounded most flights. On those days the Royal Navy battleships could plow through the storms and sink the entire invasion fleet.</ref> The Luftwaffe used 1300 medium bombers guarded by 900 fighters; they made 1500 sorties a day from bases in France, Belgium and Norway.  The RAF had 650 fighters, with more coming out of the factories every day. Thanks to its new radar system, the British knew where the Germans were, and could concentrate their counterattacks.  The Germans used their strategic bombing doctrine to focus on RAF airfields and radar stations.  After the RAF bomber forces (quite separate from the fighter forces) attacked Berlin and other cities, Hitler swore revenge and diverted the Luftwaffe to attacks on London.  The success the Luftwaffe was having in rapidly wearing down the RAF was squandered, as the civilians being hit were far less critical than the airfields and radar stations that were now ignored.<ref> Civilian deaths were 300 to 600 a day, plus 1000 to 3000 injured.  London was not a factory city and aircraft production  went up.</ref> The last German daylight raid was September 30; the Luftwaffe was taking unacceptable losses and broke off the attack; occasional blitz raids hit London and other cities from time to time before May 1941, killing some 43,000 civilians. The Luftwaffe lost 1733 planes, the British, 915. The British showed more determination, better radar, and better ground control, while the Germans violated their own doctrine with wasted attacks on London.

The [[Battle of Britain]], August to September. 1940, was fought for air supremacy over Britain. Hitler wanted to threaten an invasion, but with a weak navy he could not counter the [[Royal Navy]] unless the Luftwaffe defeated the RAF.<ref>An invasion was unlikely; over a third of the days were bad flying weather that grounded most flights. On those days the Royal Navy battleships could plow through the storms and sink the entire invasion fleet.</ref> The Luftwaffe used 1300 medium bombers guarded by 900 fighters; they made 1500 sorties a day from bases in France, Belgium and Norway.  The RAF had 650 fighters, with more coming out of the factories every day. Thanks to its new radar system, the British knew where the Germans were, and could concentrate their counterattacks.  The Germans used their strategic bombing doctrine to focus on RAF airfields and radar stations.  After the RAF bomber forces (quite separate from the fighter forces) attacked Berlin and other cities, Hitler swore revenge and diverted the Luftwaffe to attacks on [[London]].  The success the Luftwaffe was having in rapidly wearing down the RAF was squandered, as the civilians being hit were far less critical than the airfields and radar stations that were now ignored.<ref> Civilian deaths were 300 to 600 a day, plus 1000 to 3000 injured.  London was not a factory city and aircraft production  went up.</ref> The last German daylight raid was September 30; the Luftwaffe was taking unacceptable losses and broke off the attack; occasional blitz raids hit London and other cities from time to time before May 1941, killing some 43,000 civilians. The Luftwaffe lost 1733 planes, the British, 915. The British showed more determination, better radar, and better ground control, while the Germans violated their own doctrine with wasted attacks on London.

The British surprised the Germans with their high quality airplanes; flying close to home bases where they could refuel, and using [[radar]] as part of an integrated air defense system, they had a significant advantage over German planes operating at long range. The Hawker Hurricane fighter plane played a vital role for the Royal Air Force (RAF) in winning the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940. A fast, heavily armed monoplane that went into service in 1937, the Hurricane was effective against both German fighters and bombers and accounted for 70-75% of German losses during the battle.  The Germans immediately pulled out their Stukas, which were so slow they were child's play for the Hurricanes and Spitfires. The Battle of Britain showed the world that Hitler's vaunted war machine could be defeated.

The British surprised the Germans with their high quality airplanes; flying close to home bases where they could refuel, and using [[radar]] as part of an integrated air defense system, they had a significant advantage over German planes operating at long range. The [[Hawker Hurricane]] fighter plane played a vital role for the Royal Air Force (RAF) in winning the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940. A fast, heavily armed monoplane that went into service in 1937, the Hurricane was effective against both German fighters and bombers and accounted for 70-75% of German losses during the battle.  The Germans immediately pulled out their Stukas, which were so slow they were child's play for the Hurricanes and Spitfires. The Battle of Britain showed the world that Hitler's vaunted war machine could be defeated.

===Navigation===

===Navigation===

The first system of radio guidance used by the Luftwaffe was the Knickebein or System K, operational in 1938. With it, ground controllers could direct bombers to targets at night and in all kinds of weather. Thirteen [[Knickebein]] transmitters were eventually built in the west, six in France. System K was expanded by the addition of [[X-Gerät]], a system of automatic bombardment. This was followed by System [[Y-Gerät]] (Wotan II). British countermeasures forced the Germans to discontinue the offensive use of the system but they used the Y-Gerät until the invasion of Normandy.  

The first system of radio guidance used by the Luftwaffe was the Knickebein or System K, operational in 1938. With it, ground controllers could direct bombers to targets at night and in all kinds of weather. Thirteen [[Knickebein]] transmitters were eventually built in the west, six in France. System K was expanded by the addition of [[X-Gerät]], a system of automatic bombardment. This was followed by System [[Y-Gerät]] (Wotan II). British countermeasures forced the Germans to discontinue the offensive use of the system but they used the Y-Gerät until the invasion of Normandy.  

After the war, much German radio-navigation technology was adopted for military and civilian purposes.<ref>Jean-François Salles, "Organisation des Systemes de Radionavigation de la Luftwaffe en Normandie en 1944," [The Organization of the Radio Navigation Systems of the Luftwaffe in Normandy in 1944]. ''Revue Historique des Armées'' 1995 (1): 77-88. Issn: 0035-3299  </ref>

After the war, much German radio-navigation technology was adopted for military and civilian purposes.<ref>Jean-François Salles, "Organisation des Systemes de Radionavigation de la Luftwaffe en Normandie en 1944," [The Organization of the Radio Navigation Systems of the Luftwaffe in Normandy in 1944]. ''Revue Historique des Armées'' 1995 (1): 77-88. Issn: 0035-3299  </ref>

==Hitler's mistakes==

==Hitler's mistakes==

After the failure of the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe failed to mount a major strategic air campaign, not because of the lack of strategic air doctrine or theory but because of the failure to produce an effective heavy bomber, the failure to train enough pilots for a war of attrition, and the failure of the high command to utilize the Luftwaffe in the most effective manner.  Göring met Hitler often; they talked of Nazi party affairs. The Luftwaffe was unaware of Hitler's strategic plans and was unable to prepare accordingly. Hitler's interference sabotaged the jet planes the Germans had invented.  Hitler made strategy without realizing how progressively weaker his air power was becoming or how rapidly the Allies were building up theirs, and he put increasing faith in secret weapons (especially the V-1 and V-2) that were too inaccurate to be of much value.<ref>R. J. Overy, "Hitler and Air Strategy," ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 1980 15(3): 405-421.  </ref>

After the failure of the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe failed to mount a major strategic air campaign, not because of the lack of strategic air doctrine or theory but because of the failure to produce an effective heavy bomber, the failure to train enough pilots for a war of attrition, and the failure of the high command to utilize the Luftwaffe in the most effective manner.  Göring met Hitler often; they talked of Nazi party affairs. The Luftwaffe was unaware of Hitler's strategic plans and was unable to prepare accordingly. Hitler's interference sabotaged the jet planes the Germans had invented.  Hitler made strategy without realizing how progressively weaker his air power was becoming or how rapidly the Allies were building up theirs, and he put increasing faith in secret weapons (especially the V-1 and V-2) that were too inaccurate to be of much value.<ref>R. J. Overy, "Hitler and Air Strategy," ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 1980 15(3): 405-421.  </ref>